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Since the 1950's, the willful and malicious damage by 
young vandals to school property has cost taxpayers hundreds 
of millions of dollars each year. Dwindling educational 
budgets have had to include the ever-growing expense re-
quired to repair or replace school property, as well as to 
cover the hidden costs of increased security devices and 
personnel. Through the years, the public has demanded that 
parents of vandals bear at least some of the financial re-
sponsibility for their children's destructive acts. As a 
result, forty-nine state legislatures have passed parental 
responsibility laws which place no-fault or vicarious lia-
bility on parents of children who damage property. 
It was the primary purpose of this study to provide 
pertinent information to educators who might bring suit 
against parents of vandals in order to defray the costs of 
vandalism and to reduce the number of such incidents. State 
statutes were analyzed and selected court cases were re-
viewed for the issues which they presented. Selected findings 
of congressional sub-committees were also given concerning 
factors of vandalism and suggested strategies school officials 
might employ. 
Several questions were posed in the introductory chap-
ter. One major question involved the constitutional challenge 
to the parental liability statutes of different states since 
the late 1950's. Another vital question that the study 
addressed concerned the arguments for and against having 
no-fault liability for parents of vandals. Also, the question 
of statutory law requirements for parental liability versus 
common law was considered. 
Based upon the review of the literature, an analysis of 
parental liability statutes, and a review of court cases, 
certain conclusions and recommendations were made. One 
specific conclusion was that despite the many challenges in 
state courts, the parental responsibility laws have almost 
always been upheld as constitutional. Also, it was con-
cluded that since the statutes are in derogation to common 
law and must be strictly construed, the statutes need to be 
reviewed and revised periodically. One major recommendation 
for school officials was for them to become informed about 
the school-related factors that have been shown to reduce 
incidents of student vandalism. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Vandalism has been a very costly and disruptive influ-
ence in this nation's public schools for at least the past 
thirty years. Since the 1950's, the media has frequently 
reported on school crime and the public has become more 
1 
aware and alarmed about the amount of vandalism occurring in 
schools. Even administrators and teachers, who were generally 
reluctant at first to share such information with the public, 
have expressed serious concern regarding the willful and wan-
ton destruction of school property. As a result of media 
coverage, reports of congressional committees, and reports 
from educators themselves, the public has learned that vanda-
lism is definitely a national problem. They have come to 
learn, too, that vandalism has had a negative impact on pub-
lic schools, and that it continues to present staggering 
costs to already strained educational budgets. 
Much of the literature concerned with vandalism has 
focused on the various factors which cause this particular 
type of school crime, on the extent to which vandalism occurs 
in public schools, and on the preventive measures that have 
been taken to reduce such destructive acts. As this study 
shows, vandalism has been examined from a variety of per-
spectives, but it is a problem that continues to challenge 
2 
educators seeking to provide a safe environment for their 
students and for themselves. With public awareness of van-
dalism, however, has come some public support for the efforts 
of school administrators combatting vandalism and its effects. 
One means of such support has been through the passage 
of parental responsibility statutes by almost all of the state 
legislatures. This study examines these state statutes and 
the court cases that have resulted from issues concerning the 
vicarious liability of parents for the destruction of property 
by their children. The major purpose of this study, then, is 
to provide educators with pertinent information concerning the 
legal aspects of parental responsibility laws. This informa-
tion should enable public school officials to decide whether 
such statutory law offers a feasible means for obtaining com-
pensatory damages and for reducing the number of incidents of 
vandalism. 
Statement of the Problem 
After three decades, school officials are still seeking 
effective means with which to reduce vandalism in public 
schools. The incidents and costs of destruction to school 
property have greatly increased from the 1950's until the 
present. During this time period, the public's attitude 
about who should pay for vandalism has come to focus on the 
parent whose child has purposefully damaged school property. 
Every state legislature except New Hampshire's has enacted 
statutory law known as parental responsibility laws. In 
addition, some states have also passed statutes pertaining to 
the specific destruction of school property. 
One means, then, for opposing vandalism has been for 
educators to seek compensation through the statutory laws 
that hold the parents financially responsible, at least to 
some extent, for the torts of their children. The parental 
liability statutes have provided officials with a means for 
obtaining a degree of financial relief from the cost of re-
pairing or replacing school property. However, some con-
troversial issues concerning these laws have emerged in 
specific court cases. For example, the constitutionality of 
some of these state statutes has been debated in several 
court cases. 
Questions to be Answered 
The purpose of this study is to review state statutes 
and court cases that involve vicarious liability of parents 
for the torts of their children in order to determine the 
extent to which the parental responsibility laws can be 
used to defray costs from and to serve as a deterrent to stu-
dent vandalism of school property. Below are listed key 
questions to be answered through this study. 
1. What states have passed statutes pertaining to the 
liability of parents for the willful and wanton destruction 
to property by their children? 
2. What states have specific statutes pertaining to 
the destruction of school property? 
3 
3. What were the intended purposes of the parental 
responsibility laws enacted by the state legislatures? 
4. Under what circumstances can parents be held liable 
for their children's torts according to comnon law as opposed 
to civil or statutory law? 
5. What are the pros and cons for having parents be 
vicariously liable for the torts of their children? 
6. Have the state statutes, commonly known as parental 
responsibility laws, withstood challenges to their consti-
tutionality? 
4 
7. Can parents utilize homeowner's insurance policies 
for financial relief for court-ordered payments of compensation 
for the torts of their children? 
8. Based on case law, what are the trends and directions 
for parental responsibility for student vandalism? 
Scope of the Study 
This is a descriptive study of the legal aspects of the 
state statutes that are referred to as the parental responsi-
bility laws. The research presents each of these statutes and 
also presents the specific statutes that refer to destruction 
of school property. The difference between the destruction 
incurred through careless or negligent acts of minors and those 
that are the result of willful and wanton acts is distinguished 
early in the study. Also, this study compares the issue of 
parental liability for the torts of the child according to 
common law versus statutory law. 
5 
After an analysis of the parental responsibility laws, 
court cases which have challenged their constitutionality are 
reviewed. In addition, major court cases which have involved 
aspects of the vicarious liability issue concerning the pa-
rent-child relationship are included in this study. These 
selected court cases that stem from statutory law have par-
ticular significance to school officials seeking means to 
reduce the increasing costs of vandalism to school property. 
Methods, Procedures, and Source of Information 
The basic research technique of this descriptive re-
search study was to examine the available references con-
cerning the legal aspects of the vicarious liability of 
parents for the torts of their children under statutory law. 
In order to determine if a·need existed for such 
research, Dissertation Abstracts was searched for this 
topic. A review of related literature was obtained through 
a computer search from the Educational Information Center 
(ERIC). In addition, general research summaries were 
sought in the Encyclopedia of Educational Research. 
Journal articles related to the topic were located 
through the aid of such sources as Reader's Guide to Peri-
odical Literature, Education Index, Index to Legal Periodicals, 
and the Current Law Index. Other information concerned with 
this topic was searched for in such selected books on school 
law as Newton Edwards' The Courts and the Public Schools: The 
Legal Basis of School Organization and Administration. The 
6 
Social Science Citations was another source for articles con-
cerned with the issue of parental responsibility for destru-
tive acts of minors. 
Each state's statutes were searched for statutory law 
which maintains that parents are liable for the torts of 
their children and for specific statutes pertaining to the 
destruction of school property. Federal and state court cases 
concerned with these statutes were located through use of the 
Corpus Juris Secundim, American Jurisprudence, the National 
Reporter System, and the American ?igest System. More recent 
court cases were located by examining case summaries contained 
in the 1983 and 1984 issues of the NOLPE School Law Reporter. 
All court cases were read and categorized according to the 
issues which are stated in the general literature review. 
Definition of the Terms 
The specific terms used in this study were found in 
Black's Law Dictionary and are defined below: 
Common law. As distinguished from law created by the 
enactment of legislatures, the common law comprises the body 
of those principles and rules of action, relating to the gov-
ernment and security of persons and property, which derive 
their authority solely from usages and customs of immemorial 
antiquity, or from the judgments and decrees of the courts 
recognizing, affirming, and enforcing such usages and customs; 
and, in this sense, particularly the ancient unwritten law of 
England. 
Liability created by statute. One depending for its 
existence on the enactment of a statute, and not on the con-
tract of the parties. One which would not exist but for the 
statute. 
7 
Liable. Bound or obliged in law or equity; responsible; 
chargeable; answerable; compellable to make satisfaction, 
compensation, or restitution. 
Malicious. Characterized by, or involving, malice; 
having, or done with, wicked or mischieveous intentions or 
motives; wrongful and done intentionally without just cause 
or excuse. 
Parental liability. By statutes in certain states, the 
parents may be held liable up to a specified amount for 
damages caused to property of others by their children if 
such damage is found to have resulted from negligent control 
of parent over acts of child. 
Vandalism. The willful and malicious destruction of 
property generally, and the destruction must have been inten-
tional or in such reckless and wanton disregard of rights of 
others as to be equivalent of intent, and malice may be in-
ferred from act of destruction. 
Vicarious liability. Indirect legal responsibility; for 
example, the liability of an employer for the acts of an em-
ployee, or a principal for torts and contracts of an agent. 
Tort. A private or civil wrong or injury other than 
breach of contract, for which the court will provide a remedy 
in the form of an action for damages. 
8 
Statutory law. That body of law created by acts of the 
legislature in contrast to law generated by judicial opinions 
and administrative bodies. 
Wanton. Reckless, heedless, malicious, characterized 
by extreme recklessness or foolhardiness; recklessly disre-
gardful of the rights or safety of others or of consequences. 
Police power. The power of the state to place restraints 
on the personal freedom and property rights of persons for the 
protection of the public safety, health, and morals or the 
promotion of the public convenience and general prosperity. 
The police power is subject to limitations of the federal and 
state constitutions, and especially to the requirements of due 
process. 
Willful. Premeditated; malicious, done with evil intent, 
or with a bad motive or purpose, or with indifference to the 
natural consequences; unlawful; without legal justification. 
Significance of the Study 
Since the 1950's, much of the literature about public 
schools has focused on the causes and effects of vandalism 
and the preventive strategies that school officials have used 
in their attempt to reduce the costly destruction of school 
property. It was in the 1950's that crime by youth generally 
increased in this society, and school crime itself was definitely 
a problem by the late 1950's and early 1960's. 1 During the 
1Rodger Bybee, Violence, Values, and Justice in the 
Schools (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1982), p. 101. 
9 
past thirty years, then, school officials have grappled with 
understanding the nature and extent of vandalism in the hope 
that this hydra-headed problem could be contained, if not 
completely eliminated. However, despite concentrated efforts 
to reduce vandalism, many public school systems have met with 
limited success. The costs of repairing and replacing school 
property because of vandalism continues to be a financial drain 
on educational budgets. 
According to the National Institute of Education's three-
part Safe School Study published in 1977, approximately 24,000 
of the nation's 84,000 public elementary and secondary schools 
(at least one out of every four schools) report some vandalism 
each month with an average of $81. 2 Added to this report is 
the estimate that around 8,000 schools (1 out of 10) are 
broken into each month with the average cost of a school bur-
glary being $183. 3 The rise in the number of school fires has 
been increasingly expensive, too. Arsonists caused 20,500 
fires or $87 million damages in schools during 1971 and these 
figures climbed in 1974 to result in at least $100 million in 
damages. 4 Estimates of the annual cost for the repair and 
replacement of public property were around $200 million in 
2National Institute of Education, Violent Schools-
Safe Schools (Washington, D.C.,: U.S. Department of Health 
Education, and Welfare, 1977), p. 4. 
3Ibid. 
4Joseph I. Grealy, "School Violence-What Can Be Done 
About It?" American School and University, 47 (June 1975): 
25. 
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1971 and were thought to be over $600 million in 1977. 5 
These figures do not include the hidden costs of addi-
tional security measures which public school systems must 
provide in their attempts to protect themselves against fur-
ther escalating costs of vandalism. In fact, while the Los 
Angeles County Schools reported a 56% increase between the 
1977-78 school year and the 1978-79 school year in the cost 
of repairing damages done by vandals, this same school sys-
tem also reported having to spend $10 million in 1979-80 
solely on the cost of security personnel. 6 Such combined 
costs that stem from the actual destruction of school property 
and the expense of providing security measures to prevent even 
further costs are staggering. The National Association of 
School Security Directors estimates that on a national basis 
school vandalism siphons more than $590 million from school 
education budgets. 7 This sum is more than the total amount 
spent on school textbooks in 1972. 8 
Actual costs from vandalism are difficult to obtain 
simply because there is "no uniform nationwide reporting 
system for school related crime and the accuracy of school 
5Peter C. Kratcoski, L. D. Kratcoski, and D. Peterson, 
"The Crisis of Vandalism in Our Schools," U.S.A. Today, 107 
(July 1978):15. 
6c. Roy Mayer and Thomas W. Butterworth, "Evaluating a 
Preventive Approach to Reducing School Vandalism." Phi Delta 
Kappan, 62 (March 1981):498. 
7Birch Bayh, "Seeking Solutions to School Violence and 
Vandalism," Phi Delta Kappan, 59 (January 1978): 301. 
8rbid. 
and district level reporting varies widely from place to 
place."9 In fact, such record keeping and reporting of 
incidents in many districts were not practiced until the 
late 1960's and early 1970's. 10 This lack of a consistent 
reporting system on a national level is only one reason for 
11 
the lack of specific data about the real extent of vandalism 
in public schools and the resulting costs. Another ongoing 
problem has been the reluctance of many administrators in 
revealing these statistics because of the negative impression 
given to the public about educational settings. 11 These two 
factors are the major reasons why the public in general did 
not become aware of the extent of school vandalism until the 
beginning of the 1970's. 12 
In spite of the lack of a nationwide reporting system, 
there is strong evidence that even if specific statistics 
may vary in different public school systems from year to year, 
government studies, such as those sponsored by the Subcommittee 
to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, have found school crime to 
have reached significant proportions. 13 Also, many reports 
have been found to be quite conservative since these reports 
9Birch Bayh, Challenge for the Third Century: Educa-
tion in a Safe Environment-Final Report on the Nature and 
Prevention of School Violence and Vandalism (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 12. 
10shirley Boss Neill, "Violence and Vandalism: Dimensions 
and Correctives," Phi Delta Kappan, 59 (January 1978): 305. 
11 rbid. 
12Ibid. 
13Ibid. 
have frequently omitted cost items that stem directly from 
vandalism. 14 In addition, an often unreported cost of van-
dalism has been the ever increasing insurance coverage that 
public school systems must maintain. Insurance rates and 
loss deductible exclusions have risen as destruction of 
school property has risen. 15 
12 
As school officials have studied the factors that cause 
vandalism and have attempted a variety of strategies to pre-
vent, or at least, to reduce this destruction of school pro-
perty, the taxpaying public has borne the brunt of the costs 
of vandalism. A disturbing fact is that most of the vandals 
are children, adolescents, and young adults. FBI statistics 
reveal that 77% of those arrested for vandalism are under 18 
years of age, with the majority being from 12 to 14 years 
old. 16 Information gleaned from recent police records and 
from local, state, and national juvenile delinquency records 
point out that over 90% of vandalism related arrests and con-
17 victions are adolescent boys who are typically 12 years old. 
This age factor presents a dile~ua to officials who are 
seeking some compensation for vandalism to school property. 
Although minors hav~ always been responsible for their own 
torts under common law, suing minors does not appear to be a 
14Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16"School Crime," Education Digest, 44 (1975): 36-37. 
17James L. Howard, "Factors in Vandalism," Journal of 
Research and Development in Education, 11 (1978):54. 
13 
18 satisfactory course of action in most cases. Indeed, minors 
are often not worth suing because they·themselves generally do 
not have the funds or the me~ns of acquiring enough funds to 
pay for any substantial costs of their destructive acts. 19 
Therefore, as costs for vandalism have greatly increased and 
educational budgets have been strained, the taxpaying public 
has sought restitution for vandalism from the parents of van-
dals through the passage of statutory law. 
The primary purpose of this study, then, is to provide 
school officials with a thorough analysis of the legal aspects 
of the parental responsibility laws, which have also been 
20 labelled, "punish the parents laws." This study will also 
enable school officials to determine the feasibility of reducing 
the incidents of vandalism and of obtaining appropriate compen-
sation from parents of vandals through the courts. 
Design of the Study 
The remainder of the study is divided into five major 
parts. Chapter II contains a review of related literature. 
Not only is the literature focusing on the legal aspects of 
the liability of parents for the torts of their children, 
but this chapter also considers the factors of vandalism that 
are pertinent to the topic. This section is for the purpose 
18Jeri J. Goldman, "Restitution for Damages to Public 
School Property," Journal of Law and Education, 11 (April, 
1982): 148. 
19 Ibid. 
20 James 
the Parents?" 
1961): 804. 
A. Kenny and James V. Kenny, "Shall We Punish 
American Bar Association Journal, 47 (August 
of informing school officials about what recent studies 
have found to be the causes of vandalism and what major 
strategies have been proposed for reducing vandalism, in 
addition to pursuing legal procedures. 
14 
Chapter Ill presents a narrative discussion of th~ 
state statutes that hold parents vicariously liable for the 
torts of their children. This portion of the study also 
presents information about the specific statutes dealing with 
destruction of school property. 
Chapter IV examines the major legal questions related 
to the vicarious liability of parents under statutory law. 
Court cases which have challenged the constitutionality of 
the concept of vicarious liability, which have involved 
specific requirements for recovery, and which have involved 
the issues of limits of recovery and insurance are also 
discussed. 
Chapter V presents an analysis and review of selected 
court cases whose decisions have important implication for 
education officials seeking some financial recovery for the 
destruction of school property. 
The final chapter of this study offers a review and 
summary of the information presented in the review of the 
literature and from the analysis of statutory law and specific 
court cases. The questions proposed in the first chapter are 
answered in this concluding chapter. 
15 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Overview 
Some degree of vandalism has occurred in public schools 
since these educational settings were first established in 
this country. Destruction of school property, whether it was 
a broken window, a marred desk, or even an occasional fire set 
by an arsonist, has been one of the factors that has confronted 
educators every school year for decades. In fact, for at least 
fifty years now, school vandalism has been an issue of some 
concern to administrators and other school officials. 1 How-
ever, since the 1950's and continuing into at least the mid-
1970's, a sharp rise in the number of incidents of school 
vandalism has caused educators to direct much of their 
attention and energies to this particular problem. 
Many believe this increase in school vandalism is directly 
related to the significant increase in crime by youth that began 
in the early 1950's. 2 Federal Bureau of Investigation reports 
clearly indicate an increase in arrest rates of juveniles, not 
only for crimes against persons, but also for crimes against 
1E. L. Koch, "School Vandalism and Strategies of Social 
Control," Urban Education, 10 (April 1975): 54. 
2Rodger Bybee, Violence, Values, and Justice in the 
Schools (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 1982), p. 101. 
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property. For example, the arrest rate of 15 to 18-year-olds 
grew from 160 per 100,000 in 1953 to 520 per 100,000 in 1974 
for crimes against property (including theft, burglary, van-
dalism, and arson. 3 By the late 1950's and early 1960's, 
this general increase in crimes by youth soon began to be 
experienced in schools which at one time had traditionally 
been viewed, by the public at least, more as a "haven from 
the disorders of everyday life."4 
Indeed, school crimes, including vandalism, were so 
widespread by 1965 that many groups such as the National 
Education Association began to examine this escalating issue. 5 
For example, in a 1969 study of vandalism, Bernard Greenberg 
of the Stanford Research Institute concluded that although 
vandalism has always been a problem in schools, " ... the 
rate of incidents in the schools has reached alarming pro-
portitJns."6 As an example of this increase, Greenberg esti-
1nated a rise in the total losses of 120 California school 
districts from vandalism climbed from $1.7 in 1965-66 to $3.0 
million in 1967-68. 7 
3Ibid. 
4Michael D. Casserly, Scott A. Bass, and John R. Garrett, 
School Vandalism (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and 
Company, 1980), p. 1. 
5 Bybee, p. 101. 
6united States Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, National Institute of Education, Violent Schools: 
Safe Schools (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1977)' p. 33. 
7Ibid. 
After school crime had continued to grow by the early 
1970's, it evolved into such an important public issue that 
. t d . 1 . . . 8 
~ came un er congress~ona ~nvest~gat~on. Actually, the 
17 
federal government had been actively involved with the problem 
of juvenile delinquency since the early 1950's when the U.S. 
Senate Committee and the Judiciary established a Subcommittee 
on Juvenile Delinquency. 9 As crime and schools became more 
closely linked by the early 1970's, two major bills were 
passed. The Amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Act was one of the two bills passed in 1974. This 
bill later in 1977 provided for the publication of The Safe 
School Study. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
Act was the second bill passed in 1974. 10 
With the 1970's hearings of the Senate Subcommittee to 
Investigate Juvenile Delinquency and those of the House Sub-
committee on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Education, 
the general public became more informed about the extent and 
nature of the acts of violence and vandalism that were occurring 
in public schools across the nation. 11 Pnother result from 
these hearings was the passage of the "Safe School Study Act" 
in the House of Representatives and the Education Amendments 
of 1974 (Public Law 93-380) which directed the Department of 
8 Bybee, p. 101. 
9casserly, p. 2. 
10rbid. 
11Ernst Wenk and Nora Harlow, eds., School Crime and 
Disruption (Davis, California: Responsible Action, 1978), p. 7. 
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Health, Education, and Welfare to "conduct a study to determine 
the incidence and seriousness of school crime; the number and 
location of schools affected; the casts; the me~ns of prevention 
in use, and the effectiveness of these means."12 
Therefore, the National Institute of Education (NIE) de-
signed and implemented a three-part study and included informa-
tion from other studies including data from a survey conducted 
by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) in 1975 
in order to produce Violent Schools-Safe Schools: The Safe 
School Study Report of the Congres.s in 1977. 13 This same year 
the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency presented 
their major study, Challenge for the Third Century: Education 
in a Safe Environment-Final Report on the Nature of School Vio-
lence and Vandalism. 
Both reports conclude that vandalism in the nation's 
public schools is proving to be a serious disruption to these 
learning environments and a tremendous drain of expenditures 
for the repair and replacement of school property. In Challenge 
for the Third Century, the summary report declares that violence 
and vandalism are occurring with more frequency and intensity 
14 than in the past. - The subcommittee has stressed in its 
report that "not every elementary and secondary school in this 
country is staggering under a crime wave of violence and 
12united States Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, National Institute of Education, p. 1. 
13Ibid. 
14Birch Bayh, "Seeking Solutions to School Violence and 
Vandalism," Phi Delta Kappan, 59 (January 1978): 300. 
vandalism. 15 It does emphasize, however, that while many 
school systems are not greatly affected by any substantial 
amount of either violence -or vandalism, there is ample evi-
dence that "a significant and growing number of schools in 
urban, suburban, and rural areas are confronting serious 
levels of violence and vandalism." 16 
19 
The Safe School Study concludes that property de-
struction in schools certainly increased from the early 1950's 
to the early 1970's, but that numerous studies published by 
the mid-1970's show this increase to be levelling off. 17 The 
estimate of the annual cost of such a level of vandalism, 
however, proves to be at least $200 million with some estimates 
running as high as $600 million. 18 Also, when answering the 
question of exactly how serious a problem vandalism presents 
to schools, the study concludes that it is "considerably more 
serious than it was 15 years ago, and about the same as it was 
5 years ago." 19 
These two major studies and the congressional hearings 
held during the 1970's, then, brought dramatic attention to 
significant factors concerned with student vandalism. They 
also helped to give impetus to a growing belief that parents 
15 Ibid. 
16Ibid. 
17National Institute of Education, p. 2. 
18 Ibid. , p . 4 . 
19Ibid., p. 37. 
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were to blame for the increase in crime by youth and that 
parents should be held legally accountable for the delinquent 
acts of their children. Such an attitude had begun to emerge 
as early as 1957 when one study found, for example, that 
almost nine out of ten persons believed that parents should 
be "held responsible to at least some degree for the delin-
quency of their children." 20 
The public's perception of the responsibility of parents 
for the delinquent acts of their children prompted passage of 
what have been termed "punish the parents" laws. Since the 
1950's, forty-nine of the fifty states (New Hampshire has sta-
tutory provisions for parents to be fined for the wrongdoings 
of their children) have translated this concept of the moral 
and legal responsibility of parents into statutory law. It is 
necessary to note early in this study, however, that histori-
cally the courts have not required parents to be financially 
responsible for destruction of school property that has occurred 
as a result of acts of neglect or carelessness. Instead, the 
courts have allowed boards of education to expel students or 
to charge their parents only for destruction of school property 
that involves willful or malicious acts. 21 
In addressing this issue, the Supreme Court of Indiana 
has declared: 
20James A. Kenny and James V. Kenny, "Shall We Punish 
the Parents?" American Bar Association Journal, 47 (August 
1961): 805. 
21 Newton Edwards, The Courts and the Public Schools 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940), p. 533. 
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Carelessness on the part of children is one of the most 
common, and yet one of the least blameworthy of their 
faults. In simple carelessness there is no purpose to 
do wrong. To punish a child for carelessness in any 
case is to punish it where it22as no purpose or intent to do wrong or violate rules. 
The Supreme Court of Iowa has also addressed this issue 
and has substantiated the concept that carelessness or neg-
lect by children should be viewed differently from willful and 
destructive acts: 
The state does not deprive its citizens of their property 
or their liberty, or of any rights, except as a punishment 
for a crime. It would be very hard and obviously injust 
to deprive a child of education for the reason that through 
accident and without intention of wrong he destroyed pro-
perty of the school district. Doubtless a child can be 
expelled from school as a punishment for breach of disci-
~line or for o2~enses against good morals, but not for 
lnnocent acts. 
In the remaining portion of this chapter, selected major 
factors of vandalism will be presented so that the role of 
parental responsibility laws can be viewed from a broad per-
spective of the variety of causes and strategies to reduce 
student vandalism. The concept of common law regarding 
parental responsibility will also be presented. Finally, a 
discussion of the pros and cons of the parental responsibility 
laws conclude the chapter. Therefore, the remainder of this 
review of the literature concerning parental responsibility 
for student vandalism will be as follows: 
22state v. Vanderbilt, 18 N.E. 266 (Ind. 1888). 
23Perkins v. Board of Directors of the Independent 
School District of West Des Moines, 9 N.W. 356 (Iowa 1880). 
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1. Selected Significant Factors of Student Vandalism 
2. Common Law Doctrine of Parental Liability 
3. Civil or Statutory Law Concerning Parental Liability 
Selected Significant Factors of 
Student Vandalism 
The Safe School Study of 1977 provides systematic data 
concerning schools, communities surrounding schools, families 
of student, peers, and other factors that are for-the purpose 
of assessing the causes, extent, and costs of student vanda-
lism. This particular study presents the following 12 factors 
which are consistently related with school property losses: 
1. The crime rate in the attendance area. 
2. Residential concentration around the school. The 
school's proximity to students' homes may make it 
a convenient target for vandalism. 
3. The presence of nonstudent youth around school, 
cited by principals as a problem. Evidently, they 
increase the school's risk of property loss. 
4. Family intactness and family discipline. Schools 
having higher proportions of students from families 
in which both parents are present, and in which dis-
cipline is firm, suffer less property loss due to 
vandalism and other offenses. 
5. School size. In larger schools, where there is more 
to steal or destroy, property losses will be higher. 
6. Rule enforcement, classroom control, and nonclassroom 
superv~s~on. These again indicate that the more 
firmly a school is run, the fewer offenses it has. 
7. Coordination between faculty and administration. This 
is another measure of how well the school is run. 
8. Hostile and authoritarian attitudes on the part of 
teachers toward students. As a response to such atti-
tudes, students apparently take it out on the school. 
23 
9. Student's valuing their teachers' op1n1ons of them. 
Schools in which students identify with their teachers 
have less vandalism. 
10. The manipulation of grades as a disciplinary measure. 
This practice may be seen by students as arbitrary and 
unfair, with the result that the school again is the 
victim. 
11. The importance of grades to students. Schools where 
students strive to get good grades have ~ vanda-
lism. 
12. The importance of leadership status to students. 
Schools where there is intense com~~tition for leader-
ship have greater property losses. 
In summary, the Safe School Study and other studies 
since the 1950's have clearly revealed that there is no single 
factor that fully explains student vandalism. The causes are 
complex and at times they are interrelated. Depending on the 
basic approach used to explain vandalism, factors such as 
society itself, the individual vandal, and influential insti-
tutions such as the school and family have been cited. 
Common Law Doctrine of Parental Liability 
Essentially, the common law doctrine declares that a 
parent is not liable for the torts of his child, merely be-
f h h "ld 1 t" h' 25 Th" d t . cause o t e parent-c 1 re a 1ons 1p. 1s oc r1ne 
contrasts sharply with the civil law doctrine which declares 
"that a parent is liable for the torts of his minor child un-
less that parent was unable to prevent the child's act or 
the child was under the legal age of responsibility." 26 
24National Institute of Education, p. 8. 
25Alice B. Freer, "Parental Liability for Torts of 
Children," Kentucky Law Journal, 53 (1965): 254. 
26 Ibid. 
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Therefore, "Unless made so by statute, there is no liability 
on the part of a parent, as such, for the tort of a child."27 
The_ philosophical basis for this common law's doctrine of 
parental liability is the historical assumption th_at there 
should be no liability without fault. 28 Even under common. 
law, however, both the child and the parent, under certain 
circumstances, can be held liable for the child's. inten-
tional damage to property. 
In all, there are five frequently cited grounds upon 
which a parent could be found liable for the torts of his 
child at common law. They are the fpllowing: 
1. where the relationship of master and servant exists 
and the child is acting within the scope of his authority 
accorded by the parent; 
2. where a parent is negligent in entrusting to the 
child an instrument which, because of its nature, use, and 
purpose, is so dangerous as to constitute, in the hands of 
the child, an unreasonable risk to others; 
3. where a parent is negligent in entrusting to the 
child an instrumentality which, though not necessarily a 
dangerous thing of itself, is likely to be put to a dangerous 
use because of the known propensities of the child; 
4. where the parent's negligence consists entirely of 
his failure reasonably to restrain the child from vicious 
conduct imperiling others, when the parent has knowledge of 
the child's propensity toward such conduct; 
5. where the parent participates in the child's tortious 
act by 7ons2~ting to. it or by later ratifying it and accepting 
the fru~ts. 
27 John J. Puig, "Parental Responsibility in New York 
for an Infant's Willful Property Damage," Albany Law Review, 
44 (July 1980): 943. 
28Jeri Goldman, "Restitution for Damages to Public 
School Property," Journal of Law and Education, 11 (April 
1982): 151. 
29John v. O'Connor, "Torts: The Constitutional Validity 
of Parental Liability Statutes," Marquette Law Revietv, 55 
(1972): 586. 
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In the first and last situations listed above, liability 
is based on a theory of resp8ndant superior. 30 In the first 
situation, the child may be conside~ed to be acting as an 
agent of the parent if, for example, the child performs an 
errand under the direction of the parent at the time any 
damages occur. 31 In the last situation, the parent may be 
liable if he either directs or encourages the child's acts, 
and the result is damage to property or to persons during the 
32 damaging of property. In this situation, the parent has 
approved a tortious act and, consequently, may be found liable 
at common law. 
The negligence of the parent himself may be grounds for 
liability if his negligence is found to be the proximate cause 
of his child's harmful act. For exa1nple, the parent could be 
found negligent and therefore liable if he allowed his child 
to have an instrument that in itself could be dangerous. The 
1917 Vallency v. Rigillo33 case illustrates this situation be-
cause the child was entrusted with the use of a gun. Negligence 
may also be based on the parent's allowing the child to use any 
instrument which the child has previously shown a tendency to 
30Nancy L. Speck, "The Pennsylvania Parental Liability 
Statute," University of Pittsburgh Law Review, 29 (1968): 
579-80. 
31 "The Iowa Parental Responsibility Act," Iowa Law Re'\·tew, 
55 (1969-70): 1039. 
32Ibid. 
33vallency v. Rigillo, 102 A 348 (N.J. 1917). 
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misuse. For example, in the 1945 Gossett v. Egmond34 decision, 
the parent was found liable for allowing his mentally incom-
petent son to use the family car. Finally, a parent may be 
found negligent at common law if he fails to warn others of a 
child's dangerous traits or conduct. A babysitter was not 
warned about a child's violent characteristics and the parent 
was found liable in the case of Ellis v. D'Angelo. 35 However, 
finding liability for this particular situation is very diffi-
cult because it is not enough that the child is known to be 
. h. kl 36 m~sc ~evous or even rec ess. The parent is liable only when 
the parent knows that the child more than likely will cause 
d . . 37 amage or ~nJury. 
In summary, then, under the common law a parent is 
liable only when negligence is established or when there is 
evidence that the parent has had the child act as an agent. 
Therefore, although these situations do allow for compensation 
for victims of children's torts, the common law has been judged 
. ff . 38 ~ne ect~ve. Proving that any of the situations exists is 
frequently difficult because each area of exception presents 
specific barriers to the goal of tort law, which is compensation 
34Gossett v. Van Egmond, 155 Pzd 304 (Ore. 1945). 
35Ellis v. D'Angelo, 253 Pzd 675 (Calif. 1953). 
36 Speck, p. 580. 
37 Ibid. 
38rbid. 
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for the innocent victim. 39 
For example, in the exception which concerns entrusting 
a child with a dangerous instrumentality, the question of what 
is a dangerous instrumentality is often raised with different 
uses yielding different answers. 40 There is no specific ans-
wer to this question and the answer given is often dependent 
upon the circumstances of a specific case. These circumstances 
may include the child's age, judgment, and experience. 41 Also, 
in cases that involve a dangerous instrumentality, it is often 
necessary to prove the child's incompetence. 42 
Another major problem with parental liability under 
common law is that the case law in this area has not been 
applied consistently. "Even though a case seemingly fit into 
one of the above categories, some injured plaintiffs were denied 
recovery because a particular court was reluctant to impose 
liability without fault and, therefore, chose to ignore the 
case law." 43 
These obstacles illustrate, then, that the common law 
provides compensation to victims of torts by minors only in 
39Michael A. Axel, "Statutory Vicarious Parental Lia-
bility: Review and Reform," Case Western Reserve Law Review, 
32 (1981-82): 559. 
40 Bruce D. Frankel, "Parental Liability for a Child's 
Tortious Acts," Dickinson Law Review, 81 (1977): 7 59. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Axel, p. 560. 
43 Deborah J. Fish, "Constitutional Law/Parental Respon-
sibility," Illinois Bar Journal, 68 (March 1980): 475. 
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very particular situations and it presents difficult pro-
bl f f 1 . . ff 
44 Wh h . f d ems o proo to p a~nt~ s. en t e parent ~s not oun 
liable, then only the child is responsible for compensating 
victims for damages. Since minors are most often without 
funds, the injured party is more than likely left with little 
or no compensation. 
Civil or Statutory Law Concerning 
Parental Responsibility 
All but two states initially adopted the common law 
approach to help compensate for damages caused by minors. 
Only Louisiana and Hawaii originally adopted statutes like 
those of civil law countries rather than the common law doc-
trine from English law. 45 Since the 1950's almost all the 
other states have enacted parental liability statutes. In 
contrast to common law doctrine, these statutes place vi-
carious liability on parents for torts of unemancipated chil-
dren. Unlike the principle of common law doctrine, statutory 
law holds parents responsible for torts of their children, 
regardless of fault. 
The purpose of this portion of the chapter will be to 
present some of the major arguments for and against such 
statutory law in regard to student vandalism. An analysis 
of the statutes themselves will follow in Chapter III and 
the vital legal aspects of vicarious liability of parents 
44 p . 947 u~g, p. . 
45"The Iowa Parental Responsibility Act," p. 1040. 
for the torts of their children that the courts have con-
sidered will be presented in Chapters IV and V. This por-
tion, therefore, will focus on the pros and cons of these 
responsibility laws. 
As juvenile delinquency increased in the 1950's, so 
did the public demand that parents of delinquents be held 
more responsible for their crimes against innocent victims. 
In surveys such as the one conducted in 1957 under the di-
rection of Dr. Charles T. O'Reilly, the public clearly 
indicated (almost 9 out of 10 persons) that they believed 
29 
t t b . f . '1 d 1' 46 0 paren s o e a maJor cause o JUvenl e e lnquency. ne 
result of this widely supported view by the general public 
was the passage of what have been termed in the literature 
as "punish the parents" laws, parental responsibility laws, 
or vandalism statutes. 
Although the public overwhelmingly supported the en-
actment of these laws beginning thirty years ago, many 
arguments have been made for and against them. There continues 
to be support generated for these particular laws; presently, 
every state except New Hampshire, which has a statute pro-
viding for parents of delinquents to be fined, has a parental 
responsibility law. Some states have statutes specifically 
pertaining to destruction of school property. Yet, during 
these past thirty years, the wisdom of these laws continues 
to be debated. 
The arguments in favor of such statutory law generally 
46 Kenny and Kenny, p. 804. 
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cite the unique responsibility that parents have in the care 
and guidance of their children. The very impetus for the 
passage of these laws stemmed from societal norm that 
emerged during the 1950's which declared that part of the 
responsibility of bearing and rearing children also involves 
47 
being accountable for their acts. It includes, too, the 
obligation to rear children in such a way that they do not 
43 
encroach on the rights of others. Certainly, the American 
judicial system and legal scholars have historically placed. 
49 
many duties on the parent in the parent-child relationship. 
When crimes by youth, including the destruction of school 
property, began to increase sharply in the 1950's, the pub-
lic began to emphasize the responsibilities and duties of 
parents. 
In addition, during this time emphasis was placed on 
the authority of the parent in the parent-child relationship. 
For example, the Court of Common Pleas of Connecticut the 
case of Watson v. Gradzik emphasized that "Since the parents 
have the authority under the law to demand obedience from 
their children, it is reasonable to hold parents responsible 
for exerting that authority to control their children. 50 
The defendants in this case and in the 1979 Vanthournot v. 
47Fish, p. 476. 
48rbid., p. 477. 
49 Frankel, p. 755. 
50watson v. Gradzik, 34 Conn. Sup. 7, 373 A. 2d 191 
(1971). 
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Burge unsuccessfully presented the argument that parents 
are not totally responsible for the antisocial behavior of 
their children because the children are also i~fluenced by 
others such as close relatives and friends. 
Another argument in support of these parental respon-
sibility statutes has been the belief that it is reasonable 
to place vicarious liability on parents rather than to ex-
pect innocent victims or the tax-paying public to pay for 
damages done by minors. 52 Also, those who support the 
31 
statutes believe that they serve as a deterrent to destruction 
of property because " ... if Pop has to foot the bills for 
Junior's spree, he's likely to jolly well see that Junior 
doesn't do it again, if he can help it." 53 These two aspects--
compensation for victims and deterrence to juvenile delin-
quency--continue to be the major purposes of and reasons for 
support from those who argue in favor of parental responsi-
bility laws. 
Although public opinion and the courts have thus far 
continued to support the premise that parents should be 
vicariously liable for the torts of their children, many 
arguments against this principle have been expressed. Some 
51 
Vanthournout v. Burge, 69 Ill. App. 3d 193, 387 N.E. 
2d 341, Cert. denied, 79 Ill. 2d 618 (1979). 
52 
Goldman, p. 170. 
53Michael Severino, "Who Pays--or Should Pay When 
Young Vandals Smash Things Up in Your Schools?" American 
School Board Journal, 159 (June 1972): 33. 
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of these arguments center around the parent-child relation-
ship itself. For example, it has been argued that additional 
stress can be placed on the parent-child relationship if the 
54 
parent is held so highly responsible. Not only could this 
additional stress encourage the parent to be more strict and 
to punish the child too severely, this argument also contends 
that the child may well hope to hurt the parent by purposely 
55 
destroying property. The parent-child relationship is seen 
as a frequent cause of delinquency and critics of this statutory 
law believe it can greatly disrupt family situations that may 
56 
already be stressed. 
Further, with the possibility of impending financial ob-
ligations stemming from the torts of the child, a parent may 
not be at all cooperative with juvenile authorities. The pa-
rent may see it in his best interest to help establish the 
innocence of his child in court rather than face financial 
bl . . 57 o ~gat~ons. Even if rehabilitative treatment would be in 
the child's best interest, a parent may focus his efforts 
58 
solely on his avoiding restitution for damages. 
Still another argument given in opposition to the 
statutes has been the belief that although bad parenting may 
54Roberta Gottesman, "Kids Damages--Should Parents Be 
Held Responsible?" Principal, 61 (May 1982): 50. 
55 
Ibid. 
56 
Freer, p. 262. 
57 
Speck, p. 595. 
58 Gottesman, p. 50. 
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be a major reason for delinquency of children, vicarious lia-
bility may be unfairly imposed on certain parents. Some 
critics believe the statutes make scapegoats of the parents 
who have attempted to control the behavior of their children 
because the laHs do not discriminate between those parents 
59 who do and those who do not. Further, there are those who 
believe that some parents may have contributed to their 
children's delinquency not intentionally, but because of their 
own human failings. 60 Harriett Goldberg speaks of this when 
she points out that parents of delinquent children also had 
parents: 
When the circumstances are analyzed, it is usually found 
that these people are themselves "more sinned against 
than sinning" and require specialized care. The very 
factors that have brought about their own disintegration 
and disorganization are again op~Iating to produce 
maladjustment in their chLldren. 
There are several arguments against these statutory laws, 
then, that are based on the parent-child relationship. An-
other major argument found in the literature, however, is 
concerned with one of the primary purposes of the statutes. 
This argument addresses the issue of whether these statutes 
actually are helping to deter destruction of property by 
juveniles. Although this aspect of the parental responsibility 
laws needs to be the focus of further studies, there is no 
conclusive evidence as yet, that these statutes serve as a 
59speck, p. 582. 
6°Kenny and Kenny, p. 808. 
61Ibid. 
deterrent to student vandalism or juvenile delinquency in 
general. 62 
First of all, it is most difficult to determine the 
effect of parental liability statutes: 
Comparable data over a long period of time are often 
not available even for the same court--good data for 
a control group of courts not having parental lia-
bility laws are often not available to indicate the 
net impact of the parental liability laws. Without 
the latter, where states with parental liability 
laws have experienced an increase in delinquency, 
one cannot answer the questions as to how much
6
§reater 
the increase might have been without the laws. 
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Based on statistical information that is available, how-
ever, the contention that parental responsibility laws reduce 
vandalism cannot be supported.64 A study done by the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1963 revealed this 
following information: 
--In one state in which a parental liability law was 
passed in 1955, acts of damage to property increased 
from 613 that year to 1,000 by 1962. 
--In another state which passed a law in 1956, acts 
of carelessness or mischief (including vandalism) 
increased from 2,672 in 1956 to 3,151 in 1961. 
--In another state which passed a lm.; in 1953, court 
cases of damage to pg~perty increased from 502 in 
1955 to 785 in 1959. 
Therefore, although the evidence is not conclusive, critics 
62 "The Imva Parental Responsibility Act," p. 1042. 
63 Freer, pp. 263-264. 
64 Ibid., p. 264. 
65 Ibid., pp. 264-65. 
of parental responsibility laws point to statistics such as 
those from the five-year study by the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare to support their view that vandalism 
has not been substantially arrested. 
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In conclusion, many arguments for and against parental 
responsibility statutes are found in a review of the litera-
ture concerning vandalism. Nuch criticism of the no fault 
principle of tort law being applied to the parent-child re-
lationship can be found primarily in articles from law reviews. 
Many questions have been raised in legal journals and education 
publications regarding the effectiveness of the parent respon-
sibility laws as a deterrent to vandalism or as a means of 
compensation to victims of property damage. Yet each of the 
states (except for New Hampshire, with statutory law that 
provides for a parent to be fined) continues to maintain such 
statutory law as passed by each state legislature. 
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CHAPTER III 
ANALYSES OF THE STATE STATUTES 
Overview 
This particular portion of the study is for the purpose 
of describing the statutory law that presently exists in the 
fifty states regarding the liability of parents for property 
damage by their children. Forty-nine states do now have what 
have been termed parental responsibility laws which hold 
parents vicariously liable for the destructive acts of their 
unemancipated children. Only New Hampshire is without such 
specific statutory law. Yet, even this state does have statu-
tory provisions for making a parent be responsible for paying 
any fines levied against his child: 
A warrant against a minor may require the parent 
or guardian of the minor to be summoned to attend the 
examination or trial, by delivering to him an attested 
copy of the warrant, and of the complaint, if annexed 
thereto, and the parent or guardian, being so summoned, 
may be adjudged to pay the fine imposed, and execution 
may issue against him herefor.l 
This statutory law is quite different from the responsi-
bility laws passed by the legislatures of the other states. 
The statutory laws of these forty-nine states leave no doubt 
that the parent or legal guardian is held liable for the de-
structive acts of his child. These statutes definitely contain 
1New Hampshire, Revised Statutes Annotated (1974) Sec. 
592-A:16. 
more specifically worded conditions and reminders than does 
the New Hampshire statutes. 
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An examination of the statutes reveals that most sta-
tutes share some important similarities, as well as some 
interesting differences in their basic elements. For example, 
the parental responsibility laws generally have the same 
legislative intentions. Also, most of these laws insist on 
liability of parents for intentional torts of their children. 
Most statutes also declare a maximum amount of damages re-
coverable from such torts, and some states include limits for 
personal injury, as well as for property damage. 
The forty-nine statutes also contain some obvious dif-
ferences. There is a wide range in the amount of the recov-
erable damages and this proves to be perhaps the most major 
difference among the statutes. Another important difference, 
however, is that not all of the states allow for the additional 
use of common law remedies. This failure to include such pro-
visions for additional liability may severely limit the amount 
a victim could receive for personal injuries or property 
damages. 
The remainder of this chapter will analyze the state 
statutes in order to determine their purposes and their basic 
elements. Not only will the forty-nine statutes pertaining to 
general property destruction be reviewed, but also those st&te 
statutes dealing with the specific destruction of school pro-
perty by students will be presented. 
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Legislative Intent for Parental Responsibility Laws 
Only three of the forty-nine states with parental respon-
sibility laws have included in their state statutes the purposes 
for the passage of these laws. Certainly, judicial decisions 
have interpreted various aspects of these laws, including their 
purposes. However, only three states have made an official rec-
ord of these purposes by including them in their statutory laws. 
All three states, Georgia, New Jersey, and West Virginia, offi-
cially declare the legislative intent behind their respective 
parental responsibility laws. Their legislative findings re-
flect the public's concern for juvenile delinquency and the 
parent's responsibility for his children's acts of vandalism 
and willful injury to other persons. 
The legislature of Georgia included its purpose for 
passage of the parental responsibility law titled "Liability 
for malicious acts of minor child" by including a subsection 
of that law when it was passed in 1956. The statement reads 
directly as follows: 
(c) The intent of the legislature in passing this Code 
section is to provide for the public welfare and aid 
in the control of juvenile delinquency, not to provide 
restorative ~ompensation to victims or tortious conduct 
by children. 
Whereas the Georgia statute stresses the concern of its 
legislature for the public welfare because of juvenile delin-
quency, the legislative findings in New Jersey's statutory law 
emphasize not only protection of the public, but the role of 
2Georgia, Official Code of Georgia, Title 51, Chap. 2, 
Art. 3. 
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the parent. Under the heading of "Legislative Findings," 
the New Jersey lawmakers stated for the record the following 
in 1965: 
The Legislature finds that malicious acts of van-
dalism by youths are increasing at an alarming rate; 
that such acts are frequently attributable to lack of 
care, custody and control exercised by the parent; 
that parents should have some responsibility for the 
conduct of their children; that while there is a re-
luctance to charge a child with juvenile delinquency, 
there should be some legal deterrent to juvenile acts 
of vandalism and to parental neglect of supervision. 
The Legislature therefore finds it desirable to estab-
lish a civil procedure for the recovery of damages 
for such acts from the neglectful parent, guardian, or 
other person having3legal custody of the child who caused such damage. 
The legislative intent found in West Virginia's statu-
tory laws reiterates this concern for the rise in delinquent 
acts, particularly those of vandalism and injury to persons. 
Originally prepared in 1957, the section was rewritten in 
1981 to read as follows: 
The legislature hereby finds and declares that there 
are now and have been repeated and widespread acts of 
vandalism, willful and malicious destruction of property 
and other injury to persons and property occasioned by 
the willful, malicious and sometimes criminal acts of 
children under the age of eighteen years; that the ma-
jority of such children are living with a parent or 
parents; that there arises or should arise out of such 
relationship, a responsibiilty to recompense persons 
injured by such acts of vandalism and willful and mali-
cious injury to persons and property. Therefore, it is 
the intent of the legislature to make parents responsi-
ble for the torts of their minor children by reason of 
the parent-child relationship, and to impose on such 
said parent or parents for such acts of their children, 
who live with them and who commit acts of vandalism or 
willful and malicious injury to persons and property, 
3 New Jersey, Statutes Annotated (1984), Title 2A, 
Chap. 53A, art. 14. 
liability ~n accordance with the provisions hereinafter 
set forth. 
The purposes of the parental responsibility laws for 
these three states are quite similar but also provide for 
some differences in what reasons are stressed in these sta-
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tutes. For example, all three address their concerns for the 
amount of juvenile delinquency that the public now endures, 
particularly those acts of vandalism and willful and mali-
cious injury to persons and property. The Georgia statute's 
statement of intent focuses largely on a rather general state-
ment regarding the welfare of the public and control of 
juvenile delinquency as its major purposes. However, both 
the New Jersey and West Virginia statutes explicitly state 
the belief that such statutory law is for the major purpose 
of holding parents responsible for their children's acts. 
Whereas the New Jersey statute cites parental neglect as the 
primary cause of juvenile delinquency, the West Virginia sta-
tute emphasizes parental responsibility for delinquent acts 
of children that arises from the special parent-child rela-
tionship. All three statutes definitely reflect the public's 
attitude that parents should be held responsible for the 
wrongdoings of their children. This attitude emerged in the 
late SO's and early 60's as juvenile delinquency increased. 
These three statutes were written originally in that period 
and they still exist, with West Virginia's statute revised in 
1981, as explanations for the parental responsibility laws of 
4west Virginia, Code (Supp. 1984), Chap. 55, art. 7A-1. 
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those three states. 
General Property Destruction Statutes 
As of 1984, forty-nine states have enacted parent lia-
bility statutes dealing with the destruction of property. An 
analysis of these statutes is facilitated through tables which 
provide pertinent information regarding the basic elements of 
these statutes. Table 1, for example, illustrates some of the 
basic information concerning the statutory reference, date of 
enactment, maximum recovery limit permitted, whether liability 
for personal injury as well as property destruction is included, 
and whether stolen property or shoplifting is also specified. 
As Table 1 indicates, two states, Hawaii and Louisiana, 
have had parental liability statutes since the 1800's, but the 
remaining forty-seven states, enacted such statutory law since 
1951. Nebraska was the first state to place parental respon-
sibility laws into effect during the 1950's. By the end of 
the 50's, twenty-eight states, not including Hawaii and 
Louisiana, had promoted the passage of parental responsibility 
laws. During the 1960's, beginning with North Carolina and 
Washington in 1961, sixteen additional states enacted these 
laws. Finally, in the 1970's three states--New York (1970), 
Utah (1977), and Mississippi (1978)--included such statutory 
laws. All states, with the exception of New Hampshire (which 
has statutory provisions by which parents may be fined for a 
child's wrongdoing), presently have parental responsibility 
laws. Of these forty-nine, forty-four have had revisions of 
these laws since their initial enactment. Alabama, Iowa, 
Pennsylvania, Utah, and Vermont are the only states whose 
parental responsibility laws are those passed originally 
by their legislatures. 
The limitations placed on the amount to be recovered 
by the plaintiff vary widely among the statutes. The mini-
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mum specified amount is Vermont's $250 and the maximum amount 
specified is Texas' $15,000. The amounts may prove deceptive, 
however, because Vermont, like nineteen other states, allows 
for additional recovery through other legal remedies such as 
those of common law. The wording within North Carolina '.s 
statute is similar to the phrasing of this provision within 
other statutes: "This act shall not preclude or limit re-
covery of damages from parents under common law remedies 
available in this state."5 Many states also allow the plain-
tiff to receive court costs and attorney fees if a parent is 
found liable. In all, seventeen states have specific stipu-
lations that the plaintiff may recover at least some court 
costs that result from the civil action. 
Specific provisions may also affect the amounts of re-
covery. For example, the statute for Kansas declares that 
if parental negligence is found, then there is no limit on 
recovery. This provision is stated in the following: 
Such recovery shall be limited to the actual damages 
in an amount not to exceed ($1,000), in addition to 
taxable court costs, unless the court or jury finds that 
the malicious or willful act of such minor causing such 
injury, damage or destruction is the result of parental 
5North Carolina, General Statutes, Chap. 1, art. 538, 
sec. 1. 
neglect, in which event th~ one thousand ($1,000) 
limitation does not apply. 
Four states have no limits placed on recovery from 
damage to property. Hawaii's statute requires that the 
father and mother "shall jointly and severally be liable 
in damages for tortious acts committed by their children." 7 
No limit is designated in Louisiana's statute which simply 
states, "the father, or after his decease, the mother, are 
responsible for the damage occasioned by their minor or un-
. d h.ld 118 emanc~pate c ~ ren .... The New Jersey statute, how-
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ever, reads somewhat differently, although it has no limit 
placed on recovery for damages to property. This statute 
also holds the parent, guardian or one who has legal custody 
of a child liable, not merely on the basis of the parent-
child relationship. Instead, the statute declares this 
adult to be one " ... who fails or neglects to exercise 
reasonable supervision and control of the conduct of such 
. f 119 
~n ant .... Nebraska, too, has no limit placed on re-
covery for damages to property, but it does limit the amount 
10 of recovery from personal injury to $1,000 for each occurrence. 
Table 1 also reveals that twenty-eight states allow at 
least some recovery for personal injury, as well as for 
6Kansas, Statutes Annotated, Vol. 3, chap. 38, art. 120. 
7H .. 
awa~~, Revised Statutes (1976) sec. 577-3. 
8Louisiana, Civil Code (West, 1979), art. 2318. 
9New Jersey, Statutes Annotated (1984), Title 2A, chap. 
53A, art. 15. 
10Nebraska, Revised Statutes, (1978), art. 8, sec. 43-801. 
TABLE 1 Parent Liability Statutes, as of 1984, Dealing with the 
General Destruction of Property by Minors 
Statute 
ALA. CODE 
tit. 6, 6-5-380 (Supp. 1983) 
ALASKA STAT. 
34. 50.020 (1975) 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
12-661 (1982) 
ARK. STAT. ANN. 
50-109 (Supp. 1981) 
CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. 
1714.1 (1984) 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
13-21-107 (Supp. 1983) 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
52-572 (West Supp. 1984) 
DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 10, 3922 (Supp. 1982) 
FLA. STAT. ANN. 
741.24 (West Supp. 1984) 
GA. CODE A'lN. 
tit. 51, 51-2-3 (Supp. 1984) 
DCJte of 
Enactment 
1965 
1957 
1956 
1959 
1955 
1959 
1955 
1953 
1967 
1956 
Statute 
is 
Original 
Version 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Recovery 
Limit 
$ 500 
2,000 
2,500 
2,000 
10,000 
3,500 
3,000 
5,000 
2,500 
5,000 
Personal 
Injury 
Covered 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Stolen 
Property/ 
Shoplifting 
Covered 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Allows 
for 
Court 
Costs 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
NO 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Allows 
for other 
Legal 
Remedies 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes +"-
+"-
TABLE 1 Parent Liability Statutes, as of 1984, Dealing with the 
General Destruction of Property by Minors 
Statute Stolen Allows Allows 
is Personal Property/ for for other 
Date of Original Recovery Injury Shoplifting Court Legal 
Statute Enactment Version Limit Covered Covered Costs Remedies 
HAW. REV. STAT. 1858 No No limit Yes No No No 
577-3 (1976) 
IDAHO CODE 1957 No $1,500 No No No No 
6-210 (1979) 
ILL. ANN. STAT. CH. 70 1969 No 1,000 Yes No Yes Yes 
51-57 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983) 
IND. STAT. ANN. 1957 No 2,500 
34-4-31-1 (Burns Supp. 1984) 
No No No No 
IOWA CODE ANN. 1969 Yes 1,000 Yes No No No 
613.16 (West Supp. 1983) 
KAN. STAT. ANN. 1959 No 1,000 Yes No Yes No 
38-120 (1981) 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 1968 No 2,500 No No No Yes 
405.025 (Michie Co. Supp. 1982) 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. 1804 No No limit Yes No No No 
art. 2318 (West Supp. 1979) 
ME. REV. STAT. 1959 No 800 Yes No No No 
tit. 19' 217 (1981) 
MD. CODE .:\NN. 1959 No 5,000 Yes Yes No No J::--
3-829 (198L~) Ln 
TABLE 1 Parent Liability Statutes, as of 19H4, Dealing with the 
General Destruction uf Property by Minors 
Statute Stolen Allow::; AllnWti 
is Personal Property/ for for other 
Uate of Original Recovery Injury Shoplifting Court I.e gal 
Statute Enactment Version Limit Covered Covered Costs Remedies 
MASS. LAWS ANN. 1969 No $ 2,000 Yes No No No 
ch. 231, 85G (Lawyer's Co-op 
Supp. 1984) 
. MICH. STAT. ANN, 1953 No 2,500 Yes No No No 
27A.2913 (Callaghan Supp. 1984) 
MINN. STAT. ANN. 1967 No 500 Yes No No Yes 
540.18 (West Supp. 1984) 
MISS. CODE ANN. 1978 No 2,000 No No No Yes 
93-13-2 (Supp. 1983) 
MO. ANN. STAT. 1965 No 2,000 Yes No No Yes 
537.045 (Vernon Supp. 1984) 
MONT. CODE ANN. 1957 No 2,500 No No Yes No 
40-6-237 to 40-6-238 (1983) 
NEB. REV. STAT. 1951 No No limit Yes No No No 
43-801 (1978) 
NEV. REV. STAT. 1957 No 10,000 Yes No No Yes 
41.470 (1979) 
N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. 1957 No None Fine No No No 
592-A: 16 (1974) Stated 
N. J. STA'.i~. ANN. 1965 No No limit No No No No 
~ 
0"1 
2A:53A-15 (Supp. 1984) 
TABLE 1 Parent Liability Statutes, as of l9H4, Dealing with the 
General Destructiou of Property by Minors 
Statute 
N. M. STAT. ANN. 
32-1-46 (Michie Co. Supp. 1984) 
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW 
3-112 (1983) 
Date of 
Enactment 
1957 
N. C. GEN STAT. 1961 
1-538.1 
N. D. CENT. CODE ANN. 1957 
32-03-39 (1976) 
32-03-39-2 (Allen Smith Supp. 1983) 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 1965 
3109.09 to 3109.10 (1980) 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. 1957 
tit. 23, 10 (West Supp. 1983) 
ORE. REV. STAT. 1959 
30.765 (1977) 
PA. STAT. ANN. 1967 
tit. 11, 2001-2005 
(Purdon Supp. 1984) 
R. I. GEN. LAWS 1956 
9-1-3 (Michie Supp. 1983) 
Statute 
is 
Original 
Version 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Recovery 
Limit 
$ 4,000 
1,000 
1,000 
3,000 
2,500 
5,000 
1,000 
1,500 
Personal 
Injury 
Covered 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Stolen 
Property/ 
Shoplifting 
Covert!d 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Allows 
for 
Court 
Costs 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Allows 
for other 
Legal 
Remedies 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
J::o-
'-.1 
TABLE 1 Parent Liability Statutes, as of 19M4, Dealing with the 
General Destruction of Property by Minors 
Statute 
Date of 
Enactment 
S. C. CODE 1965 
20-7-340 (Lawyer's Co-op 
Supp. 1983) 
S. D. CODIFIED LAWS 1957 
25-5-15 (Allen Smith Supp. 1983) 
TENN. CODE ANN. 1957 
37-1001 to 1003 (Michie Co. 
Supp. 1983) 
TEXAS FAM. CODE ANN. 1957 
tit. 2, 33.01-.03 (West Supp. 1984) 
UTAH CODE ANN. 1977 
78-11-20 to 21 (1977) 
VT. STAT. ANN. 1959 
ch. 15, 901 (1974) 
VA. CODE 1960 
8.01-43 to 44 (1984) 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 1961 
4.24.190 (West Supp. 1983) 
W. VA. CODE 1957 
55-7A-1 to 2 (Michie Supp. 1984) 
Statute 
is 
Original 
Version 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Personal 
Recovery Injury 
Limit Covered 
$ 1,000 No 
750 Yes 
10,000 No 
15,000 No 
1,000 No 
250 Yes 
500 No 
3,000 Yes 
2,500 Yes 
Stolen Allows 
Property/ for 
Shoplifting Court 
Covered Costs 
Yes No 
No Yes 
No Yes 
No Yes 
Yes NO 
No No 
No No 
No NO 
Yes Yes 
Allows 
for other 
Legal 
Remedies 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
~ 
co 
TABLE 1 
Statute 
WIS. STAT. ANN. 
895.035 (1983) 
WYO. STAT. ANN. 
14-2-203 (1978) 
Parent Liability Statutes, as of 1984, Dealing with the 
General Destrm:tiou of Property by Minors 
Statute Stolen Allow::; 
is Personal Property/ for 
Date of Original Recovery Injury Shoplifting Court 
En;tctment Vt~rsion l.imi t Covered Covered Costs 
1957 No $ 1,000 Yes No Yes 
1965 No 300 No No Yes 
t\ I lows 
for other 
Legal 
Renwd ies 
Yes 
Yes 
~ 
\.0 
property damage. Some states, such as Kansas, have equal 
amounts .of recovery determined for either personal injury 
or property damage. Kansas, for example, states that this 
recovery " ... shall not exceed two thousand five hundred 
dollars for each tort of the minor." 11 California, on the 
other hand, is like most other states that declare, " 
in the case of injury to a person, imputed liability shall 
50 
be further limited to medical, dental, and hospital expenses 
by the injured person, not to exceed ten thousand dollars 
($10,000).'' 12 The amount of recovery for personal injury, 
then, is generally limited to the medical, dental, or hos-
pital costs or to a specified amount, regardless of the 
actual costs of medical treatment. 
Ten states allow recovery for perperty that is stolen 
or shoplifted. Arizona's statute typifies the wording for 
these offenses, "Any act of malicious or willful misconduct 
of a minor which results in any injury to the person or 
property of another, to include theft or shoplifting .. 
Ohio's statute, on the other hand, has its own particular 
phrasing to describe what it terms a "theft offense." 14 In 
11Arizona, Revised Statutes Annotated (1982), art. 7, 
sec. 12-661. 
12california, Civil Code Annotated (Deering, 1984), 
sec. 1714.1. 
13Arizona, Revised Statues Annotated (1982), art. 7, 
sec. 12-661. 
140hio, Revised Code Annotated, (Page 1980), Title 31, 
sec. 3109.09. 
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addition, Oklahoma's statute identifies this tort as larcency. 15 
Specific Statutory Requirements for Recovery 
Table 2 contains the various limitations which are speci-
fied in most of the statutes. Almost all of the parental re-
sponsibility laws contain similar specific conditions which 
must be met before a plaintiff can obtain any recovery under 
these statutory laws. These requirements are classified as 
(1) willful, malicious, or intentional act, (2) minor is sub-
ject to parental control, (3) parental neglect is required, 
and (4) age limit of minor. Some statutes do not contain 
their own particular requirements in their wording, yet most 
are quite uniform in the conditions that they require. 
Forty-five states specify that the destructive acts or 
injury to person or property must be the result of a willful, 
malicious, or intentional act. The Idaho statute allows that 
recovery can be obtained from the parents of any minor under 
eighteen years of age "who shall maliciously or wilfully de-
stray property. 1116 The statutory law for Indiana, how-
ever, omits the willful and malicious criteria, in order to 
stress the intent of the child. It reads, "A parent is lia-
ble for not more than two thousand five hundred dollars 
($2,500) in actual damages arising from harm to a person or 
property intentionally caused by his child. . . 1117 
15oklahoma, Statutes Annotated (West, 1983), Chap. 23, 
art. 10. 
16Idaho Code Vol. 2 (1979), sec. 6-210. 
17I d" n 1ana, Statutes Annotated (1984), Title 34, Chap. 31, 
sec. 34-4-31-1. 
The wording of two state statutes differs from these 
forty-nine that address the willful, malicious, or inten-
tional acts of a minor. Iowa's statute declares that the 
parent is liable for the "unlawful acts" of his child. 18 
On the other hand, Maryland's statute stipulates that pa-
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rents are liable " ... in any case in which the court finds 
a child has committed a delinquent act .... " 19 
Although most statutes contain the specific wording 
of willful, malicious, or intentional, and two states declare 
the acts must be either unlawful or delinquent, only two 
states are without any requirements as to the intent of the 
act by the child. Hawaii and Louisiana are the only states 
which make the parent liable whether the child's act was 
intentional or accidental. Hawaii's statute provides the 
following: 
The father and mother of unmarried minor children shall 
jointly and severally be liable in damages for tortious 
acts committed by their children and shall be jointly 
and severally entitled to prosecute and defend all 
actions in which the ch~~dren or their individual pro-
perty may be concerned. 
Louisiana's statute reads as follows: 
The father, or after his decease, the mother, are re-
sponsible for the damage occasioned by their minor or 
unemancipated children, residing with them, or placed 
by them under the care of other pers2~s, reserving to 
them recourse against those persons. 
18rowa, Code Annotated (West 1983), Vol. 41, sec. 613.16. 
19Maryland, Annotated Code (1984), sec. 3-829. 
20Hawaii, Revised Statutes (1976), sec. 577-3. 
21Louisiana, Civil Code (West, 1979), art. 2318. 
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Maryland is the only state that does not require the 
child to be in the custody or control of the parent in order 
for recovery. All of the other states with parental respon-
sibility laws maintain this condition and the wording of 
Alabama's statute is typical of that found in these other 
states: 
The parent or parents of any minor under the age of 
18 years with whom such minor is living an22who have custody of such minor shall be liable ... 
Table 2 also illustrates that every state with a pa-
rental responsibility law except Kansas, Kentucky, New Jersey, 
Tennessee, and Utah places liability on parents without re-
gard to fault or negligence. Each of the exceptions listed 
require that the parent be liable only because of neglect 
or be charged a higher amount of damages if neglect is found. 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, Kansas places no limit on 
the damages that can be recovered from a parent who has been 
found to be negligent. Kentucky's statute stipulates that a 
parent may be liable for damages up to twenty-five hundred 
dollars, "if the parent or guardian has been joined as a 
party defendant in the original action." 23 
In a subsection of that statute, the following is 
provided: 
(2) Nothing in this section is intended to or shall limit 
to twenty-five hundred dollars ($2500) the liability of 
a person to whom the negligence of a minor is imputed b~7 
22Alabama, Code (1975), Title 6, art. 21, sec. 6-5-380. 
23Kentucky, Revised Statutes (1982), sec. 405.025. 
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KRS 186.590, nor shall this section limit the lia- 24 bility set forth in any other statute to the contrary. 
New Jersey's statute; also discussed earlier in this 
chapter, requires that parental neglect or failure to super-
vise and control a child be a condition for recovery. Tennessee 
is explicit in its statutory provisions for the circumstances 
under which a parent is liable. 
(a) A parent or guardian shall be liable for the tortious 
activities of a minor child that causes injuries to 
property where the parent or guardian knows, or 
should know, of the child's tendency to commit 
wrongful acts which can be expected to cause in-
jury to property, and where the parent or guardian 
has an opportunity to control the child but fails 
to exercise reasonable means to restrain the tortious 
conduct. 
(b) A parent or guardian shall be presumed to know of 
a child's tendency to commit wrongful acts, if the 
child has previously be~~ charged and found respon-
sible for such actions. 
Utah attempts to protect the parent from liability ·if 
certain efforts have been made by the parent of a child who 
has damaged property: 
No parent or guardian shall be liable if he or she 
made a reasonable effort to supervise and direct their 
minor child, or in the event the parent knew in advance 
of the possible taking, injury or destruction by their 
minor 7hi~d, 2ge or she made a reasonable effort to restra1n 1t. 
Finally, in Table 2, twenty-one states with parental 
responsibility laws identify the age limit of the young 
24Ibid. 
25Tennessee, Code Annotated (1983), chap. 10, sec. 
37-1003. 
26utah, Code Annotated (1977), sec. 78-11-20. 
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TABLE 2 
Conditions Specified for Recovery 
Willful, malicious, Subject to Parent 
or intentional Parental Neglect Age 
State Act Control Required Limit 
Alabama Yes Yes 18 
Alaska Yes Yes 18 
Arizona Yes Yes Minor 
Arkansas Yes Yes 18 
California Yes Yes Minor 
Colorado Yes Yes 18 
Connecticut Yes Yes Minor 
Delaware Yes Yes 18 
Florida Yes Yes 18 
Georgia Yes Yes 18 
Hawaii No Yes Minor 
Idaho Yes Yes 18 
Over 11 
Illinois Yes Yes Under 19 
Indiana Yes Yes Child 
Iowa Unlawful Yes 18 
Kansas Yes Yes 18 
Kentucky Yes Yes Minor 
Louisiana No Yes Minor 
Between 7 
Maine Yes Yes and 17 
Maryland Delinquent Act No Child 
Massachusetts Yes 
Over 7 
Yes Under 18 
Michigan Yes Yes Minor 
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TABLE 2 
Conditions Specified for Recovery 
Willful, malicious, Subject to Parent 
or intentional Parental Neglect Age 
State Act Control Required Limit 
Minnesota Yes Yes 18 
Over 10 
Mississippi Yes Yes Under 18 
Missouri Yes Yes 18 
Hontana Yes Yes 18 
Nebraska Yes Yes Minor 
Nevada Yes Yes Minor 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey Yes Yes 18 
New Mexico Yes Yes Child 
Over 10 
New York Yes Yes Under 18 
North Carolina Yes Yes Hi nor 
North Dakota Yes Yes Minor 
Ohio Yes Yes 18 
Oklahoma Yes Yes 18 
Oregon Yes Yes Minor 
Pennsylvania Yes Yes 18 
Rhode Island Yes Yes Minor 
South Carolina Yes Yes 17 
South Dakota Yes Yes 18 
Tennessee Yes Yes Yes 18 
Over 12 
Texas Yes Yes Under 18 
Utah Yes Yes Yes Minor 
State 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Washington 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
TABLE 2 
Conditions Specified for Recovery 
Willful, malicious, 
or intentional 
Act 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Subject to 
Parental 
Control 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Parent 
Neglect 
Required 
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Age 
Limit 
17 
Minor 
18 
Minor 
Minor 
Over 10 
Under 17 
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person to be 18 years of age. Two states have 17 as the 
limit. Sixteen states declare no limit but specify the term 
"minor," while three states use the term "child." Both 
Mississippi and New York identify the minimum and maximum 
age limit to over 10 and under 18. On the other hand, Illinois 
limits the age from over 11 to under 19; Maine's limit is be-
tween 7 and 17; Massachusetts is over 7 and under 18; while 
Texas sets the limit at over 12 but under 18; and Wyoming's 
age limit is over 10 but under 17. 
Statutes Dealing Specifically with the 
Destruction of School Property 
Altogether there are twenty-four statutes that address 
the specific destruction of school property. Some of these 
statutes do not have the topic of student vandalism as their 
major purpose but instead, they give destruction of school 
property as one of the grounds for suspension or expulsion of 
students. However, several states do contain statutes whose 
purpose is to present the legal aspects involved in recovery 
for the damage to or destruction of school property. These 
particular statutes detail the liability of parents and some-
times the liability of the students who commit such vandalism. 
Tables 3 and 4 help to illustrate some of the important aspects 
of these statutes as they are presented in this section of the 
chapter. 
Table 3 indicates that nine states have statutory laws 
that enumerate the grounds for suspension or expulsion of stu-
dents. One of these grounds for such punishment is each of these 
Table 3 
Statutes Containing Provisions for Suspension 
or Expulsion on Grounds of Destruction 
of School Property 
Date.of Statute in 
59 
Statute Enactment Original Version 
IND. BURNS STAT. 
20-8.1-5-4 (Michie, 1984) 
KY. REV. STAT. 
158.150 (1980 Replacement) 
LA. STAT. ANN. 
R.S. 17:416 (1984) 
HINN. STAT. ANN. 
127.29 (West, 1976) 
MONT. CODE ANN. 
20-5-201 (1983) 
NEB. REV. STAT., 1943 
79-4-180 (Reissue/1981) 
N. J. STAT. ANN. 
18A:37-2 (West, 1984) 
TENN. CODE 
49-6-3401 (1983) 
WYO. STAT. 
21-4-305 to 21-4-306 (1977) 
1973 No 
1978 Yes 
1983 No 
1978 No 
1971 No 
1976 Yes 
1969 No 
1977 No 
1969 No 
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statutes is the damaging or destruction of school property. 
Indiana's statute, "Grounds for expulsion or suspension," 
has the provisions similar to many of the ten other statutes. 27 
The statute lists the student conduct that would warrant sus-
p~nsion or expulsion, and it includes the following: -
(b) Causing or attempting to cause substantial damage 
to school property, stealing or attempting to steal 
school property of substantial value, or repeated 
damage 2~r theft involving school property of small value. 
In the Kentucky statute, suspension or expulsion might result 
from " ... stealing or destruction or defacing of school 
property or personal property. 1129 However, such punish-
ment is given in the Minnesota statute for the "willful conduct 
which endangers the pupil or other pupils or the property of 
the school." 30 
The statutes identified in Table 3, then, provide for 
suspension or expulsion of those students who vandalize 
school property. Table 4, however, illustrates information 
regarding the fifteen specific statutes that pertain to the 
liability of parents and/or students for school vandalism. 
The table provides the statutory references, the date of 
passage, and information regarding revision, pupil punishm~nt 
and the maximum amount of parental liability stipulated in 
these fifteen statutes. 
27I d" n ~ana, Statutes (Supp. 1984), sec. 20-8.1-5-4. 
28 Ibid. 
29Kentucky, Revised Statutes (1980 Replacement), 
sec. 158.150. 
30Minnesota, Statutes Annotated, Title lOA, sec. 127.29. 
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Table 4 reveals that fifteen states not only have sta-
tutes dealing with general property destruction in their 
statutory law, but each also has passed a statute dealing 
with specific school property destruction. Six of these states 
had enacted the original version of these specific statutes in 
the early 1900's. As mentioned previously in the chapter, 
most of the parental responsibility laws for general destruc-
tion of property were passed after 1950. Yet, California 
enacted a statute for specific destruction of school property 
in 1901. Arizona passed its statute dealing specifically with 
school vandalism in 1912; Louisiana enacted its statute in 
1922; Arkansas passed its law in 1931; Mississippi passed its 
statute in 1942; and Vermont enacted its statute in 1947. 
Hawaii has been the last state to acquire the particular 
type of statute and it originally passed its law in 1978. Of 
all fifteen statutes, only the Arkansas statute is in its 
original version. 
Whereas the statutes for general destruction of pro-
perty are found to contain several similar elements (limits 
of recovery, age limit specified, etc.), the statutes for 
specific destruction of school property contain fewer common 
elements. The two major characteristics that these statutes 
share are that generally the student is suspended or expelled 
and the parent or the student is held liable for damages. 
Arizona's statute typifies several of the other statutes: 
A. A pupil who cuts, defaces, or otherwise injures any 
school property may be suspended or expelled. 
B. Upon complaint of the governing board, the parents 
or guardians of minors who have injured school pro-
perty shall be lia~te for all damages caused by their 
children or wards. 
Disciplinary action against students who damage, de-
stroy, or steal school property generally may include not 
only suspension or expulsion, but a variety of other mea-
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sures as well, For example, Table 4 reveals that the students 
may be responsible for paying for damages. The Arkansas sta-
tute states that any person "shall be fined in a sum double 
the value of such buildings, furniture, fixtures, or apparatus 
so destroyed or damaged, and shall be fined in a sum not less 
than ten dollars ($10.00), nor more than fifty dollars ($50.00) 
for each offense. 1132 The Hawaii statute requires that: 
(a) Any pupil found to be responsible for an act of 
vandalism against any public school, building, 
facility, or. ground shall make restitution in any 
manner including monetary restitution by 5~e pupil 
or pupil's parents, or guardian, or both. 
Pupils or the parents may be responsible for maximum res-
titution of $3,500; damages that exceed this amount are 
referred to the attorney general or the state for further 
action. 
Table 4 also indicates that the pupil must pay for 
damage or grades, diplomas, and transcripts may be withheld. 
31Arizona, Revised Statutes Annotated (1983), Title 15, 
chap. 8, sec. 15-842. 
32Arkansas, Statutes Annotated (1980), Title 7, sec. 
80-1903. 
33Hawaii, Revised Statutes (Supp. 1983), sec. 298-27. 
34 Ibid. 
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Table 4 
Pupil/Parent Liability Statutes Dealing 
with the Specific Destruction 
of School Property by Minor 
Statute 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1912 
15-842 (1983) 
No 
Ark. Stat. Ann. 
80-1903 to 80-1904 
(1980) 
1931 Yes 
Cal. Edu. Code 
48904 (1984) 
Fla. Stat. Ann. 
235.09 (West, 1984 
Haw. Rev. Stat 
298.27 (1983) 
Me. Rev. Stat. 
6805 70 6807 (1983) 
1901 No 
1977 No 
1978 No 
1954 No 
Suspension or 
Expulsion 
All 
Damaees 
Any person (1) Double the 
sum destroyed or damaged 
(2) Fine no less than 
$10.00, no more than $50 
for each offense. 
Grades, diploma, 
transcripts 
withheld until 
damages paid, 
or 
voluntary work 
in lieu of pay-
ment 
Any person 
(not k-12) is 
guilty of 
misdemeanor 
Restitution, in-
cluding maximum 
$3,500 
$5,000 
maximum 
plus 
$5,000 
maximum 
paid for 
any 
reward 
Restitution, 
including 
monetary 
maximum of 
$3,500 
Double the 
damage, 
maximum fine 
of $10 for 
defacing with 
obscenity 
taxed for 
value 
Table 4 
Pupil/Parent Liability Statutes Dealing 
with the Specific Destruction 
of School Property by Minor 
.-I 
ct1 ~ 
~ t) s:: s:: s:: •.-1•.-1 Q) 
Q) ~ bOS:: ] s Cll•.-1 0 
~ •.-1 $-l•.-1 .-len 
Q) t) ~ocn •r-1•.-1 
~ ct1 ct1 1-1 §'§ 
Statute 
ct1 4-l s:: ~CI)Q) 
ClOJ:z.l Cl) •.-1 ::> ~~ 
Miss. Code Ann. 1942 No Suspension or 
37-11-19 (1972) expulsion 
Nev. Rev. Stat. 1956 No Charged with no 
393.070 (1979) less than a mis-
demeanor damages 
charged 
N.J. Stat. Ann. 1983 No 
18A:37-3 
N.C. Gen; Stat. 
115C-398 to 115C-399 1981 Yes 
115C-523 (1983) 1955 No 
Ore. Rev. Stat. Pupil is 
339.260, 339.270 1965, No disciplined 
(1977) 1971 Suspension or 
expulsion 
S.D. Codified Laws 1931 No Suspension or 
13-32-5 (1982) expulsion 
Vt. Stat. Ann 1947 No 
3744 (1968) 
Va. Code 1950 No Reimbursement 
22.1-276 to for breakage 
22.1-277 or destruction 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann 1969 No Suspension or 
punishment, 
diploma, 
grades, trans-
cript may be 
withheld until 
payment. 
Nay pay or may 
work in lieu 
of payment 
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>. 
~ 
•.-I 
.-I ~ 
•.-I s:: 
..0 Q) 
ct1 1-1 
•.-1 4-l ct1 
...lOP.. 
All 
damages 
All 
damages 
Assessed 
damages not 
to exceed 
$5,000 
No reference 
to parent 
All 
damages 
No reference 
to parents 
All 
damages 
Both the California statute35 and the Washington statute36 
provide this punishment until restitution is made. Both 
statutes, however, do allow the pupil to make restitution 
through voluntary vork: "When the pupil and parent or 
guardian are unable to pay for the damages, the school dis-
trict shall provide a program of voluntary work for the 
pupil in lieu of monetary damages." 37 
Table 4 also reveals that the liability of the parent 
varies greatly among the states. The parent is definitely 
responsible for paying for all damages in many states. 
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Mississippi's statute reads as several of the fifteen states 
when it stipulates that a pupil's "parents or person or per-
sons in loco parentis shall be liable for all damages." 38 
Oregon, however, qualifies the amount, to cover the assessed 
damages and if the parent does not pay, then the district 
school board, ". . in addition to any other remedy provided 
by law . . . may bring action . . . for the amount of the 
assessed damages not to exceed $5,000 plus costs."39 Haine, 
on the other hand, declares that the school administrative 
unit " ... may recover from the minor's parent, in a civil 
35california, Deering's Education Code Annotated 
(Supp. 1984), sec. 48904. 
36washington, West's Revised Code Annotated, (1984), 
Title 28A, Chap. 28A.87, sec. 120. 
37Ibid. 
38Mississippi, Code Annotated (1972), sec. 37-11-19. 
39oregon, Revised Statutes, (1977 Replacement), sec. 
339.260. 
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action, double the damage." 40 If a student loses, destroys, 
or unnecessarily injures a school book or appliance and if 
the parent refuses to pay the assessed amount of damage, the 
Maine statute provides that, "the municipal assessors shall 
include in_the next municipal tax of the delinquent parent 
the value of the book or appliance to be assessed and collected 
h . . 1 .,41 as ot er mun~c~pa taxes. 
In summary, these fifteen statutes pertaining to the 
liability of the parent or the pupil for destruction of school 
property have some similar elements, but they also contain a 
wide variation in the provisions for pupil punishment and 
maximum liability of the parent. These statutes are also in 
addition to the statutory laws which pertain to the vicarious 
liability of parents for the general destruction of property 
by their children. The North Carolina statute deserves par-
ticular attention because it not only asserts that parents are 
liable for their children's acts of vandalism, but this statute 
also requires that teachers and principals face liability for 
damages to school property if they have not exercised proper 
supervision of students. This portion of the statute reads 
as follows: 
It shall be the duty of every teacher and principal 
in charge of school buildings to instruct the children 
in the proper care of public property, and it is their 
duty to exercise due care in the protection of school 
40Maine, Revised Statutes Annotated, (1981), Title 20, 
chap. 20-A, sec. 6805. 
41 Ibid. 
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property against damage, either by defacement of the 
walls and doors or any breakage on the part of the 
pupils, and if they shall fail to exercise a reasonable 
care in the protection of property during the day, they 
may be held financially responsible for all damages, 
and if the damage is due to carelessness or negligence 
on the part of the teachers or principal, the superin-
tendent may hold those in charge of the building re-
sponsible for the damage, and if it is not repaired 
before the close of a term, a sufficient amount may be 
deducted from their final vouch~2s to repair the damage 
for which they are responsible. 
42North Carolina General Statutes (1983), sec. 
llSC-523. 
CHAPTER IV 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWS 
Overview 
A variety of legal issues have emerged concerning 
parental responsibility laws since the 1950's when many 
states first enacted such statutes. Although the legis-
latures of forty-nine states have responded to the public's 
demand that parents be held legally responsible for damage 
to property by their children, various aspects of these 
state acts have prompted many court cases. Therefore, the 
purpose of this chapter will be to identify and to analyze 
the major legal issues concerned with selected court cases 
that deal with the liability of parents for the torts of 
their minor children. 
One major issue that has been addressed in several 
court cases has been the question of the constitutionality 
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of parental responsibility laws. Challengers have generally 
claimed that the statutes are violative of the equal protection 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. They have charged, too, 
that these statutes allow the deprivation of the parents' 
property without due process as guaranteed in both the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 
Finally, challengers have also claimed that these statutory 
laws are unconstitutional because they interfere with the 
fundamental rights of parents to bear and raise children. 
This issue of the constitutionality of parental responsi-
bility acts will be the first examined in this chapter. 
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Two important legal issues stern from the fact that 
general property statutes are in derogation to common law 
and must be strictly construed. One issue involves the 
requirements of most property statutes that destruction of 
property must be the result of willful and malicious in-
tent. Destruction of property that is due to the careless-
ness on the part of a minor is not included in the parental 
responsibility statutes. A second legal issue involves the 
requirement that a parent is liable only if the minor is in 
his custody or control. Both of these issues have been the 
subject of litigation and they, too, will be examined in 
this chapter. 
There are two other important issues related to the 
general property statutes which are discussed: (1) the maxi-
mum amount of recovery that can be charged to parents under 
statutory law; and (2) whether parents can seek financial 
relief from insurance policies. Another issue related to 
insurance is that of the insurance company in the role of 
subrogee. Selected court cases are presented to illustrate 
aspects of these various issues, which in different situa--
tions produce different findings from the courts. 
The final section of this chapter focuses on those 
statutes which pertain specifically to the destruction of 
school property. ·The issue of whether statutory law applies 
to damages during or after school hours is related to the 
fact that statutes must be strictly construed. Whether pa-
rents are liable for their children's careless and negli-
gent acts is discussed, along with a specific court ruling 
regarding indefinite school suspension until restitution is 
made. The issue of the maximum amount of recovery is also 
presented as it relates to damages that result from more 
than one incident. Finally, the issue of having an insu-
ranee company serve as subrogee completes this section re-
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garding statutes pertaining specifically to school property. 
The United States Supreme Court has yet to hear a case 
directly involving these parental responsibility laws. In-
stead, all of the issues discussed in this chapter have been 
determined in no court higher than various state supreme courts 
and state courts of appeals. Therefore, with no United States 
Supreme Court decisions, there are no binding rulings through-
out the United States. 1 Rather, the issues presented in this 
chapter come from the different state courts whose decisions 
have affected primarily the courts within those states, al-
though some state supreme court decisions have resulted in 
decisions that have been influential in cases in other states 
or areas of the country. 
Yet, in spite of the fact that legal precedents have 
been established by these particular courts, a plaintiff may 
1Alan Aberson, "Litigation," Public Policy and the 
Education of Exceptional Children, ed. Frederick J. Weintraub 
(Reston, Virginia: The Council for Exceptional Children, 
1976), p. 254. 
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still present a grievance in court because, even in United 
States Supreme court decisions, ''There is really little abso-
lute or 'apolitical' law that remains immutable as time passes, 
as public policies change and interests of society shift." 2 
Laws are not static but ever-changing; different circumstances 
and facts may yield different decisions in different courts. 
The legal aspects of the parental liability statutes which 
are discussed in this chapter illustrate these characteristics 
of legal precedents. 
Constitutionality of Parental Responsibility Laws 
The major challenge to parental responsibility laws has 
been legislative in their constitutionality. Several court 
cases in various states have addressed this issue since the 
first such case, Kelly v. Williams, was held in Texas. 3 Since 
1961, the defendant parents have presented the belief that the 
parental liability statutes violate the equal protection 
clause of the Forteenth Amendment; deprive the parent of pro-
perty without due process, which is guaranteed in both the 
2Ibid. 
3see Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W. 2d 434 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1961); General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 
130 S.E. 2d 645 (1963); Mahaney v. Hunter Enterprises, 426 
p. 2d 442 (Wyo. 1967); corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 
S.E. 2d 766 (1971); In re: Sorrell 20 Md. App. 179, 315A 
2d 110 (1974), cert. denied, 271 Md. 740, 744 (1979); 
Watson v. Gradzik, 34 Conn. Sup. 7, 373 A. 2d 191 (C.P. 1977); 
Rudnay v. Corbett, 53 Ohio App. 2d 311, 374 N.E. 2d 171 (1977); 
Vanthournout v. Burge, 69 Ill. App. 3d 193, 387 N.E. 2d 341, 
cert. denied, 79 Ill. 2d 618 (1979); Hayward v. Ramick, 248 
~841, 285 S.E. 2d 697 (1982); Stang v. Waller, Fla. App. 
415 So. 2d 123 (1982). 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and interfere with their 
fundamental right to bear and raise children. Only one of 
these cases, Corley v. Lewless, has found a parental lia-
bility statute to be unconstitutional. 4 
One rea~on why all but one case have been unsuccess-
ful in their constitutional challenge is "It is well 
settled that a defendant who attacks a statute on consti-
tutional grounds has no easy burden."5 In addition, the 
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following remarks highlight the difficulty of such challenges: 
When the constitutionality of legislation is 
in question, it is the duty of the court to sustain 
it unless its invalidity is beyond a reasonable 
doubt. . . . It is a rule of statutory construction 
. . . that the courts are bound to assume that the 
legislature, in enacting a particular law, did so 
upon proper motives and to accomplish a worthy 
objective .... Furthermore, courts must, if pos-
sible, construe a law so that it is effective ... 
It is to be presumed that legislatures do not 
delib5rately enact ineffective and unconstitutional 
laws. 
Although defendant parents have had the burden of 
proof, they have attempted for over twenty years to challenge 
the constitutionality of different general liability statutes. 
The equal protection clause has often been cited as one of 
the grounds for unconstitutionality. This particular argu-
ment is espoused by parents who believe they are unfairly 
4corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E. 2d 766 (1971). 
5watson v. Gradzik, 34 Conn. Sup. 7, 373 A. 2d 191 
(C.P. 1977). 
6Amsel v. Brooks, 141 Conn. 288, 294, 106A. 2d 152, 
156, 
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singled out for being liable for the torts of their children. 
However, this issue has become one of fairness as perceived 
by the state courts. For example, the Court of Civil Appeals 
of Texas in Kelly v. Williams expressed its agreement with a 
statement from the Villanova Law Review, (vol. 3, p. 529) that 
declares, "in all fairness, it is better that the parents of 
these young tort feasors be required to compensate those who 
are damaged, even though the parents be without fault, rather 
h 1 h 1 f 11 h • • • II 7 t an to et t e oss a upon t e 1nnocent v1ct1ms. 
This aspect of fairness was reiterated in another court 
case involving a pupil's damaging of school property: "If it 
would be unfair to assess the parents of the wrongdoer, how 
could it be fair to assess the parents of the other 499 inno-
cent students .... This would exemplify charity but not 
justice. 8 Still another case rejected the equal protection 
argument by finding that restricting the liability to the 
natural parent was reasonable and that all those within the 
class were treated equally. 9 
The Appellate Court of Appeals in Vanthournout v. 
Burge cited the following reasoning for upholding the Illinois 
Parental Responsibility Act: 
If there is a reasonable basis for differentiating 
between the class to which the law is applicable and 
the class to which it is not, the General Assembly 
7Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W. 2d 434 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). 
8Palmyra Bd. of Education, Burlington Co. v. Hansen, 56 
N.J. Super 567, 153 A. 2d 393 (1959). 
9Mahaney v. Hunter Enterprises, Inc., Wyo., 426 P. 2d 
442 (1967). 
may constitutionally classify persons and objects for 
the purpose of legislative regulation or control and 
rna~ pass 10aws applicable only t~ such persons or obJects. 
Therefore, the issue of fairness in consideration of the 
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general welfare and the requirement for having a reasonable 
basis for statutory inequality have been replies of state 
courts to charges by defendant parents that they have re-
ceived unequal protection from parental responsibility laws. 
Most constitutional challenges have focused on the 
charges of depriving the parent of property without due pro-
cess of law by imposing liability without fault of the parent. 
However, as one case states, "Vicarious liability without 
fault is not a new concept. It has been upheld against due 
process challenges in a number of other situations."11 A 
prominent example of the imposition of liability without 
fault includes the provision under the workmen's compensa-
tion act in which the employer is held liable for injuries to 
employees. 12 Other examples include the liability without 
fault of a municipality to a property owner for damages caused 
by a rioting mob and the vicarious liability of the owner of 
an aircraft for ground damages caused by the operation of the 
aircraft. 13 
10vanthournout v. Burge, 69 Ill. App. 3d 193, 387 N.E 
2d 341, Cert. denied, 79 Ill. 2d 618 (1979) 
11Piscataway Tp. Bd. of Education v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 
308, 431 A. 2d 799 (1981). 
12Ibid. 
13Ibid. 
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The courts have also answered defendant parents who 
cite inadequate due process as grounds for declaring parent 
liability statutes unconstitutional by citing from Nebbia v. 
New York: 
The guaranty of due process . . . demands only that 
the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capri-
cious, and that the means selected shall have a real 
and subst!Utial relation to the object sought to be 
obtained. 
Central to this aspect has been the additional challenge that 
due process is violated because the general liability statutes 
require unreasonable exercise of the police power of the state. 
Repeatedly, however, the courts have considered the 
goals of the parental liability statutes to be within the 
police powers of the state; primarily because they hold the 
welfare of the state above that of the individua1. 15 Indeed, 
courts have expressed belief that the state has a legitimate 
interest in the objective of controlling or reducing juvenile 
delinquency and of compensating innocent victims of the torts 
caused by minors by imposing liability upon parents of those 
16 children who wilfully or maliciously damage property. There-
fore, as the court declared in Rudnay v. Corbett, such statutory 
law "bears a rational relation to the object sought to be 
attained". 17 Based on these requirements, the courts have 
14Rudnay v. Corbett, 53 Ohio App. 2d 311, 374 N.E. 2d 
311, 174 (1977). 
15General Insurance Company of America v. Faulkner, 
259 NC 317, 130 S.E. 2d 645 (1963). 
16stang v. Waller, Fla. App. 415 So. 2d 123 (1982). 
17 Rudnay v. Corbett, 53 Ohio App. 2d 311, 374 N.E. 2d 
171 (1977). 
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declared that parental liability statutes do not violate due 
process. 
Another constitutional challenge has been the contention 
of defendant parents that parental liability statutes inter-
fere with the fundamental right to bear and raise children. 
The courts have not supported this contention, either. Vari-
ous courts have taken the firm position that the right to 
bear and raise children is accompanied by the responsibility 
to see that one's children are properly raised so that the 
rights of other people are protected. 18 Judicial findings in 
Watson v. Gradzik19 concerning this challenge have also been 
cited in Vanthournout v. Burge20 and Piscataway Bd. of Ed. v. 
Caffiero. 21 In fact, in the Piscataway Bd. of Ed. v. 
Caffiero case, the court found, "The effect of the vicarious 
liability statute on the decision of individuals to bear or 
b h 'ld . 1 . b t ,ZZ eget c l ren lS specu atLve, at es . 
In summary, the courts have thus far largely rejected 
all three contentions of parent defendants who would challenge 
the constitutionality of parental liability statutes. The 
societal norm pervades the findings in judicial decisions 
18watson v. Gradzik, 34 Conn. Sup. 7, 373 A. 2d 191 
(C.P. 1977). 
19Ibid. 
20vanthournout v. Burge, 69 Ill. App. 3d 193, 387 N.E. 
2nd 341, Cert. denied, 79 Ill. 2d 618 (1979). 
21Piscataway Tp. Bd. of Education v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 
308, 431 A. 2d 799 (1981). 
22 Ibid., p. 806. 
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presented in this section: Parents hold a unique relationship 
with their children and should bear a moral responsibility for 
their behavior. Although many other people--teachers, friends, 
relatives--influence children, the courts see the _parents as 
having a primary role which makes them ultimately responsible 
for their children's wrongdoings. "Because parents do have the 
authority to compel obedience of their children, it would not 
seem unreasonable to hold them responsible for exercising that 
authority." 23 In addition, the courts have weighed the general 
welfare against the individual interest and this concern for 
the public has permeated many of the findings. 
In only one case have defendant parents successfully 
challenged the constitutionality of a parental liability sta-
tute.24 In Corley v. Lewless, the Georgia Supreme Court de-
clared the Act of 1966 to be unconstitutional based on dis-
tinctions that this general liability statute had versus those 
of statutes which had been uniformly upheld until 1961. In 
Corley v. Lewless, the court declared the general liability 
statute unconstitutional primarily because there was no limi-
25 tation on the liability of the parent. 
In reaching its decision, the court researched the issue 
and found that until that time (1961), only three other such 
23 Watson v. Gradzik, 34 Conn. Sup. 7 ' 373 A. 2d 191 
(C.P. 1977). 
24 Corley v. Lew1ess, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E. 2d 766 
(1971). 
25 Ibid. , p. 769. 
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statutes had been subjected to constitutional challenge. The 
statutes of Texas, North Carolina, and Wyoming had ~11 success-
fully met constitutional challenges, but the Georgia Supreme 
Court found that these three statutes were distinguishable from 
the Georgia·statute. 26 In all three cases, the statutes covered 
only property damages and each statute had a limitation of re-
covery of $300 or $500. 27 Therefore, the court reasoned that 
recovery was in the nature of a penalty rather than for the 
purpose of compensating the injured parties. 28 After stating 
that the statute "imposes vicarious tort liability solely on 
the basis of the parent-child relationship, 29 the court de-
clared the statute unconstitutional. 
In 1976 the Georgia legislature enacted a new general 
liability statute with a $500 limit of recovery for the ex-
pressed intent of providing for aid in controlling juvenile 
delinquency and not for compensating victims. A due process 
attack was made on the 1976 statute in the case of Hayward v. 
Ramick; the defendant parents appealed to the Supreme Court 
of Georgia in 1982. 30 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the 
decision of the Superior Court and therefore upheld the con-
stitutionality of Georgia's revised parental liability statute. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., p. 770. 
30Hayward v. Ramick, 248 Ga. 841, 285 S.E. 2d 697 
(1982). 
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Issues Related to General Property Statutes 
Generally, the mere relationship of parent and child 
does not impose on the parent liability for the torts of the 
child. Yet, there are circumstances in which a parent may 
be held liable even under common law. The case of Steinberg 
v. Cauchois is often cited as providing the most widely 
accepted ground upon which a parent can be found liable for 
the torts of his child at common law. 31 However, under stat-
utory law, a parent may be vicariously liable for the torts 
of his child. Yet, because such statutory law is in deroga-
tion to common law, it must be strictly construed. Statutory 
law, therefore cannot alter the common law in any way not 
specifically stated in the wording of the statute itself. 
C~reless and Negligent Acts 
Most general parental liability statutes specify that 
parents are liable only for their children's "willful" and 
"malicious" destruction acts. Certainly, several court cases 
have held that pupils and their parents are not liable for 
injury to property where the injury stems from any acts of 
neglect or carelessness. In Lutterman v. Martin, a nine-year-
old boy set fire to a barn by lighting the paper he had stuffed 
. ff 32 ~nto a co ee can. His father was sued for damages, but the 
Connecticut Court of Common Pleas found for the defendant 
31steinberg v. Cauchois, 249 App. Div. 518, 293 N.Y.S. 
147 (1937). 
32Lutteman v. Martin, 20 Conn. Sup. 371, 135 A. 2d 600 
(1957). 
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father on grounds that evidence failed to disclose the young-
ster's act had been willful. Instead, the court characterized 
the act as simple negligence and cited the following: 
Negligence may take on a variety of forms and 
partake of all manner of degrees. The shortcoming 
may be slight, or it may be a grievous one. It may 
result from omission or from commission; from pure 
inadvertence or·from voluntary action. It may be 
characterized by needlessness, or by a persistence 
in ill-chosen conduct. But whatever its form or 
degree, it is something quite apart from wilful or 
malicious injury, whose characteristic element is 
the desire to injure, either actually entertained 33 or to be implied from the conduct and circumstances. 
Many court cases have yielded decisions in favor of 
parent defendants whose children have been found guilty of 
negligent acts. 34 Although plaintiffs in these cases had 
hoped to present their action under authority of parent lia-
bility statutes, the decisions were not in their favor because 
of the absence of any substantial evidence of the willful and 
malicious acts which were specified in the statutes. 
Willful and Malicious Acts 
The terms "willful" and "malicious" are of general and 
d 1 1 d h d . 35 I widesprea ega usage an ave accepte meanlngs. n 
Ortega v. Montoya, the Supreme Court of New Mexico reversed 
the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the 
33 Ibid., p. 602. 
34 see McKinney v. Cahall, 40 Mich. App. 389, 198 N.W. 
2d 713 (1972); Town of Groton v. Medberry, 6 conn. Cir. 671, 
301 A. 2d 270 (1972); Walker v. Kelly, 6 conn. Cir. 715, 314 
A. 2d 785 (1973); Crum v. Groce, Colo., 556 P. 2d 1223 (1976); 
Sutherland v. Roth, Ala. Civ. App., 407 So. 2d 139 (1981). 
35sutherland v. Roth, Ala. Civ. App., 407 So. 2d 139 
(1981). 
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decision of the trial court which had found the parent lia-
ble for the willful and malicious act of an eight-year-old. 36 
The court characterized the act based on the generally 
accepted definition of these legal terms which denote the 
intentional doing of a harmful act without any rightful course 
of excuse and without any regard for the consequences. 37 The 
court also found no difficulty in attributing the acts to the 
eight-year-old because "it is for the trier of fact to deter-
mine, based upon the child's age, experience and mental 
capacity, whether the child acted in a willful and malicious 
manner."38 
Custody and Control 
Another commonly required bar to recovery under parental 
liability statutes is that the minor must be in the custody 
and control of the parents. Again, the statutes are strictly 
construed as court cases centering around this issue have 
demonstrated. For example, two cases resulted in opposite 
findings for the different defendant parents because of this 
bar to recovery. In re: James D., the parents of a minor 
were not held liable for the destruction of a model home which 
the son and others had set fire to and completely destroyed. 39 
At the time of this incident, the son had been removed from 
36ortega v. Montoya, 97 N.M. 159, 637 P. 2d 841 (1981). 
37rbid., p. 843. 
38rbid., p. 842. 
39re: James D., 295 Md. 314, 455 A. 2d 966 (1983). 
the care and custody of the mother and father by a court 
order. The son had been placed in a particular school by 
the juvenile services and the youngster had escaped and was 
absent without leave at the time of the incident. The pa-
rents had not seen their son from the time he had escaped 
until his arrest for the incident. Since the parents did 
not have actual control and custody of the child at the 
time of the incident, the Court of Appeals of Maryland did 
not require them to pay for their son's damages. 
However, in the 1965 Repko v. Seriana40 case, the pa-
rents were held liable for their son's damage to an auto-
mobile, even though the youngster was technically under the 
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care of the state. The son had been sent home on an experi-
mental basis from a school for boys and had run away from 
home after having been there for a week. The court concluded 
that even if the state had technical custody of the son, the 
father was responsible for the damages because he had control 
of his son. The court cited the following as a basis for 
their ruling: "The duties of a parent belong to the parent 
while the child is in his control."41 
Even if statutory law does not require either custody or 
control by the parent, then he may still be liable for the 
child's willful and malicious damages. In Alber v. Noble, the 
parents of a youngster under eighteen were held liable for 
40Repko v. Seriani, 3 Conn. Cir. 374, 214 A. 2d 843 
(1965). 
41 Ibid. 
such damages by their daughter who was living in the horne 
of a boyfriend during the time of her assault on Carole 
Alber. 42 The parents of Monika Noble were made financially 
responsible for actions primarily because at the time of 
the assault, the 1972 parental liability statute in New 
Mexico required only that the child be unemancipated and 
under eighteen years of age and that the damages be the re-
sult of willful and malicious activity. 43 The court cited 
the definition of emancipation as " ... the severence of 
the parental relationship so far as legal rights and lia-
bilities are concerned." 44 
The issue of legal custody was an important aspect in 
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at least two other cases. In Davis v. Shaw, an aunt was not 
liable for damages caused by her nephew who had lived with 
45 her since the death of his parents. Although the aunt was 
generally thought of as the guardian of the nephew, she was 
not the legally qualified guardian as required by the parental 
liability statute in Louisiana. 46 Another case demonstrated 
that even if the minor marries, moves away from horne, and is 
self-supporting, the parent may be liable. 47 In Alber v. Ellis, 
the father was held financially responsible for his son's 
42Alber v. Nolle, 98 N.M. 100, 655 P. 2d 456 (1982). 
43 Ibid., p. 459. 
44 Ibid. 
45Davis v. Shaw, LA. App., 142 So. 301 (1932). 
4 6 Ibid. , p . 3 0 3 . 
47Alber v. Ellis, Ohio Corn. Pl., 359 N.E. 2d 1022 (1977). 
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willful and malicious damages because th~ custody and control 
of his son had not been taken from the parent by a domestic 
relations court. 48 
Maximum Amount of Liability 
Another legal issue related to parental responsibility 
statutes involves the maximum amount that parents may be 
ordered to pay, per malicious incident. One case which 
illustrates that parents may be charged with the maximum 
liability arising from different tortious acts is Buie v. 
Longspaugh. 49 In this particular case, the defendant parents' 
minor daughter and her friend entered three homes, each owned 
by a separate plaintiff, and after plugging the drains, turned 
on water which resulted in extensive flood damage to each 
house. 50 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the lower 
court's decision which held the state's parental liability 
statute to a $5,000 limit per tortious act, not $5,000 for a 
. f . . . 1 . d 51 Th f ser~es o tort~ous acts ~n a s~ng e ep~so e. ere ore, 
the defendant parents paid a judgment total of $15,000 plus 
interest and attorney's fees. One reason for the court's de-
cision was to allow the property owners to receive the greatest 
'bl 52 recovery pass~ e. 
48 Ibid., p. 1036. 
49Buie v. Longspaugh, Tex. Civ. App., 598 S.W. 2d 673 
(1980). 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52Ibid. 
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Relief from Insurance for Liability 
Parents who seek insurance coverage for any liability 
brought about by the action based on a parental responsi-
bility statute may find that such coveraee may very well 
depend upon the interpretation of the different policy pro-
visions. 53 Although some insurance policies are often 
liberally construed to cover parents who are sued under 
parental responsibility laws, others have been more narrowly 
construed and parent-defendants have been denied such coverage. 
Two cases illustrate the contrasting judgments by the courts. 
In Walker v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company, the 
parent who had been refused coverage when he had lost his case 
involving a suit under a parent liability statute brought 
. . h . 54 actLon agaLnst t e Lnsurance company. Because the policy 
had defined the term "insured" as including every member of 
the family, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals ruled that the 
definition was intended to broaden the coverage of the policy. 55 
Therefore, the parent received coverage under the insurance 
policy because the policy provision had been liberally con-
strued by the court. 
However, in Randolph v. Grange Mutual Casualty Company, 
the coverage for parental liability according to statutory law 
53Michael A. Axel, "Statutory Vicarious Parental 
Liability: Review and Reform," Case Western Reserve Law 
Review, 32 (1981-82): 584. 
54walker v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., Tex. Civ. 
App., 491 S.W. 2d 696 (1973). 
55 Ibid., p. 699. 
d . d 56 was enJ.e . In this case, the policy provisions were 
strictly construed. The parent who had been .found liable 
for his son's property damage had asked for coverage be-
cause his son's act was unexpected and therefore, an 
accident. 57 The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the denial of 
coverage: 
From the fact that liability may have been un-
expected or 'accidental' to appellant, it does not 
follow that the damage was unexpected or accidentally 
caused. Indeed, appellant concedes that the damage 
was not the product of an a§§ident, but of willful 
and intentional misconduct. 
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These two cases illustrate that judicial findings may differ 
on the issue of insurance coverage for parents held liable 
for damages by their children. 
Insurance Company as Subrogee 
At least two court cases have concluded that a tort 
victim's subrogated insurance company is entitled, as subrogee, 
to bring suit in its own name against the tort feasor's 
parent. 59 These cases have established the right of the 
insurance company that has paid the claim submitted by the 
tort victim, to seek direct recourse under its own company 
name. In Motorists Mutual Insurance Company v. Bill, the Ohio 
56Randolph v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co., 57 Ohio St. 
2d 25, 385 N.E. 2d 1305 (1979). 
57 Ibid. I p. 1306. 
58Ibid. 
59see General Insurance Company of America v. Faulkner, 
259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E. 2d 645 (1963); Motorists Mutual In-
surance Company v. Bill, 56 Ohio St. 2d 258, 383 N.E. 2d 880 
(1978). 
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Supreme Court declared that the insurance company could seek 
liability under the Ohio parental responsibility law. 60 The 
court provided the following reason: 
. . . the foresighted insured who has provided insurance 
coverage for his own damages . . . should not provide an 
escape hatch for parents who would have otherwise been 
held accountable to t~! owner for the damaging acts of 
their minor children. 
Conclusions 
Since statutory law is in derogation to common law, it 
must be strictly construed. Parental liability laws pertain-
ing to general property damage are examples of statutory laws 
that have certain requirements that must be met before lia-
bility can be imposed. The bars to recovery are specified 
within the statutes and must be strictly applied before resti-
tution is granted to victims. The exact wording and conditions 
must be met before parental liability is upheld by the courts. 
The most commonly stated bars to recovery demand that the 
destruction be "willful" and "malicious" and that the parents 
have "custody and control" of the child. The circumstances of 
a particular case must adhere to these requirements in the 
opinion of the court before parent defendants are made to 
assume any financial responsibility for damages. Those damages 
may also include the maximum liability for each incident of 
destruction rather than for a limit based on a series of acts 
60Motorists Mutual Insurance Company v. Bill, 56 Ohio 
St. 2d 258, 383 N.E. 2d 880 (1978). 
61 Ibid., p. 885. 
involved in one episode. The issue of insurance coverage 
for parents who are held liable under statutory law is de-
pendent upon the circumstances of each case and whether 
the policy provisions are strictly construed by the court. 
Finally, three court cases have allowed insurance companies 
to serve as subrogees in bringing suit against the parents 
of a tort feasor under the parental responsibility laws. 
Issues Related to School Property Statutes 
Certainly, when minors damage school property resti-
tution can be sought under the parental liability statutes 
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for destruction of general property. However, several states 
have also enacted specific statutory laws to cover vandalism 
of school property. Just as the parental responsibility laws 
have particular provisions barring recovery from parents, so 
do these school-related statutes. Since the pupil/parent 
liability statutes for destruction are also in derogation to 
common law, they must also be strictly construed. 
Damages During/After School Hours 
The exact wording of the liability statutes pertaining 
to destruction of school property must be strictly construed. 
One case in particular illustrates this requisrement by the 
courts. In the 1955 Lamro Independent Consolidated School 
District v. Cawthorne case, the Supreme Court of South Dakota 
reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court and did not require 
the liability of the parents for damages caused by their son. 62 
62Lamro Independent Consolidate School District v. 
Cawthorne, 76 S.D. 106, 73 N.W. 2d 337 (1955). 
Althought the sixteen-year-old student had broken into the 
school and damaged school property, he and another boy had 
done so at night. According to the statute upon which the 
plaintiff had based its claim, the parents were liable only 
for those acts "upon complaint of a teacher to any member 
of the school board."63 In the opinion of the South Dakota 
Supreme Court, the statutory language did not cover those 
acts which were done at night when the pupil would not be 
under the supervision of the teacher. Therefore, the pa-
rents could not be held U.able for the damages which he had 
actually helped to do. 
Ironically, four years after the South Dakota Supreme 
Court issued its ruling in the Cawthorne case, the Superior 
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Court of New Jersey heard a case with similar circumstances. 
However, in the New Jersey case of Board of Education v. 
64 Hansen, the ruling was against the defendant parents. They 
were held liable for their son's damages to school property 
even though this vandalism occurred after school hours. The 
counsel for the parents had argued that the language of the 
statute pertaining to the destruction of school property im-
plied that the liability was applicable only during school 
hours. 65 Although the words, "on complaint of the teacher" 
had formerly been a part of the New Jersey statute dating 
63 Ibid. 
64Palymra Bd. of Education, Burlington Co. v. Hansen, 
N.J. Super, 567, 153 A. 2d 393 (1959). 
65 Ibid., p. 395. 
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back to 1867, those words were omitted in subsequent enact-
ments of the statute. 66 The court concluded, therefore, that 
The New Jersey statute omits this phrase 'on com-
plaint of the teacher,' and ... it is reasonable to 
assume that the New Jersey Legislature did not intend 
to so restrict or qualify the liability of the parents. 
Statutes should be interpreted by giving their ~~rds 
used therein their words and ordinary meanings. 
The parents were held liable in Board of Education v. Hansen, 
then, because the statute was strictly construed and there 
were no bars to recovery limiting liability only during school 
hours. 
Careless or Negligent Acts 
Not only do statutes for parental liability for damages 
to general property require that such damages be the result of 
"willful" and "malicious" activity, but those statutes relating 
to vandalism of school property do, also. The courts have 
generally been in agreement that pupils and their parents can-
not be required to pay for damages to school property where 
the damages have been the result of carelessness or neglect. 68 
In the late 1800's, three court cases termed unreasonable any 
rule that would suspend or expel students for careless acts 
until damages could be paid. In 1880, the Supreme Court of 
Iowa ruled in the case of Perkins v. Board of Directors of the 
Independent School District of West Des Moines that a youngster 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68Newton Edwards, The Courts and the Public Schools 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940), p. 532. 
who had accidentally batted a ball through a window be re-
instated because he "was guilty of no breach of discipline 
or of any offense against good order."69 In 1888, the 
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Supreme Court of Indiana also decided in favor of the child's 
reinstatement in State v. Vanderbilt and the court concluded 
that "carelessness on the part of children is one of the most 
common, and yet one of the least blameworthy of their faults." 70 
The Supreme Court of Michigan in 1889 ruled in Holmes v. School 
Trust.ees of Avon that such a rule was unreasonable because all 
children are careless and poor children could be denied the 
common-school education which the state had guaranteed to them. 71 
The requirement that destruction of school property 
actually qualify as vandalism before a pupil be expelled or 
suspended or the pupil and/or his parents held liable for damages 
has been addressed by the courts since the 1800's. For example, 
in 1981, the court in Piscataway Township Board of Education v. 
Caffiero, reviewed the dual purposes of such statutory law 
which were not only to help recover from the expense of damages, 
but also to deter delinquent behavior. 72 Therefore, the New 
Jersey statute could not serve as the base for a claim against 
any action other than for damages caused by willful and 
69Perkins v. Independent School District of Des Moines, 
56 Iowa 476, 9. N.W. 356 (1880). 
70state v. Vanderbilt, 116 Ind. 11, 18 N.E. 266 (1888). 
71Holman v. Trustees of School District No. 5, 77 Mich. 
605, 43 N.W. 996, 6 L.R.A. 534 (1889). 
72Piscataway Township Board of Education v. Caffiero, 
86 N.J. 308, 431 A. 2d 799 (1981). 
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1 . . 73 rna ~c~ous acts. 
·In a related aspect involving an indefinite suspensi~n 
until all damages for willful and malicious injuries could be 
paid for, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals ruled in Allen v. 
Chacon that the student be allowed to return to school before 
restitution was made. 74 A youngster had served one year of an 
indefinite suspension for allegedly setting fire to his junior 
high school before the parents successfully secured a temp-
orary injunction restraining the school officials from re-
fusing to re-admit their son. 75 The Court of Civil Appeals 
upheld the District Court's temporary injunction against sus-
pension for two major reasons: (1) it was the policy of the 
school district to take into account the financial condition 
of parents requiring payments for vandalism; and (2) the 
Chacons were experiencing financial difficulties since they 
were "persons of very slender means financially." 76 The 
youngster was allowed to return to school before any damages 
were paid to the school district, even on an installment 
basis, and before the case came before a trial court. 
Maximum Amount of Recovery 
Another issue involved in applying statutory laws to 
73Ibid., p. 803. 
74Allen v. Chacon, Tex. Civ. App., 449 S.W. 2d 289 
(1969). 
75 Ibid., p. 290. 
76 Ibid. , p. 292. 
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school vandalism involves restitution for damages that re-
sult from more than one incident. The case of In re John H. 77 
found that the parents be given maximum liability for two 
separate incidents of vandalism which resulted in $200,000 to 
$400,000 in damages to an elementary school and to a junior 
high school. The Court of Appeals in Maryland spoke to 
several aspects of this case in affirming the decision of the 
Court of Special Appeals. A major aspect was that although 
the damages occurred during the same evening, the vandalism 
was determined to be from two separate incidents because 
(1) they were two different schools which were more than a 
block apart; and (2) the vandalism of the schools did not take 
place at the same time. 78 Therefore, the parents were assessed 
$10,000, or the maximum amount allowed under Maryland's general 
parental liability law which set a limit of $5,000 for all acts 
. . f . 1 . . d 79 arlslng out o a slng e lnCl ent. 
Insurance Company as Subrogee 
There has been one school-related case in which the 
court has allowed an insurance company to serve as subrogee 
and therefore to bring suit under the parental liability sta-
tute. In 1963, the Supreme Court of North Carolina in General 
Insurance Company of America v. Faulkner allowed the insurance 
77re: John H., 49 Md. App. 595, 433 A. 2d 1239 (1981), 
aff'd 293 Md. 295, 443 A, 2d 594 (1982). 
78 Ibid., p. 598. 
79 Ibid., p. 669. 
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company to sue parents of a minor who had set fire to the 
. d d f h 1 d' . 80 curtalns an rapes o a sc oo au ltorlum. The damages 
totaled $2,916.50 and the insurance company paid this amount 
to the Kinston City Board of Education. 81 The North Carolina 
Supreme Court allowed the insurance company then to bring 
suit against the parents of the minor under the parental 
liability statute which allowed $500 as maximum recovery. 
One reason the court supported the subrogated claim of the 
insurance company was because it reasoned that otherwise, 
"the defendants would receive the benefit of the insurance 
without having to pay a cent for it."82 
Conclusion 
The legal issues related to school property statutes 
are similar to those that pertain to general property -sta-
tutes. Clearly, these statutes must also be strictly con-
strued and court cases have been determined on the exact 
wording of those statutes. For over a century, the courts 
have not supported the suspension and expulsion of pupils 
or the liability of pupils and their parents for damages in-
curred as the result of carelessness. The courts have re-
quired that in order for liability to be pursued, the pupil 
should have performed "willful" and "malicious" acts. Pa-
rents may also be charged with individual incidents of 
80General Insurance Company of America v. Faulkner, 259 
N.C. 317, 130 S.E. 2d 645 (1963). 
81 Ibid., p. 647. 
82 rbid., p. 652. 
vandalism and, therefore, the total maximum amount of re-
covery can depend on the number of separate incidents. 
Finally, a board of education can maintain insurance 
coverage for acts of vandalism, and after paying a claim, 
an insurance company can serve as subrogee under its own 
name in an action under statutory law against the parents 
of a tort feasor. 
~ ..... 
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Chapter V 
REVIEW OF COURT DECISIONS 
Overview 
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A review of the major court decisions related to parental 
responsibility laws reveals a variety of issues which have been 
brought before the courts of the forty-nine states that have 
enacted such statutory legislation. The decisions have been 
concerned with the liability of parents for their children's 
destruction of general property and the specific destruction of 
school property. The majority of the court decisions presented 
in this chapter have been since the 1950's. It was during the 
late 1950's that many states responded to the public's reaction 
to rising rates of juvenile delinquency by making parents vicar-
iously liable for the destructive acts of their children. Since 
vandalism of both general and school property has continued to 
be a costly problem, the courts have had to continue to settle 
controversies concerning the application of the parental lia-
bility statutes from the 1950's to the present. 
As a review of the court decisions indicates, all of the 
statutes have been found to be constitutional, except for one. 
Even this statute, since its revision, has passed constitutional 
muster according to the 1982 decision of its state supreme 
court. The courts have decided consistently, too, that the 
statutes must be strictly construed and these decisions, 
depending on the specific facts and circumstances of individual 
cases, have been both for and against the defendant parents. 
The courts have also made pertinent decisions regarding the 
amount of recovery and the practice of allowing insurance 
companies to serve as subrogee and the parent's use of his 
homeowner's policy in order to seek financial relief from 
liability payments. 
Organization of Cases Selected for Review 
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The first category of cases selected for review are those 
cases in which the constitutionality of various parental lia-
bility statutes ha~ been challenged. Parent defendants have 
claimed in these cases that the parental responsibility laws 
either deny them equal protection, due process, or interfere 
with their fundamental right to bear and raise children. The 
following cases are included in this category: 
1. Kelly v. Williams (1961) 
2. Mahaney v. Hunter Enterprises, Inc. (1967) 
3. Corley v. Lewless (1971) 
4. Watson v. Gradzik (1977) 
5. Rudnay v. Corbett (1977) 
6. Vanthournout v. Burge (1979) 
7. Board of Education of Piscataway Township v. 
Caffiew (1981) 
8. Hayward v. Ramick (1982) 
9. Stang v. Waller (1982) 
The second grouping of cases reviewed in this chapter contains 
those cases which illustrate the fact that the parental lia-
bility statutes are in derogation of common law and, therefore, 
must be strictly construed. Not only must the exact wording 
be adhered to, but the requirements for recovery must also be 
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strictly applied before action can be taken against defendant 
parents. Two of the major conditions for recovery are that 
the destruction is willful and malicious and that the parents 
are liable if they have custody and control of the child. The 
selected cases in this category, then, are the following: 
1. Lamro Independent Consolidated School District v. 
Cawthorne (1955) 
2. Lutteman v. Martin (1957) 
3. Board of Education of Borough of Palmyra in County 
of Burlington v. Hansen (1959) 
4. Lamb v. Randall (1980) 
5. In re James D. (1983) 
The third category of selected cases are those that relate 
(1) to the limits on the amount of recovery that might be ob-
tained under certain conditions, (2) to the issue of whether an 
insurance company can serve as subrogee, and (3) to the issue of 
whether a defendant parent can seek relief for liability from 
his homeowner's insurance policy. The cases included in this 
category are the following: 
1. General Insurance Company of America v. Faulkner 
(1963) 
2. Walker v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company (1973) 
3. Buie v. Longspaugh (1980) 
4. In re John (1982) 
Cases Related to Constitutional 
Challenges to Statutes 
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Kelly v. Williams 
346 S.W. 2d 434 (Texas 1961) 
Facts 
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas received this case 
on appeal from the County Court, Dallas County. The case in-
volved a recovery for damages to the appellee's car after it 
had been stolen by the appellant's minor son. A judgment from 
a non-jury trial had been obtained by W.M. Williams against 
Warner M. Kelly, the father of the fifteen-year-old Warner S. 
Kelly. The minor had stolen Williams' car in Dallas, and en 
route to Denton, Texas, had refused to stop at the direction 
of a state highway patrolman. A high-speed chase, with the 
minor driving at speeds in excess of 100 miles an hour, re-
sulted in the youngster's driving the car into a ditch. Al-
though he was unharmed, there were extensive damages to the 
car. The County Court, Dallas County, issued a judgment 
against the minor's father under the provisions of the state's 
act which allowed recovery from the parents of minors for 
damages due to malicious and willful destruction of property. 
The limit of recovery at that time in Texas was for $300. The 
appellant then appealed on the assertion that the statute was 
unconstitutional. The constitutional challenge rested on the 
following three contentions: 
1. The caption of Article 5923-1, Vernon's Annotated 
Civil Statutes, did not clearly declare the purpose of the act 
because it made no direct reference to the liability of parents 
for the torts of their minors. 
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2. The act was in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, primarily 
because it denied parents equal protection and was violative of 
due process. 
3. The act was unenforceable because it was so vague, 
general, and indefinite. 1 
Decision 
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas dismissed each of 
the three challenges to the statute's constitutionality. It 
ruled that even though the title did not include "liability of 
parents" its omission did not violate any requirements for 
titling acts as determined by the Texas Constitution. 2 The 
Court of Civil Appeals also maintained that there are reasonable 
grounds for restricting the statute's liability to parent(s) of 
minors who commit property damages in contrast to holding others 
responsible. 3 As to the third contention, the points were 
found to have no basis when applied to this and they were, also, 
over-ruled. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court was 
affirmed. 
Discussion 
This case was the first one that presented a constitutional 
challenge to a parental liability statute, although twenty-four 
1Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W. 2d 434 (Texas, 1961). 
2Ibid., p. 436. 
3rbid., p. 437. 
other states had such legislation by 1961. The Court of 
Civil Appeals of Texas took note of this fact in offering 
its decision in this case. It also referred to the numerous 
law review articles which had supported such law and it 
specifically cited a passage from the Villanova Law Review, 
vol. 3, p. 529. 4 This passage stressed the fact that the 
concept of parental liability for the torts of children was 
not a new one to such areas of the world as Europe, Central 
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and South America, Quebec, Louisiana, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico. 
It also stated the widely held belief that it is more fair for 
parents of tort feasors to pay for their damages than for inno-
cent victims to do so. This line of reasoning and the grounds 
on which the constitutional challenges were over-ruled in this 
case have been echoed in other such cases since 1961. 
Mahaney v. Hunter Enterprises, Inc. 
426 P. 2d 442 (Wyoming 1967) 
Facts 
This case came on an appeal from a judgment rendered 
by the District Court of Campbell County, Wyoming, which had 
been in favor of the plaintiff. The plate-glass store window 
of Hunter Enterprises, Inc. had been broken and property had 
been stolen by the thirteen and sixteen-year-old sons of 
Mr. and Mrs. Claude Mahaney. The defendant-parents had 
4Ibid., p. 437. 
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unsuccessfully asked for a dismissal of the case on the basis 
of "a failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted and of the unconstitutionality of the statute under 
which the action was brought."S The defendant-parents appealed 
on the following specific grounds: 
1. The subject of the 1965 act was not clearly ex-
pressed in its title as required by the Wyoming Constitution. 
2. The statute deprived them of property without due 
process of law. 
3. The statute deprived them of equal protection of law. 
4. The statute was penal in nature and attempted to fix 
vicarious liability on them which was contrary to common-law 
principles of liability for tort damages. 6 However, judgment 
was made in the amount stipulated by the state's parental 
liability statute and, therefore, an appeal was presented to 
the Supreme Court of Wyoming. 
Decision 
The trial court's decision was affirmed by Wyoming's 
Supreme Court. Each of the defendant's points was over-ruled 
and the statute was declared constitutional. The court took 
particular note, especially in regard to the contentions that 
the defendant parents were denied equal protection and depri-
vation of property without due process, that their challenge 
5Mahaney v. Hunter Enterprises, Inc., 426 P. 2d 442 
(Wyo., 1967). 
6rbid., p. 443-444. 
to the statute's constitutionality was really without 
favorable precedent since ''only twice in the Nation have 
constitutional questions been raised against some twenty-six 
state statutes which seek to accomplish a similar result and 
in each instance the statute was held constitutional. 7 
Discussion 
The Supreme Court of Wyoming relied heavily in this 
103 
case on the finding~ of two other cases which had contained 
constitutional challenges to the parent liability statutes of 
two other states. It cited the findings in a North Carolina 
case which will be discussed later in this review, General 
Insurance Company of America v. Faulkner, 8 as well as the 
first case discussed in this chapter, Williams v. Kelly. To 
answer the question of whether there was deprivation of pro-
perty without due process, the Supreme Court of Wyoming stressed 
the North Carolina court's findings that such statutory law was 
within the police power of the state. To address the issue of 
equal protection, the court reiterated the Texas court's ruling, 
including the belief that the statute operated equally upon all 
of the class involved. This particular case revealed the pat-
tern of citing the findings of other decisions regarding the 
constitutionality of parental liability statutes as these 
7Ibid., p. 437. 
8General Insurance Company of America v. Faulkner, 130 
S.E. 2d 645 (North Carolina, 1963). 
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challenges began to emerge by the 1960's. The reasonings of 
one state court, especially in regard to the guarantees of the 
Fifth·and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, began to 
be cited as the basis for another state court's decision. 
Corley v. Lewless 
182 S.E. 2d 766 (Georgia 1971) 
Facts 
In this particular case, twelve-year-old Bruce Brady 
was charged with striking another youngster named Clark Lewless 
with a brick and causing serious personal injuries to the ten-
year-old. The father of the injured youngster brought suit 
for damages against Bruce Brady and his mother, Mrs. Doris 
Brady. His uncle Edward Corley was also included because Bruce 
and his mother were temporarily living in Mr. Corley's home 
since the mother's separation from Bruce's father. 
After the trial court found for the plaintiff in this 
case, the defendant mother and the uncle who stood in loco 
parentis appealed to the Superior Court, Richmond County, 
Georgia. The Superior Court over-ruled the motion for summary 
judgments and the defendant mother and uncle then appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Georgia. At issue was the constitution-
ality of the revised Georgia statute passed in 1966 which de-
clared the liability of parents or other persons in loco 
parentis having custody and control over a minor child. Under 
this statute, these parents or persons in loco parentis were 
held vicariously liable for the child's willful and wanton 
acts. 
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Decision 
In its review of the case, the Supreme Court of Georgia 
emphasized that at common law vicarious liability could not 
be grounded solely on the parent-child relationship, but 
nevertheless, a suit could be brought under the provisions 
of the statutory law. On the issue of the statute's consti-
tutionality, however, all of the justices concurred that the 
state's parental liability statute was unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court of Georgia maintained the statute to 
be different from other state statutes because it was not 
limited to property damage and it contained no limit for the 
liability of parents. These features distinguished the 1966 
Georgia statute from other statutes, according to this court. 
The unlimited amount for recovery "seeks to provide compen-
. . f 11 f d f 1 . . 119 sat1on 1n u or property amage or or persona lnJury. 
The court reasoned that limiting the maximum amount of re-
covery resulted in the penal nature of the other state 
statutes. However, Georgia's revised statute created a tort 
liability without fault which would otherwise not exist. 10 
Discussion 
Prior to this case, three cases had been brought before 
state courts in order to challenge the constitutionality of 
the parental liability statutes of Texas, North Carolina, and 
Wyoming. All three of these statutes had been declared 
9 Corley v. Lewless, 182 S.E. 2d 766 (Georgia, 1971). 
10rbid., p. 770. 
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constitutional. In this case, the issue of compensation in 
full to innocent victims versus financial penalties to defen-
dant parents was the primary consideration. The court cited 
the following from the North Carolina court cases. 
G.S. § 1-538.1 and similar statutes, appear to have 
been adopted not out of consideration for providing a 
restorative compensation for the victim of injurious or 
tortious conduct of children, 1~ut as an aid in the con-trol of juvenile delinquency. 
Ironically, since this case, several states have enacted 
statutes with increased amounts as limits for recovery and 
some have provisions for the full amount of damages to be re-
covered. The question of compensation versus penalty has yet 
to be successfully challenged in cases involving these 
statutes. The parental liability statutes of Louisiana and 
Hawaii are obviously compensatory in nature. One significant 
aspect of this case, then, is the illustration it presenfs 
that the rulings of state courts are not binding throughout 
the United States. 
Watson v. Gradzik 
373 A. 2d 191 (Connecticut 1977) 
Facts 
After action for damages was brought against the parents 
of an unemancipated minor for wrongful conversion of the 
plaintiff's property, the defendants demurred to the complaint 
on the ground that the parental liability statute on which the 
action was based was unconstitutional. The defendants 
11General Insurance Company of America v. Faulkner, 130 
S.E. 2d 645 (North Carolina 1963). 
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claimed that the parental liability statute restricted their 
fundamental right to bear and raise children and this was the 
primary challenge to Connecticut's general statute in this 
case. 
Decision 
The Court of Common Pleas maintained that the parental 
liability statute was constitutional and over-ruled the defen-
dant's demurrer. It refused the argument by the defendants 
that their fundamental right to bear and raise children was 
interfered with solely because they were held responsible for 
their child's wrongdoings. Instead, the court issued the 
following reasoning for its decision: 
1. With the right to bear and raise children comes the 
responsibility to see that one's children are properly 
raised so that the rights of other people are protected. 
2. Because parents do have the authority to compel 
obedience of their children, it would not seem unrea-
sonable to hold them responsible for exercising that 
authority. 
3. The defendants failed to prove that the statute did 
not serve the public health, safety, and morals in a 
reasonable manner. 
4. Similar statutes of other states had been declared 
constitutional. 
5 .. Th~ sta£~te had a rational relationship to its 
obJeCt1ves. 
Discussion 
Several statements in this case have been frequently 
cited in similar cases since 1977. In this case, the role 
12watson v. Gradzik, 373 A. 2d. 191 (Connecticut, 
1977). 
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of the parent is viewed as most influential upon the child, 
and the parent is assigned the primary responsibility for 
the actions of the child. These views echo the public's 
sentiments regarding the parent-child relationship which were 
initially responsible for the enactment of parental responsi-
bility laws in the 1950's. The statements by the Court of 
Common Pleas reiterated these views in 1977. They also 
weighed the welfare of the public against the interests of 
the individual in this decision. 
Rudnay v. Corbett 
374 N.E. 2d 171 (Ohio 1977) 
Facts 
This case was received from the Cleveland Municipal 
Court which had dismissed a suit brought by John R. Rudnay for 
damages to his automobile. The plaintiff-appellant had filed 
this suit pursuant to Ohio's Revised Code 3109.09 on August 10, 
1973. He had wanted to recover for damages that allegedly two 
eighteen-year-olds, Charles Holt and Lawrence Corbett, did 
willfully do to his ca 1·, and on each count, Mr. Rudnay asked 
for judgment of $2,000 for compensatory loss and for court 
costs. The parents of the two minors answered the suit 
separately. 
In this case, the defendant-appellee Holt had answered the 
suit by denying the allegations and by claiming that the statute 
of limitations barred any such action Mrs. Shirley Corbett, the 
other parent who was a defendant-appellee in this case, had 
also answered separately by issuing a general denial of the 
109 
allegations but not raising an affirmative defense. Both 
defendant-appellees orally moved for summary judgment based 
on the defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter and the running of the statute of limitations. 13 
After briefs in support of and in opposition to the motions 
had been filed} the tri~l court over-ruled appellee's 
motion for summary judgment. However, on December 10, 1975, 
the trial court dismissed appellant Rudnay's complaint. 
The trial court did decide that R. C. 3109.09, the statutory 
law providing for the liability of parents for the willful 
damages caused by their children, was penal in nature, and 
was therefore subject to the one-year statute of limitations 
as called for in R. C. 2305.11. 14 As a result of this 
decision, John Rudnay appealed to the Court of Appeals of 
Ohio, Cuyahoga County. 
Decision 
The Court of Appeals of Ohio agreed with the appellant's 
claim that the two-year statute of limitations set forth in 
Ohio Revised Code 2305.10 applied to actions brought under 
15 R. C. 319.09. The court based this decision on their 
determination that the legislature intended R. C. 3109.09 to 
be compensatory in nature rather than punitive in nature. 
The court examined both the language and the legislative 
13Rudnay and Corbett, 374 N.E. 2d 171 (Ohio, 1977). 
14Ibid., p. 172. 
15Ibid., p. 173. 
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history of the parental liability statute in order to support 
its decision. 
The court did not agree with the appellee parents 
(Corbett and Holt) that the findings of the statute to be 
compensatory in nature would declare it to be unconstitutional. 
Although the appellees cited the previously discussed case of 
Corley v. Lewless to support their claim, the court charac-
terized the Ohio parental liability statute as being distin-
guishable from the 1966 Georgia statute. While the Georgia 
statute provided for unlimited liability, the Ohio statute 
did have a ceiling of $2,000 for recovery. 16 Therefore, the 
Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed the judgment of the lower 
court and remanded the case for further proceedings according 
to law. 
Discussion 
This case provided another important example of the 
constitutional challenge of a parental liability statute on 
the basis of its being punitive or compensatory. The Ohio 
statute at issue in this case had been revised in 1969 to 
allow a maximum recovery of $2,000, which the court concluded 
that the legislature had "intended this section to provide an 
up-dated, realistic ceiling on recovery." 17 Although the 
increased amount was deemed more helpful and practical to 
16Ibid., p. 174. 
17Ibid. 
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victims, the fact that there was a limit imposed supported 
its constitutionality in the view of this state court. 
Vanthournout v. Burge 
387 N.E. 2d 341 (Illinois 1979) 
Facts 
In the trial court case, the plaintiff, John Vanthournout, 
filed a small claims complaint against Don Burge, the defendant 
parent whose eleven-year-old son had stolen the plaintiff's 
car and had damaged the car by driving it off the road. The 
trial court found for the plaintiff and entered judgment 
against the defendant father for $498.72 plus court costs. 
The appeal from this case was based on the constitutional 
challenge to the Illinois Parental Responsibility Law (Illi-
nois Revised Statutes, 1977, ch. 70, pars. 51-59). The 
contentions upon which this constitutional challenge rested 
were the following: 
1. The parent was deprived of property without due 
process by the imposition of liability without regard 
to fault, and this was an irrational and unfair 
imposition. 
2. The Parental Responsibility Act created an un-
reasonable classification through this vicarious 
liability when sociologists and task force reports 
have declared that many factors contribute to juvenile 
delinquency, especially since the traditional role 
of the family has been eroded by new institutions. 
3. The Act was not a valid exercise of the police 
power of the state and it did not have a reasonable 
relatio¥ghip to the objectives that it purported to 
obtain. 
18vanthournout v. Burge, 387 N.E. 2d 341 (Illinois, 
1979). 
Decision 
In reaching its decision, the Appellate Court of 
Illinois first cited six major court cases in which various 
state statutes had withstood constitutional challenges 
based on similar contentions. The court pointed out that 
only in Corley v. Lewless was a parental responsibility law 
found to be unconstitutional and this was only because no 
limitations had been placed on the amount of recovery. 19 
Then, the court cited those cases in which the Illinois 
courts of review had analyzed the due process and equal 
protection requirements. The court cited the following 
from Anderson v. Wagner: 
It is, however, generally true that, in order 
for a statute to pass constitutional muster in 
terms of the due process clause, the statutory 
means selected by the legislature must bear a 
real and substantial relation to the objective 
sought to be regulated for the health, morals, 
welfare, and safety of the community .... The 
traditional test for equal protection is not 
whether a statute results in unequal treatment, 
but whether the statutory unequality 2o treat-
ment has a reasonable basis in facts. 
In answering the second contention, the court re-
viwed the dual purpose of the Parent Responsibility Act: 
"(1) to compensate innocent victims of juvenile misconduct 
that is willful and malicious; and (2) to place upon the 
parents the obligation to control a minor child so as to 
prevent intentional harm to others." 21 According to the 
19Ibid., p. 343. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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court, these were legitimate goals and placing the burden 
on the parent-child relationship seemed to the court to be 
reasonably related to such goals. 
Building on this reasoning, the court decided that 
the statute was a fair and reasonable exercise of police 
power of the state. Therefore, the defendants had not, in 
the opinion of the court, met the burden of showing the 
unconstitutionality of the Parent Responsibiilty Law. 
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The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the lower 
court and declared the statute to be constitutional. 
Discussion 
This case is particularly significant because it demon-
strates that the court hearing the case found the role of the 
parent and the parent-child relationship itself still to be 
of prime importance in determining juvenile delinquency. 
This decision came in 1979, but this same view, that parents 
are mainly responsible for how their children behave, was the 
overwhelming public sentiment that brought about what some 
termed "punish the parent laws" in the late 1950's and early 
1960's when juvenile delinquency rates were increasing. The 
arguments of sociologists and the findings of task forces 
were rejected by this court. No other influences were con-
sidered as great as the parent's role. The court also 
reiterated the responsibility assigned to the parent in the 
child's upbringing. It stated clearly that parents have an 
obligation to control their children in the interests of the 
general public. 
Facts 
Board of Education of Piscataway Township 
v. Caffiero and Board of Education of 
the Borough of Roselle v. Monagas 
431 A. 2d 799 (New Jersey 1981) 
The Board of Education of Piscataway Township filed 
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a civil complaint against three students alleging that the 
students broke into Piscataway High School on May 9, 1976. 
Extensive damage was done to the high school by these minors 
who were enrolled in the school system. The plaintiffs 
filed against the defendants and each of the parents in 
order to seek recovery for damages on the grounds of either 
negligent supervision of the minors under the New Jersey 
statute 2A: 53A-15 or on the grounds of vicarious liability 
under the New Jersey statute 18A: 37-3. 22 Two families, 
the Caffieros and the O'Donnells, denied the allegations 
and raised separate defenses which included the unconsti-
tutionality of the vicarious liability statute. A default 
judgment, however, was entered against the Martones after 
presentation of proof by the plaintiff. 23 When the plaintiff 
asked the trial court for a summary judgment against the 
parents for the damages caused by their sons, the court 
held the vicarious liability statute (N.J. S.A. 18A: 37-3) 
unconstitutional. It declared the statute to be violative 
of due process. When the plaintiff made a motion for leave 
22Piscataway Township Board of Education v. Caffiero, 
431 A. 2d 799 (New Jersey 1981). 
23 Ibid., p. 801. 
to appeal, the court granted the motion and consolidated 
24 the appeal with Board of Education of Roselle v. Monogas. 
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The Roselle case was quit~ similar to that of Piscataway. 
The Board of Education had filed suit against Angel Monagas 
and his parents pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:37-3. Not only did 
the defendants deny the allegations, but they also raised as 
a separate defense the unconstitutionality of the vicarious 
liability statute. When the parents successfully moved for a 
dismissal of the claim against them, the trial court granted 
the Board of Education leave to appeal, in consolidation with 
P . 25 1scataway. 
Decision 
Both trial court orders were reversed by a divided 
Appellate Division which declared the statute to be consti-
tutional and, therefore, the parents were vicariously liable 
under the statute for the damages done to the school by their 
sons. 26 The defendants then filed a motion to appeal to the 
New Jersey Supreme Court which affirmed the decision of the 
Appellate Division in declaring the statute constitutional. 
The statute which is part of New Jersey's education laws 
reads as follows: 
The parent or guardian of any pupil who shall 
injure any school property shall be liable for 
damages for the amount of the injury to be collected 
24Ibid., p. 802. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
by the board of education of the district in any 
court of co~pe27nt jurisdiction, together with 
costs of su1.t. 
Before the New Jersey Supreme Court discussed its reasoning 
for declaring the statute constitutional, it outlined the 
issues pertaining to the scope of the statute. The court 
presented the following: 
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1. The statute was not applicable to parents generally 
for damages caused by their children, but the term 
"pupil" limited it to parents of public school children. 
2. Since one purpose of the statute was to help disci-
pline students, the words "parents or guardian" referred 
to the person(s) who were legally responsible for the 
pupil. 
3. ~h~ damages ~~st have resulted from willful or 
mal1.c1.ous acts. 
All of the members of the court, except one, supported the 
constitutionality of the statute on the following grounds: 
1. Although the defendants believed that they should 
be held liable for their own deeds, the concept of 
vicarious liability was not a new one and has been up-
held against due process challenges in numerous 
situations when the means has had a rational relation-
ship to obtaining an objective. 
2. The parent-child relationship provides a rational 
basis for imposing liability and is a reasonable means 
for accomplishing the purpose of compensation for 
innocent victims and for deterrence of juvenile 
delinquency. 
3. The fundamental right to bear and raise children is 
not infringed upon by this statute. 
4. The right to a free public education as protected 
by the New Jersey State Constitution is not burdened 
by this statute because the liability is imposed on 
parents, not the children who should be subjected to 
27-b.d 1 1. . 
28 Ibid. , p. 803. 
reasonable measures designated to promote discipline 
in the schools. 
5. The statute meets the requirement of equal pro-
tection because it ra2~onally furthers a legitimate 
governmental purpose. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
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of the statute that required vicarious liability of parents 
for the willful damages to school property by their children. 
However, one justice dissented and in the process, declared 
the statute a "statutory relic, created but a few short 
years after the Civil War, prior even to the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, in the 'spare-the-rod' era."30 He be-
lieved the statute not only promoted questionable policy, 
but it would adversely affect the poor and be used against 
"parents of children who have remained immune to their parents' 
best efforts at the world's most difficult job, parenting." 31 
Discussion 
Clearly illustrated in this case is the continuing argu-
ment over the issue of whether it is fair to assign vicarious 
liability to parents. The contentions presented in this 
rather recent case indicate that there are still two sharply 
different views on this matter since the parental responsibility 
laws were first enacted. On the one hand, there is the opinion 
that many factors and influences contribute to juvenile deliu-
quency, and therefore it is wrong to place the responsibility 
29 rbid., pp. 803-807. 
30Ibid., p. 808. 
31 Ibid. 
squarely on the shoulders of the parents, regardless of 
their own lack of wrongdoing. This view has been espoused 
by many of the defendant parents who suggest that such 
vicarious responsibility is inherently wrong and 
unconstitutional. 
On the other hand, in this case and the others before 
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it, the different state courts have consistently upheld the 
parental liability statutes as being constitutional, except 
for what some have termed an aberration, the Corley v. Lewless 
case, which was discussed earlier in this section. The 
courts have seen the parent-child relationship as providing 
a rational basis for imposing liability and as a reasonable 
means for achieving the legitimate objectives of compensating 
victims and deterring juvenile delinquency. 
One distinguishing aspect of this case is the vivid 
contrast between the views of the majority ruling in this 
case and the one dissenting justice. The majority's views 
indicate an understanding of the difficulties involved in 
parenting. Yet, the justices strongly agreed with the 
Supreme Court's stance that "parents have an important guiding 
role to play in the upbringing of their children."32 The 
justices not only upheld the constitutionality of the statute 
but endorsed its emphasis on requiring parents to take respon-
sibilities for their children's activities. 
The dissenting opinion is clearly representative of an 
opposing attitude regarding such statutory law and the role 
32rbid., p. 805. 
of parents. The blunt language indicates a widely held 
concern that parents who have attempted to perform their 
roles may still have to answer for the wrongdoing of 
children. 
Haywood v. Rarnick 
285 S.E. 2d 697 (Georgia 1982) 
Facts 
In a successful suit, Mr. Drayton Rarnick had alleged 
that two fifteen-year-old boys, Mark Haywood and Tony Wheat, 
had burglarized his horne and in the process caused certain 
119 
property damage. Mr. Rarnick had sought damage from the 
teenagers and from the parents of the two boys under Georgia's 
parental liability statute. This statute in Code Annotated 
§ 105-113 provided for the vicarious liability of parents 
having custody and control of children under the age of 
eighteen who commit willful and malicious acts which result 
in damage to property. After finding in favor of Mr. Rarnick, 
the jury awarded him damages against the boys and a sum 
against each parent within the $500 limit stated in the 
statute. 33 The parents then appealed to the Superior Court 
which affirmed the judgment of the jury verdict in favor of 
the plaintiff. The parents then brought an appeal to the 
Georgia Supreme Court declaring the statute to be unconsti-
tutional because it deprived them due process. They also 
asserted that an error was committed when the investigating 
33Haywood v. Rarnick, 285 S.E. 2d 697 (Georgia 1982). 
officer had related to the trial jury certain statements 
made by the boys during the investigation. 
Decision 
The Supreme Court of Georgia took note of the fact 
that a prior version of the parental liability statute had 
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been declared unconstitutional in Corley v. Lewless. How-
ever, the statute under constitutional challenge in this case 
was the 1976 statute which contained a $500 limit of lia-
bility and its expressed intent was to provide aid in 
controlling juvenile delinquency, not to compensate fully 
victims for the conduct of chldren. 34 The court upheld the 
constitutionality of Georgia's 1976 statute based on the 
following: 
We hold that this statute, intended to aid in 
reducing juvenile delinquency by imposing liability 
upon parents who control minors is neither un-
reasonable, arbitrary nor capricious. We further 
hold that the state has a legitimate interest in the 
subject (controlling juvenile delinquency), and that 
there is a rational relationship between the means 
used (imposing of liability upon parents of children 
who willfully or maliciously damage property) and 
this object. Furthermore, the General Assembly has 
enacted legislation incorporating those distinguishing 
features pointed to in ~orley, supra, and thereby 
overcame any objections which Corley found to exist 
in the former statute. 35he statute violates neither due process nor Corley. 
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of Georgia 
affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, Gwinnett 
County. It also over-ruled the second point of contention 
34 Ibid., p. 698. 
35 Ibid., p. 699. 
regarding the investigating officer's testimony declaring 
the provisions of the code cited had not intended "to 
insulate a child from the effect of testimony of those 
· · · · ,3 6 A h . d . d lnvestlgatlng crlmes. re- earlng was enle on 
January 6, ·1982. 
Discussion 
Although the 1966 Georgia parental responsibility 
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law had been declared unconstitutional in Corley v. Lewless, 
the revised 1976 statute passed constitutional muster in the 
state courts with Haywood v. Rarnick. 
The aspect of limiting the liability of parents was 
deemed critical by the courts. The Supreme Court of Georgia 
believed the 1976 revised statute successfully met the 
objections to the 1966 statute; therefore, Georgia's parental 
liability statute was declared constitutional in 1982. 
Stang v. Waller 
415 So 2d. 123 (Florida 1982) 
Facts 
Although the trial court had found that the plaintiff, 
Mr. Dorian H. S-tang, had proved "a perfect case"37 against 
the defendant parents for recovery of damages under Florida's 
parental liability statute, the court ruled the statute un-
constitutional. It acknowledged that other statutes had 
36Ibid. 
37stang v. Waller, 415 So. 2d 123 (Florida 1982). 
been found to be constitutional but it found persuasive 
arguments against such constitutionality in Corley v. 
Lewless, the dissent in Board. of Education of Piscataway 
Township v. Caffiero. and an article in the June 1972 
Notre Dame Lawyer. 38 Mr. Stang then appealed to the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District. 
Decision 
The District Court of Appeal maintained that "a 
majority of the states have similar statutes and that the 
weight of authority supports constitutionality."39 The 
court did not neglect the decision in Corley v. Lewless, 
227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E. 2d 766 (1971), but recognized that 
Georgia's revised statute had recently withstood another 
constitutional challenge in Haywood v. Ramick, 248 Ga. 841, 
285 S.E. 2d 697 (1982). In addition, the court set aside 
the due process contention with the approach established in 
h . . h. . . 1 h 11 40 A ot er cases contalnlng t lS constltutlona c a enge. s 
a result, the court reversed the trial court's decision and 
remanded the case for further proceedings. 
Discussion 
Following on the heels of Georgia's Haywoo~ v. Ramick, 
this case was added to the growing list of those decisions 
38rbid., p. 124. 
39 Ibid. 
40Ibid. 
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which upheld the constitutionality of parental responsi-
bility laws in various states. Indeed, the decision of 
Haywood v. Ramick gave added impetus to the decision of 
Florida's Court of Appeal. Certainly, this court noted 
considerable support for constitutionality in the fact 
that similar statutes had been upheld in at least nine 
other state courts. 
Facts 
Cases Related to Statutes Being Strictly 
Construed and Requirements for Recovery 
Lamro Independent Consolidated 
School District v. Cawthorne 
73 N.W. 2d 337 (South Dakota 1955) 
In an attempt to recover damages from the parents of 
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Duane Cawthorne, sixteen years old, the public school district 
brought suit in the Circuit Court, Tripp County. The pupil 
and another youngster who did not attend the school entered 
the building one evening and did extensive damage by turning 
on a drinking fountain and throwing cement on the floors. The 
plaintiff based its claim against Duane's parents upon 
SDC 15. 3009, which reads as follm,;rs: 
Any pupil, who cuts, defaces, or otherwise injures any 
schoolhouse, apparatus, or outbuilding thereof, is 
liable to suspension or expulsion; and on the complaint 
of the teacher to any member of the school board, the 
parents or gW!rdians of such pupil shall be liable for 
all damages. 
41Lamro Independent Consolidated School District v. 
Cawthorne, 13 N.W. 2d 337 (South Dakota 1955). 
The trial court entered a judgment against the defendants 
and they then appealed. 
Decision 
In its examination of the statute upon which the claim 
was based, the Supreme Court of South Dakota noted that it 
had been a part of the state law since 1893 and until the 
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present case, no action based on this statute had been pre-
sented to this particular court. 42 The court also took note 
that California had had a similar statute which had contained 
the phrase "on complaint of the teacher" but it had omitted 
the wording in a 1931 revision. 43 Unlike the California 
statute, the South Dakota statute had not been amended and 
consequently, the court concluded: 
The words disclose a definite purpose when the 
application of the statute is limited to the time 
the child is under the immediate supervision of the 
teacher and we do not believe the laoguage of the 
statute should be further attended.44 
Since the pupil had broken into the school during the middle 
of the night and was not under the supervision of any teacher, 
the court could not apply the statutory law. In addition, the 
court felt it could not find the parents liable for their son's 
acts under general law, either. Therefore, the Supreme Court 
of South Dakota in a unanimous decision, reversed the judg-
ment of the Circuit Court, Tripp County. 
42 Ibid. 
43Ibid., p. 338. 
44-b'd l. ]. • 
Discussion 
This case vividly illustrates the fact that statutory 
law is in derogation of common law and must be strictly con-
strued. Since the specific phrasing qualified the time and 
situation under which action for recovery of damages could 
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be based, the parents were not held liable for the considerable 
damage that their son and his friend did to the school. 
Lutteman v. Martin 
135 A. 2d 600 (Connecticut 1957) 
Facts 
On January 28, 1956, a nine-year-old boy and two friends 
were playing within a building which was the property of the 
plaintiff. The youngster, Glen McKnight, filled a coffee can 
with paper that he found in the building and set fire to the 
paper. This was the first time that he had had matches in 
his possession according to the evidence given and when the 
fire spread from the can to the old tires stored within the 
building, all of the frightened youngsters ran from the 
structure. The fire caused damage to the building owned by 
the plaintiff, Selma Luttemann, who sued Glen McKnight's 
father for the damages under the Connecticut parental liability 
statute. The plaintiff based this action upon the assertion 
that the igniting of the fire constituted a willful act which 
was covered by provisions of the statute. 
Decision 
The Court of Common Pleas of Connecticut entered its 
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judgment in favor of the defendant. The court did not find 
the act to be malicious, as required by the statutory law. In 
examing the second requirement for recovery, i.e., that the 
destructive act had to be willful, the court declared that for 
an act to be willful, it had to be intentional. "An intentional 
injury results from an act done for the purpose of causing the 
injury or with knowledge that the injury is substantially cer-
tain to follow." 45 In this case, however, the court found the 
youngster guilty of negligence, which it judged to be quite 
different from intentional wrong-doing. 
Discussion 
Every parental responsibility statute has as a require-
ment for recovery the willful, malicious, intentional, or 
unlawful destructive act by the minor. ·In this case, although 
there was considerable damage done to the building, the court 
declared the youngster's act to be an example of negligence. 
In its deliberation of the case, the court carefully considered 
the boy's age, intelligence, and experience and applied a 
standard of conduct which it said one could reasonably expect 
of other children of similar age, intelligence, and experience. 46 
When it could not declare that the damages had been willfully 
and maliciously done in this case, it found for the defendant 
father. Courts have generally refused to find parents liable 
45 Lutternann v. Martin, 135 A. 2d 600 (Connecticut 1957). 
46 Ibid., p. 603. 
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for their children's acts of carelessness or negligence. This 
case is a primary example of this practice. 
Facts 
Board of Education of Borough of Palmyra 
in County of Burlington v. Hansen 
153 A. 2d 393 (New Jersey 1959) 
According to the allegations of the plaintiff, Daryl 
Lee Hansen and another student went to their high school on 
the evening of December 8, 1957, to steal examination papers. 
The charges also were that Daryl Hansen set fire to the school 
while he was there that evening. The plaintiff then brought 
suit against the parents, Mr. and Mrs. Russell Clayton Hansen, 
in order to recover damages to the school. The board of edu-
cation brought this action under the provisions of R.S. 18:14-51, 
New Jersey's Statutes Annotated, which stated: 
Any pupil who shall cut, deface, or otherwise injure 
any schoolhouse, furniture, fences, outbuildings, or 
other property of the school district shall be liable 
to suspension and punishment, and his parents or guardian 
shall be liable for damages to the amount of the injury 
to be collected by the board of education in any court 47 having jurisdiction, together with the costs of the action. 
The defendant parents asked the Superior Court of New Jersey 
for a summary judgment which·would dismiss the plaintiff's 
complaints on the following grounds: 
1. The statutory provision on which the plaintiff relied 
did not apply to the facts of the case. 
2. The statute was unconstitutional because the title of 
the act failed to state the objective of imposing absolute 
liability on the parents for the torts of their children. 
47 Board of Education of Borough of Palmyra in County of 
Burlington v. Hansen, 153 A. 2d 393 (New Jersey 1959). 
3. The statute was unconstitutional because it
4
geprived 
parents of their property without due process. 
Decision 
The Superior Court denied the defendant's motion. Al-
though the defendants had argued that the language of the 
statute implied that their liability was applicable only 
during school hours, the court rejected this contention. 
Even though the original version had contained the phrase, 
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"on complaint of the teacher," subsequent enactments since 
1867 had omitted those words. 49 Therefore, the court reasoned 
that "The New Jersey Legislature did not intend to so re-
strict or qualify the liability of the parents." 50 The 
court also determined that not only should such statutory 
law be strictly construed, but public schools are statutory 
creations. As a result, the legislature has the right to 
provide a free education for the public and to set up re-
strictions imposed on those attending public schools. When 
parents enroll their children in public schools, they are 
accepting these restrictions and accepting the liability for 
any destructive acts of the child. 51 
The court refuted the other contentions of the parents 
by quickly citing constitutional provisions for the titling 
48 Ibid. 
49Ibid., p. 395. 
50Ibid. 
51 Ibid., p. 396. 
of the statute and by upholding the constitutionality of the 
statute itself. The court emphasized its view of the un-
fairness of requiring other parents or students to pay for 
the damages incurred by one student. Although the parents 
had argued that they were free from fault and as a result, 
should not be liable, the court reasoned that "equity and 
moral philosophy" were part of the basis for their asserting 
the constitutionality of the statute. 52 
Discussion 
This case also illustrates the fact that statutory 
law is in derogation of common law and must be strictly con-
strued. In this situation, however, the court allowed for 
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recovery from damages that occurred after school hours. This 
decision contrasts with the case previously discussed, Lamro 
Independent Consolidated School District v. Cawthorne, 73 N.W. 
2d 337 (South Dakota 1955), because of the wording of the New 
Jersey statute which did not restrict such liability. The 
court refused to accept the defendant's contention that the 
statute implied such a restriction. 
Another important aspect of this case is the court 
turned away the constitutional challenges to the statute. 
The reasoning of the court proved to be similar to that in 
other cases in which liability of parents for their children's 
willful destruction of general property had been at issue. 
52 Ibid., p. 397. 
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Not only did this court support the constitutionality of 
the statute found in New Jersey's education laws, but it 
also spoke to the reasonableness of requiring students to 
meet certain conditions if they attended public schools. 
The court also asserted that the parents of public school 
students also accepted vicarious liability for any destructive 
acts of their youngsters. 
Lamb v. Randall 
618 P. 2d 379 (New Mexico 1980) 
Facts 
The parents of a son under the age of eighteen were 
found liable by the District Court, San Juan County, for 
property their son stole from the home of Joyce Lamb. The 
property stolen was never returned because the minor pawned 
it for money. The plaintiff had brought suit against the 
parents pursuant to the New Mexico statute holding parents 
liable for any willful or malicious damages or destruction 
of property by their children. After the trial court decision, 
the parents appealed on the basis that the statute was not 
applicable in this case. 
Decision 
The Court of Appeals of New Mexico considered the issue 
before it in this case: "Does the crime of burglary com-
mitted by a child, when the stolen items are not regained by 
the victim, come under the purview of § 32-1-46 N.M.S.A. 
(1978 Camp.) making the parents liable in damages. " 53 
53 rn re James D., 455 A. 2d 966 (Maryland 1983). 
After altering the crime from burglary to the stealing of 
property, which is larceny, the court considered the wording 
131 
of the statute. When it found no wording within the statute 
to include the stealing of property, the court also noted 
that the property had not been damaged or destroyed. It 
reasoned, then, that the parents were not liable under the 
statute. Therefore, the judgment was in favor of the parents 
and the trial court decision was reversed. The court remanded 
the case with instructions to enter a new judgment in favor 
of the defendants. 
Discussion 
This case is notable again because a statute was 
strictly construed and, consequently, the parents were not 
found liable. Although the plaintiff had lost property as 
the result of the minor's act of larceny, the statute did 
not provide any liability of the youngster's parents for 
such an act. The dissenting judge took issue with the 
majority opinion by declaring, "Certainly, the statute should 
not be interpreted in a manner that will frustrate the policy 
goals behind its enactment. In my view the majority opinion 
in this case does just that."54 Several parental liability 
statutes now specifically include provisions for property 
which is stolen or shop-lifted by minors. This case exem-
plifies the necessity of including these provisions in the 
parental liability statutes. 
54 Ibid., p. 381. 
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In re James D. 
455 A. 2d 966 (Maryland 1983) 
Facts 
.James D., a juvenile, broke into and set fire to a 
model home on August 7, 1981. On this date, James D. had 
been under commitment to the Juvenile Services Administration 
and the Montgomery County Board of Education. He had. escaped 
from a facility where he had been placed, and he had made no 
contact with his father or mother from the time he escaped 
until his arrest for the destruction of the model home. His 
parents had been found liable for his destructive acts under 
Maryland's parental responsibility law. They appealed to the 
Court of Special Appeals, but a petition for a writ of 
certiorari was granted from the Court of Appeals before the 
argument was presented in that court. 
Decision 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the judgment 
of the trial court and did not require the mother and father 
of James D. to be financially responsible for his destruction 
of the model home. This was the court's decision after it 
examined the specific wording of Maryland's parental respon-
55 sibility law. 
Discussion 
The finding in this case is significant because the 
Maryland statute, unlike almost every other parental 
55 rn re James D., 455 A. 2d 966 (Maryland 1983). 
liability statute, does not specifically state that the 
child should be in the care (or control) and custody of 
the parents. This requirement for recovery was upheld in 
this case, however, because the court noted that in the 
statutes of five states no liability is placed on a father 
or mother if the child is in the legal custody of others. 56 
The court also declared that there would be problems with 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights Article 24 if the court 
were to interpret the statute as applying to a father or 
mother who did not have custody or control. Instead, the 
court decided to "take this opportunity to construe the 
statute more narrowly than its literal wordin8." 57 
Facts 
Cases Related to Limits of Recovery 
and Insurance 
General Insurance Company 
of America v. Faulkner 
130 S.E. 2d 645 (North Carolina 1963) 
The Kinston City Board of Education was issued a 
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policy providing insurance coverage for the Teacher's Memorial 
School by the General Insurance Company of America. This 
policy covered any loss by fire up to the amount of $479,000. 58 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58General Insurance Company of America v. Faulkner, 
130 S.E. 2d 645 (North Carolina 1963). 
This policy was in full force on December 1, 1961, when 
allegedly an eleven-year-old Freddie Faulkner set fire to 
the auditorium curtains causing damages of $2,916.50. 59 
After the school system was paid for this loss by the 
insurance company, it then became subrogated to the rights 
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and claims of the Kinston Board of Education against any 
tort-feasor responsible for the fire and subsequent damages. 60 
As the plaintiff, the insurance company then brought suit 
against the youngster's parents, pursuant to North Carolina's 
parental liability statute and asked for a recovery of the 
$500 limit. The parent defendants demurred to the complaint 
and the Superior Court, Wake County, sustained. 
Decision 
This case was received by the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina on appeal by the plaintiff from the Superior Court, 
Wake County. In its decision, the Supreme Court maintained 
that the statute was constitutional and that the insurer 
which had made full payments for the damages caused by the 
child was entitled, as subrogee, to bring suit in its own 
name against the youngster's parents. 
Discussion 
The decisions of this case have had significant impact 
on other cases concerned with parental liability statutes. 
59rbid., p. 647. 
60 rbid. 
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This case represented the second constitutional challenge to 
a state's parental responsibility law and the court's reasoning 
regarding its constitutionality has been cited in similar 
cases in other states since 1963. 
The question of an insurance company serving as subrogee 
was presented first in this case, also. Often quoted in other 
cases is the court's reasoning on this issue. In disagreeing 
with the interpretation of the defendants, the court stated 
that to deny the granting of subrogation would be illogical 
because "the defendants would receive the benefit of the 
. . h h . f . 1161 ~nsurance w~t out av~ng to pay a cent or ~t. The court 
ruled to accept the right of subrogation and, therefore, es-
tablished a precedent for similar cases since that time. 
Facts 
Walker v. Lumbermens Mutual 
Casualty Company 
491 S.W. 2d 696 (Texas 1973) 
Mr. Bill Walker had a claim issued against him for his 
eleven-year-old son's malicious, willful, and intentional acts 
which resulted in damage to the property of Mr. Harry Dugan. 
The claim was made under Article 5923-1, Vernon's Annotated 
Civil Statutes, which imposes vicarious liability on the 
parent of a child under eighteen and over the age of ten for 
62 such destruction of property. When Mr. Walker notified his 
insurance company, Lumbermens Mutual, the company refused to 
61 Ibid. , p. 652. 
62walker v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, 491 
S.W. 696 (Texas 1973). 
furnish a defense and refused to accept any responsibility 
for the claim against the parent except for the amount of 
$250.00. 63 The parent then employed his personal attorney 
to defend the case. 
Although the child, Terry Walker, was not sued 
judgment was rendered against his father who subsequently 
brought suit against Lumbermen's Mutual. He sought tore-
cover benefits under a Texas Standard Homeowner's policy 
furnished by Lumbermens Mutual. The trial court ruled that 
plaintiff's claim was not covered under Section II, Coverage 
D of the policy and the plaintiff appealed to the Court of 
Civil Appeals of Texas. 
Decision 
The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals 
of Texas on the contention that his homeowner's insurance 
company was liable under Section II, Coverage D--Personal 
Liability which reads as follows: 
To pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which 
the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay 
as damages because of bodily injury or property 
damage, and the Company shall defend any suit against 
the Insured4alleging such bodily injury or property damage .... 6 
The court agreed and included as part of its reasoning the 
conditions that constituted exclusions to such coverage: 
"Coverage D shall not apply to bodily injury or property 
63Ibid., p. 697. 
64 Ibid. 
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damage caused intentionally by or at the direction of the 
Insured."65 The court maintained that the father, not the 
son who had committed the destructive acts, was sued for 
the property damage. It was not the father who had inten-
tionally caused damage or directed it to be done. In 
addition, the court believed that since the policy defined 
the term "insured" as including all members of the family, 
the intention of the definition was to expand the coverage 
of the policy. 66 By construing the term liberally, the 
court maintained the father was entitled to coverage under 
the insurance contract. 67 The court reversed the judgment 
of the 101 District Court, Dallas County. 
Discussion 
This case indicates that a parent's right to coverage 
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for liability imposed under a parental responsibility law 
depends to a great degree on how the court interprets the 
various policy provisions. If homeowner's insurance policies 
are liberally construed, the court will require companies to 
provide coverage. In this case, the court took an expansive 
view of the provisions of the plaintiff's policy and declared 
that he was entitled to the coverage. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. , p. 699. 
67 Ibid. 
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Buie v. Longspaugh 
598 S.W. 2d 673 (Texas 1980) 
Facts 
Two minors between twelve and eighteen years old caused 
considerable damage to three houses. The youngsters unlaw-
fully entered the houses on November 30, 1975, turned on the 
water in various sinks which they had plugged and caused ex-
tensive flood damage to each house in the amount of $5,000 or 
68 more. The three different owners then brought suit against 
the parents of the minors under the Texas parental liability 
statute. The Tarrant County District Court maintained a 
judgment against the parents, jointly and severally, and 
awarded each plaintiff $5,000 plus interest for recovery for 
a total of $15,000 plus interest and at~orney's fees. 69 
Decision 
The only defendant to appeal to the Texas Court of 
Civil Appeals was Mr. Clifford Buie, who appealed only the 
part of the judgment related to the amount of the recovery. 
The defendant contended that the statute should be construed 
as limiting recovery to $5,000 per episode of willful and 
malicious conduct. The defendant cited the following portion 
of the statute: 
Recovery for damage caused by willful and malicious 
conduct is limited to actual damages, not to exceed 70 $5,000 plus court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 
68B . 
u~e v. Longspaugh, 598 S.W. 693 (Texas 1980). 
69 rbid. 
70 Ibid., p. 675. 
The Court of Civil Appeals, however, affirmed the 
judgment of the lower court. It gave as its major reasons 
the following: 
1. The Court determined the purpose of the parental 
liability provisions was to protect and to compensate 
property owners for the willful and malicious damages 
to their property by minors. 
2. The provisions should be construed in a way to 
make them most effective in protecting property 
owners. 
3. Although the court appreciated the financtal hard-
ship imposed by allowing S5,000 to be recovered for 
each act, it was the legislature's, not the court's 
role to change the statute's provisions. 
4. The court refused to characterize the provisions 
as either penal or compensatory but felt compelled 
only to uphold them for the purposes intended by the 
legislature. 
5 Th 1 1 . b . 1 . t . . t . 1 71 . e parenta la l lty statute was cons ltu lOna . 
Discussion 
In recent years, parental liability statutes have 
been revised with limits of recovery being increased. This 
increase in amount of recovery has been to help property 
owners obtain a more realistic amount for damages that 
prove costly. Also, to protect property owners, the courts 
have begun to look at the limit for recovery as being for 
each act, rather than for a series of tortious acts. While 
this increase in recovery for each destructive incident may 
be helpful to the property owner, it certainly brings more 
of a financial responsibility to the minor's parents. One 
71 Ibid., p. 675-676. 
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result may also be that more property owners may bring suit 
against parents for the destructive acts of their children 
because of this increased amount of recovery for each inci-
dent by the child. There is added impetus in many statutes, 
too, which allow for the amount of recovery to include court 
costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 
In re John H. 
443 A. 2d 594 (Maryland 1982) 
Facts 
In a juvenile proceeding, the following facts were 
agreed upon: John H. and another youngster sometime during 
the evening of November 10, 1979 or early morning of 
November 11, 1979, unlawfully entered an elementary school. 
They ransacked and extensively damaged the interior of 
the building. Between 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. on November 
11, 1979, the same two youngsters entered a junior high 
school in another location of the city and caused excessive 
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amounts of damage to it. The total damage estimates of their 
acts were from $200,000 to $400,000. 72 
After these incidents, John H. was adjudged a delin-
quent because of these and other acts. The board of educa-
tion brought suit against the parents in order to obtain 
restitution from them for their son's destructive acts. The 
Circuit Court of Baltimore County found in favor of the 
board of education and entered a judgment of $10,100 against 
72In re John H., 443 A. 2d 594 (Maryland 1982). 
the parents. The parents then appealed the judgment to 
the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the lower 
court's decision. 
Decision 
The Court of Appeals received this case on certiorai 
and it affirmed the decision by asserting the following: 
1. The board of education qualified as the statute's 
stipulated "wrong person" and therefore vicarious 
liability could be imposed upon the parents. 
2. The trial judge was correct in imposing the maximum 
liability upon the parents for each separate incident, 
since there were two separate incidents at two different 
schools. 
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3. The statute is constitutional because the defend~nts 73 failed in the burden of proof to demonstrate otherw~se. 
Discussion 
This case features several important aspects, in-
cluding the decision to allow property owners to recover 
the maximum amount of recovery for each separate incident 
of destruction. Each court in this case agreed that the 
circumstances warranted maximum recovery from the parents. 
This decision is exemplary of a trend in recent cases which 
allows the maximum liability of parents under statutory 
law in order to provide more protection to property 
owners. In addition, since the amount of recovery has 
been increased in currently revised statutes, the liability 
of parents for the willful destruction of property by their 
children has greatly increased for each incident. 
73 Ibid. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study was designed to provide educators with im-
portant information regarding the legal aspects of parental 
responsibility laws. A major purpose for this compilation 
of data was to help public school officials determine whe-
ther such statutory law offers a realistic strategy for 
obtaining compensatory damages and for reducing the number 
of incidents of vandalism. In order to accomplish this pur-
pose, pertinent facts related to the parental liability 
statutes were analyzed. The statutes concerned with paren-
tal liability for the destruction of general property, as 
well as statutes dealing with the specific destruction of 
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school property, were examined. In addition, selected court 
cases presented the critical legal issues regarding vicarious 
liability of parents. A general review of the literature was 
presented in order to determine the causes and types of vanda-
lism, the scope and cost for public schools, and the various 
strategies employed to combat the destruction of school property. 
Summary 
In Chapter I, several key questions were given to 
serve as a basis for the educational and legal research of the 
study. The first question listed in the introductory chapter 
asked for the identity of those states which have passed statutes 
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providing for the liability of parents for the willful and 
wanton destruction to general property by their children. Two 
states, Hawaii and Louisiana, have maintained such statutory 
law since the 1800's. Forty-seven other states, beginning 
with Nebraska in 1951, have enacted parental responsibility 
laws since the 1950's. Only New Hampshire is without statu-
tory law requiring vicarious liability of parents for the 
destructive acts of their children. Even this state, however, 
has a statutory provision for a parent to be fined for a child's 
w~ongdoing. 
The second question in the introductory chapter related 
to those states which have specific statutes pertaining to the 
destruction of school property. Fifteen states have such sta-
tutory law, although an additional nine states have statutory 
provisions for suspension and/or expulsion of students who 
vandalize school property. Altogether, then, these twenty-four 
states have attempted to focus on the destruction of school 
property with this statutory law, along with their statutes for 
general destruction of property by minors. One interesting 
aspect regarding the statutes involving suspension and/or ex-
pulsion of students for school vandalism is the fact that six 
states passed such legislation in the early 1900's. The great 
majority of states did not see passage of statutes for general 
property destruction until the 1950's. 
The third question posed was the intended purposes of the 
parental responsibility laws passed by the state legislatures. 
Although only three states have legislated statutes declaring 
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the specific intent for parental liability there are generally 
two intended purposes for these statutes as determined by 
judicial decisions and legislative histories. 
1. To obtain compensatory damages to victims of property 
destruction. 
2. To aid in reducing juvenile delinquency by making 
parents more financially responsible for the child's 
destructive acts. 
These intended purposes have proved to be controversial issues, 
which were discussed in Chapters II and IV, especially. Partic-
ular court decisions, as presented in Chapter V, have also 
addressed these purposes. 
The review of the literature in Chapter II provides con-
siderable evidence that vicarious parental liability has not 
proved to be a deterrent to the rising rate of juvenile crimes. 
However, a review of judicial decisions reveals that the courts 
have placed more emphasis on declaring that the statutes do 
provide a reasonable means to a rational objective. Also, as 
states have increased the amount of recovery to be allowed, 
much debate has swirled around the issue of compensation. In 
fact, one state statute was declared unconstitutional primarily 
because there was no limit to recovery in its parental liability 
statutes. Needless to say, the dual purposes of the statutes 
have been much debated in the general literature and in liti-
gation. The "Conclusions" and "Recommendations" sections of 
this final chapter present other aspects of these intended pur-
poses of parental responsibility laws. 
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The fourth question presented a vital consideration when 
it asked for the circumstances under which parents can be held 
liable for their children's torts according to common law as 
opposed to civil or statutory law. Generally, parents cannot 
be held liable for their children's wrongdoing merely on the 
basis of the parent-child relationship. Only under the narrow 
circumstances detailed in Chapter II and defended in the courts 
as revealed in Chapter IV can a parent be required by common 
law to bear any financial responsibility for his child's de-
structive acts. On the other hand, statutory law can require 
liability without fault as substantiated by several court 
cases. However, there are definite requirements for recovery 
which must be met since statutory law is in derogation to 
common law and, as a result, statutory law must be strictly 
construed. In addition, some state statutes allow for recovery 
under common law as well as statutory law if circumstances jus-
tify both avenues for recovery to be pursued. Chapters III 
and V present an examination of the requirements for recovery 
under civil law by analyzing the statutes and various court 
decisions which have unsuccessfully contended that no-fault 
liability established by legislatures is unconstitutional. 
The fifth question required an account of the pros and 
cons for having parents be vicariously liable for the torts of 
their children. As discussed in Chapter II, many arguments 
have been made for and against parental responsibility laws. 
The arguments in favor of these laws are often based on the 
belief that a parent has a special responsibility in determining 
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the child's behavior. However, those arguments against parental 
responsibility laws cite the spect~um of factors that can also 
be influential on the child's behavior. While the debate con-
tinues, however, the parental responsibility laws remain within 
the legislation of forty-nine states. 
The final three questions in the introductory chapter were 
related to specific issues determined by court cases reviewed in 
Chapters IV and V. These three questions involved the consti-
tutional challenges to the parental liability statutes, the issue 
of whether parent-defendants can utilize their homeowner's in-
surance policies for financial relief for court-ordered payments 
of compensation, and the identification of any trends and di-
rections for parental responsibility for student vandalism. 
These questions are answered in the "Conclusions" and "Recom-
mendations" sections of this chapter. 
Conclusions 
Drawing particular conclusions from legal research can 
be difficult, especially when varying circumstances in vanda-
lism cases can produce different decisions. Yet, the follow-
ing conclusions have been drawn from the court cases analyzed 
in the study on parental liability for student vandalism: 
1. The parental liability statutes have passed con-
stitutional muster because the courts have con-
sistently declared that they do not violate the 
parent's equal protection rights of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and they do not deprive the parent of 
due process rights of the Fifth Amendment to the 
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Constitution. The only exception, the Georgia sta-
tute, was revised and upheld in a later case. 
2. The courts have consistently rejected the contention 
that the parental liability statutes interfere with 
the parent's fundamental right to bear and raise 
children. Indeed, the courts have consistently 
found that a parent has a duty to raise his children 
so that they will not interfere with the rights of 
others. 
3. The courts have attempted to rule on the legislative 
intent of parental responsibility laws, but since 
they are in derogation to common law and must be 
strictly construed, the courts have been bound to 
base their rulings primarily on the language and pro-
visions specifically contained within those statutes. 
4. A parent may seek financial relief from his homeowner's 
insurance policy under certain circumstances and if 
the courts liberally construe the policy provisions. 
5. An insurance company, after paying a victim for pro-
perty loss or damage according to its policy provi-
sions, may bring suit under its own name as subrogee 
against the parent of a child who has committed the 
damage. 
6. If a court has determined that a minor has committed 
series of single incidents of vandalism, rather than 
an episodic act, it applies the maximum amount of 
recovery for each separate incident, in order to 
afford property owners the greatest recovery 
possible. 
7. The issue of whether parental liability statutes 
should be penal or compensatory in nature has con-
tinued to be debated in the courts, especially 
since limits of recovery are being increased as 
statutes are currently being revised. 
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8. The courts have examined the conduct of a child 
according to the standard of behavior that can be 
expected from a child of similar age, intelligence, 
and experience in order to determine whether a de-
structive act is intentional, willful, or malicious. 
9. A parent is not liable for a child's destructive 
acts which are the result of the minor's careless-
ness or negligence. 
10. The courts have maintained that a parent must h2ve 
legal custody and actual control of the child be-
fore any action under a parental liability statute 
can be taken. 
11. The parental liability statutes offer a helpful 
means to school officials in their efforts to re-
duce the costs and incidents of vandalism, but they 
are certainly no panacea to this complex problem. 
Recommendations 
The purpose of this study has been to provide educators 
with vital information regarding the issue of vandalism and 
149 
some of the strategies currently employed against the destruc-
tion of school property. The legal aspects of parental lia-
bility statutes, also called parental responsibility laws, have 
been examined so that school officials can determine whether 
they offer a realistic means for recovery of damages, as well 
as for deterring vandalism. Based on the results of this 
study, the following recommendations are made: 
1. School officials should become informed about what 
research has found to be the causes and types of 
vandalism of school property and what the role of 
the school setting itself can be in determining the 
amount of vandalism that occurs. 
2. School officials should attend to the strategies to 
reduce vandalism that are suggested in the sub-
committee reports of the Safe School Study and 
Challenge for the Third Century. 
3. School officials should review their state's pa-
rental liability statutes in order to determine 
whether there is any need for revision, especially 
in the amount of recovery. 
4. Each school system should study its own problem 
with vandalism, utilize a uniform reporting system 
for incidents of vandalism, and prepare a system-
wide plan for reducing destruction of school property. 
5. The role of the principal and parental community 
involvement should be examined closely as keys to 
deterrning the amount of vandalism that occurs in any 
school. 
6. Further study is recommended to determine those 
factors related to the school setting which reduce 
the incidents of vandalism. 
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APPENDIX A 
STATE ACTS RELATED TO LIABILITY OF PARENTS 
FOR TORTS OF MINORS, PARTICULARLY 
DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY 
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Alabama 
§ 6-5-380. Liability of parents for destruction of property 
by minor. 
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(a) The parent or parents of any minor under the age 
of 18 years with whom such minor is living and who have cus-
today of such minor shall be liable for the actual damages 
sustained, but not exceeding the sum of $500.00, plus the 
court costs of action, to any person, firm, association, 
corporation and the state of Alabama and its political sub-
division for all damages proximately caused by the injury to, 
or destruction of, any property, real, personal or mixed, by 
the intentional, willful or malicious act or acts of such 
minor. 
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
limit the liability of any such parent or parents as the same 
may now otherwise exist under the laws of the state of Alabama. 
(Acts 1965, 2nd Ex. Sess., No. 99, p. 132.) 
Alaska 
Sec. 34.50.020. Liability for destruction of property by minor. 
(a) A person, municipal corporation, association, village, 
school district or religious or charitable organization, incor-
porated or unincorporated may recover damages in a civil action 
in an amount not to exceed $2,000 and court costs, from either 
parent or both parents or the legal guardian or person having 
legal custody of an unemancipated minor under the age of 18 
years, who maliciously or wilfully destroys real or personal 
property belonging to the person, municipal, corporation, asso-
ciation, village, school district or religious or charitable 
organization. 
(b) A state agency or its agents, including a person 
working in or responsible for the operation of a foster, re-
ceiving, or detention home or children's institution, is not 
liable for the acts of unemancipated minors in its charge or 
custody. (§ 1 ch 98 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 107 SLA 1967) 
Arizona 
§ 12-661. Liabilities of parents or legal guardians for 
malicious or wilful misconduct of minors 
A. Any act of malicious or wilful misconduct of a minor 
which results in any injury to the person or property of an-
other, to include theft or shoplifting, shall be imputed to the 
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parents or legal guardian having custody or control of the 
minor whether or not such parents or guardian could have an-
ticipated the misconduct for all purposes of civil damages, 
and such parents or guardian having custody or control shall 
be jointly and severally liable with such minor for any actual 
damages resulting from such malicious or wilful misconduct. 
B. The joint and several liability of one or both 
parents or legal guardian having custody or control of a minor 
under this section shall not exceed two thousand five hundred 
dollars for each tort of the minor. The liability imposed by 
this section is in addition to any liability otherwise imposed 
by law. 
Added by Laws 1956, Ch. 59, § 1. Amended by Laws 1978, Ch. 
136, § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1978; Laws 1980, Ch. 27, § 1. 
Arkansas 
50-109. Destruction of property by minors--Liability of 
parents. 
The State, or any county, city, town or school district, 
or any person, corporation or organization shall be entitled 
to recover damages in an amount not in excess of Two Thousand 
Dollars ($2,000.00) in a court of competent jurisdiction from 
the parents of any minor under the age of eighteen (18), 
living with the parents, who shall maliciously or willfully 
destroy property, real, personal or mixed, belonging to the 
State or any such county, city, town or school district, or 
any person, corporation or organization. [Acts 1959, No. 45, 
§ 1, p. 163; 1975, No. 283, § 1, p. 702; 1977, No. 201, § 1, 
p. 267.] 
California 
§ 1714.1. [Civil liability of parents for minor's acts of 
wilful misconduct resulting in death, personal in-
jury, or property damage] 
(a) Any act of willful misconduct of a minor which results in 
injury or death to another person or in any injury to the pro-
perty of another shall be imputed to the parent or guardian 
having custody and control of the minor for all purposes of 
civil damages, and the parent or guardian having custody and 
control shall be jointly and severally liable with the monor 
for any damages resulting from the willful misconduct. 
The joint and several liability of the parent or guardian having 
custody and control of a minor under this subdivision shall not 
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exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for each tort of the 
minor, and in the case of injury to a person, imputed liability 
shall be further limited to medical, dental and hospital ex-
penses. incurred by the injured person, not to exceed ten thou-
sand dollars ($10,000). The liability imposed by this section 
is in addition to any liability now imposed by law. 
(b) Any act of willful misconduct of a minor which results in 
the defacement of property of another with paint or a similar 
substance shall be imputed to the parent or guardian having 
custody and control of the minor for all purposes of civil 
damages, including court costs, and attorney's fees, to the 
prevailing party, and the parent or guardian having custody 
and control shall be jointly and severally liable with the 
_minor for any damages resulting from the willful misconduct, 
not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for each tort of 
the minor. 
Amended by Stats 1972 ch 442 § 1; Stats 1974 ch 340 § 1; stats 
1979 ch 127 § 1; Stats 1983 ch 981 §1. 
Colorado 
13-21-107. Damages for destruction or bodily injury caused by 
minors. 
(1) The state or any county, city, town, school district, or 
other political subdivision of the state, or any person, part-
nership, corporation, association, or religious organization, 
whether incorporated or unincorporated, is entitled to recover 
damages in an amount not to exceed three thousand five hundred 
dollars in a court of competent jurisdiction from the parents 
of each minor under the age of eighteen years, living with such 
parents, who maliciously or willfully damages or destroys 
property, real, personal, or mixed, belonging to the state, or 
to any county, city, town, or other political subdivision of 
the state, or to any person, partnership, corporation, asso-
ciation, or religious organization or who maliciously or will-
fully damages or destroys any such property belonging to or 
used by a school district. The recovery shall be the actual 
damages in an amount not to exceed three thousand five hundred 
dollars, in addition to court costs and reasonable attorney 
fees. 
(2) Any person is entitled to recover damages in an amount 
not to exceed three thousand five hundred dollars in a court 
of competent jurisdiction from the parents of each minor under 
the age of eighteen years, living with such parents, who 
knowingly causes bodily injury to that person, including bodily 
injury occurring on property belonging to or used by a school 
district. The recovery shall be the actual damages in an 
amount not to exceed three thousand five hundred dollars, in 
addition to court costs and reasonable attorney fees. 
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Source: Amended, L. 77, p. 802, § 1; amended, L. 79, p. 766, 
§ 1; amended, L. 83, pp. 617, 618, § § 1, 1. 
Connecticut 
§ 52-572. Parental liability for torts of minors. Damage 
defined 
(a) The parent or parents or guardian of any unemancipated 
minor or minors, which minor or minors wilfully or maliciously 
cause damage to any property or injury to any person, or, having 
taken a motor vehicle without the permission of the owner there-
of, cause damage to the motor vehicle, shall be jointly and 
severally liable with the minor or minors for the damage or 
injury to an amount not exceeding three thousand dollars, if the 
minor or minors would have been liable for the damage or injury 
if they had been adults. 
(b) This section shall not be construed to relieve the minor 
or minors from personal liability for the damage or injury. 
(c) The liability provided for in this section shall be in 
addition to and not in lieu of any other liability which may 
exist at law. 
(d) As used in this section, "damage" shall include depriving 
the owner of his property or motor vehicle or of the use, pos-
session or enjoyment thereof. 
(1969, P.A. 326; 1971, P.A. 314; 1972, P.A. 127, § 75; 1979, 
P.A. 79-58; 1982, P.A. 82-160, § 236.) 
Delaware 
§ 3922. Destruction of property by minors; recovery of damages 
from parents. 
Any municipal corporation, county, town, school district 
and agency of the State or any person, partnership, corporation 
or association, or any religious organization whether incorpo-
rated or unincorporated, shall be entitled to recover damages 
in an appropriate civil action in an amount not to exceed $5,000 
in a court of competent jurisdiction from the parents or guar-
dians of any minor under the age of 18 years, living with the 
parents, who shall intentionally or recklessly destroy or damage 
property, real, personal or mixed, belonging to such municipal 
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corporation, county, town, school district or agency of the 
State, or person, partnership, corporation or association or 
religious organization. However, if any such minor shall be 
charged with any act of delinquency as a result of such de-
struction or darnage and thereafter be found delinquent of such 
charge, whether by trial or by admission, the appropriate 
court, as part of its sentence, may assess an amount not to 
exceed $5,000 against the parents or guardians of the child if 
the child was living with his parents or guardians at the time 
of such destruction or damage. (10 Del. C. 1953, § 3923; 51 
Del. Laws, c. 321; 59 Del. Laws, c. 112, § 1; 62 Del. Laws, c. 
166, § l; 62 Del. Laws, c. 315, § 2.) 
Florida 
741.24 Civil action against parents; willful destruction or 
theft of property by minor 
(1) Any municipal corporation, county, school district, or 
department of Florida; any person, partnership, corporation, 
or association; or any religious organization, whether incor-
porated or unincorporated, shall be entitled to recover damages 
in an appropriate action at law in an amount not to exceed 
$2,500, in a court of competent jurisdiction, from the parents 
of any minor under the age of 18 years, living with the parents, 
who shall maliciously or willfully destroy or steal property, 
real, personal, or mixed, belonging to such municipal corpo-
ration, county, school district, department of the state, 
person, partnership, corporation, association, or religious 
organization. 
(2) The recovery shall be limited to the actual damages in 
an amount not to exceed $2,500, in addition to taxable court 
costs. 
Renumbered as 741.24 and amended by Laws 1967, c. 67-254, § 40, 
eff. June 26, 1967; Laws 1967, c. 67-404, § 1, eff. July 25, 
1967; Laws 1977, c. 77-366, § 1, eff. June 27, 1977; Laws 1979, 
c. 79-400, § 280, eff. Aug. 5, 1979. 
Georgia 
51-2-3. Liability for malicious acts of minor child. 
(a) Every parent or guardian having the custody and control 
over a minor child or children under the age of 18 shall be 
liable in an amount not to exceed $5,000.00 plus court costs 
for the willful or malicious acts of the minor child or chil-
dren resulting in damage to the property of another. 
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(b) This Code section shall be cumulative and shall not be 
restrictive of any remedies now available to any person, firm, 
or corporation for injuries or damages arising out of the acts, 
torts, or negligence of a minor child under the "family-purpose 
car doctrine" or any statutes now in force and effect in this 
state. 
(c) The intent of the legislature in passing this Code 
section is to provide for the public welfare and aid in the 
control of juvenile delinquency, not to provide restorative 
compensation to victims of injurious or tortious conduct by 
children. (Ga. L. 1956, p. 699, § 1; Ga. L. 1966, p. 424, 
§ 1 ; Ga . L. 19 7 6 , p. 511 , § 2 ; Ga. L. 19 8 2 , p. 8 4 9 , § § 1 , 2. ) 
Hawaii 
§577-3 Natural guardian; liability for torts of child. 
The father and mother of an unmarried minor child are 
jointly the natural guardians of his person and property. They 
shall have equal powers and duties with respect to him and 
neither shall have any right superior to that of the other con-
cerning his custody or control or any other matter affecting 
him; provided, that if either parent dies or abandons the family 
or is incapable for any reason to act as guardian, the guardian-
ship devolves upon the other parent, and that when the parents 
live apart, the court may award the guardianship to either of 
them, having special regard to the interests of the child. The 
father and mother of unmarried minor children shall jointly and 
severally be liable in damages for tortious acts committed by 
their children, and shall be jointly and severally entitled to 
prosecute and defend all actions in which the children or their 
individual property may be concerned. [CC 1859, § 1288; RL 
1925, § 3033; am L 1931, c 77, §1; RL 1935, §4511, RL 1945, 
§12262; RL 1955, §330-3; HRS §577-3; am L 1972, c 144, §1] 
Idaho 
6-210. Recovery of damages for wilful destruction of property 
by minor. 
Any municipal corporation, county, city, village, school 
district, or any person, partnership, corporation or associ-
ation, or any religious organization, whether incorporated or 
unincorporated, shall be entitled to recover damages in an 
amount not to exceed one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) 
in a court of competent jurisdiction from the parents of any 
minor, under the age of eighteen (18) years, living iwth the 
parents, who shall maliciously or wilfully destroy property, 
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real, personal, or mixed, belonging to such municipal corpora-
tion, county, city, village, school district, or person, 
partnership, corporation, association, or religious organi-
zation . [ 19 5 7 , c h . 3 2 , § 1 , p . 51 ; am . 1 9 7 7 , c h . 55 , § 1 , 
p. 106.] 
Illinois 
PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY LAW 
51. Short title and citation 
§ 1. This Act shall be known and may be cited as the Paren-
tal Responsibility Law. 
P.A. 76-1679, § 1, eff. Octo. 6, 1969. 
52. Definitions 
§ 2. As used in this Act, unless the context otherwise re-
quires, the terms specified have the meanings ascribed to them: 
(1) "Legal guardian" means a person appointed guardian, or 
given custody, of a minor by a circuit court of the State, but 
does not include a person appointed guardian, or given custody, 
of a minor under the "Juvenile Court Act", approved August 5, 
1965, as now or hereafter amended. 
(2) "Minor" means a person who is above the age of 11 years, 
but not yet 19 years of age. 
P.A. 76-1679, § 2, eff. Oct. 6, 1969. 
53. Parent or legal guardian--Liability--Wilful or malicious 
acts of minor 
§ 3. The parent or legal guardian of an unemancipated minor 
who resides with such parent or legal guardian is liable for 
actual damages for the wilful or malicious acts of such minor 
which cause injury to a person or property. 
P.A. 76-1679, § 3, eff. Oct. 6, 1969. 
54. Persons or entities entitled to enforce Act 
§ 4. Any muncipal corporation, county, township, village or 
any other political subdivision or department of the State o£ 
Illinois, or any person, partnership, corporation, association 
or any incorporated or unincorporated religious, educational 
or charitable organization is entitled to enforce the liability 
imposed by this Act. 
P.A. 76-1679, § 4, eff. Oct. 6, 1969. 
55. Limitation on damages--Damages allowable 
§ 5. No recovery under this Act may exceed $1000 actual 
damages for each person, or legal entity as provided in 
Section 4 of this Act, for each occurrence of such wilful 
or malicious acts by the minor causing injury, in addition 
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to taxable court costs. In determining the damages to be 
allowed in an action under this Act for personal injury, only 
medical, dental and hospital expenses and expenses for treat-
ment by Christian Science practitioners and nursing care 
appropriate thereto may be considered. 
P.A. 76-1679, § 6, eff. Oct. 6, 1969. Amended by P.A. 81-588, 
§1, eff. Jan. 1, 1980. 
56. Common law damages 
§ 6. This Act shall not affect the recovery of damages in 
any other cause of action where the liability of the parent or 
legal guardian is predicated on a common law basis. 
P.A. 76-1679, § 6, eff. Oct. 6, 1969. 
57. Judgments--Applicability of other Act 
§ 7. Section 12-107 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as now 
or hereafter amended, is not applicable to judgments obtained 
under this Act. 
P.A. 76-1679, § 7, eff. Oct. 6, 1969. Amended by P.A. 81-267, 
§ 2, eff. Aug. 28, 1979; P.A. 82-783, Art. XI, § 121, eff. 
July 13, 1982. 
Indiana 
34-4-31-1. Limited liability imposed for damages caused by 
child. 
A parent is liable for not more than two thousand five 
hundred dollars [$2,500] in actual damages arising from harm 
to a person or property intentionally caused by his child if: 
(1) He has custody of the child; and 
(2) The child is living with him. [IC 34-4-31-1, as 
. added by Acts 1978, P.L. 136, §55; P.L. 326-1983, § 2.] 
Iowa 
613.16. Parental responsibility for actions of children 
1. The parent or parents of an unemancipated minor child 
under the age of eighteen years shall be liable for actual 
damages to person or property caused by unlawful acts of 
such child. However, a parent who is not entitled to legal 
custody of the minor child at the time of the unlawful act 
shall not _be liable for such damages. 
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2. The legal obligation of the parent or parents of an un-
emancipated minor child under the age of eighteen years to pay 
damages shall be limited as follows: 
a. Not more than one thousand dollars for any one act. 
b. Not more than two thousand dollars, payable to the same 
claimant, for two or more acts. 
3. The word 11person 11 for the purpose of this section shall 
in~lude firm, association, partnership or corporation. 
4. When an action is brought on parental responsibility for 
acts of their children, the parents shall be named as defendants 
therein and, in addition, the minor child shall be named as a 
defendant. The filing of an answer by the parents shall remove 
any requirements that a guardian ad litem be required. 
Acts 1969 (63 G.A.) ch. 291, § 1, eff. July 1, 1969. 
Kansas 
38-120. Recovery from parents for malicious or willful acts 
by certain children; limitations. 
Any person receiving bodily injury or any person, part-
nership, corporation, political subdivision or other entity 
whose property has been damaged or destroyed shall be entitled 
to recover damages in an appropriate action at law in a court 
of competent jurisdiction from the parents of any child, living 
with the parents, who maliciously or willfully injured such 
person or damaged or destroyed such property while under the 
age of eighteen (18) years. Such recovery shall be limited to 
the actual damages in an amount not to exceed one thousand 
dollars ($1,000), in addition to taxable court costs, unless 
the court or jury finds that the malicious or willful act of 
such minor causing such injury, damage or destruction is the 
result of parental neglect, in which event the one thousand 
dollars ($1,000) limitation does not apply. Recovery under 
this section for bodily injury shall be limited to actual 
medical expenses. 
History: L. 1959, ch. 203, § 1; L. 1965, ch. 275, § l; 
L. 1978, ch. 156, § 1; July 1. 
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Kentucky 
405.025. Parent or guardian liable for wilful damage to pro-
perty caused by minor. 
(1) The parent or guardian of any unemancipated minor, in 
their care and custody, against whom judgment has been rendered 
for the wilful marking upon, defacing or damaging any property, 
shall be liable for the payment of that judgment up to an amount 
not to exceed twenty-five hundred dollars ($2500), if the parent 
or guardian has been joined as a party defendant in the original 
action. The judgment provided herein to be paid shall be paid 
to the owner of the property damaged but such payment shall not 
be a bar to any criminal action or any proceeding against the 
unemancipated minor comrr1itting such damage for the balance of 
the judgment not paid by the parent or guardian. No parent 
shall be liable under the provisions of this subsection in a 
cumulative amount in excess of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) 
for the wilful marking upon, defacing or damaging of any pro-
perty by any child. 
(2) Nothing in this section is intended to or shall limit to 
twenty-five hundred dollars ($2500) the liability of a person 
to whom the negligence of a minor is imputed by KRS 186.590, nor 
shall this section limit the liability set forth in any other 
statute to the contrary. (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 44, § § 1, 2; 
1976, ch. 235, § 1.) 
Louisiana 
Art. 2318. Acts of minors 
Art. 2318. The father, or after his decease, the mother, are 
responsible for the damage occasioned by their minor or un-
emancipated children, residing with them, or placed by them 
under the care of other persons, reserving to them recourse 
against those persons. 
The same responsibility attaches to the tutors of minors. 
Maine 
§ 217. Liability of parents or legal guardians for damages by 
children. 
The parents or legal guardians of any minor who is be-
tween 7 and 17 years of age and is living with his parents or 
legal guardians, which minor willfully or maliciously causes 
damage to any property or injury to any person, shall be 
jointly and severally liable with the minor for that damage 
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or lnJury in an amount not exceeding $800, if the minor would 
have been liable for the damage or injury if he had been an 
adult. Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve 
the minor from personal liability for that damage or injury. 
1959, c. 321; 1979, c. 15. 
Maryland 
§ 3-829. Liability for acts of a child. 
(a) The court may enter a judgment of restitution against 
the parent of a child, or the child in any case in which the 
court finds a child has committed a delinquent act and during 
the commission of that delinquent act has: 
(1) Stolen, damaged, or destroyed the property of another; 
(2) Inflicted personal injury on another, requiring the in-
jured person to incur medical, dental, hospital, or funeral 
expenses. 
(b) Considering the age and circumstances of a child, the 
court may order the child to make restituion to the wronged 
party personally. 
(c) (1) A judgment rendered under this section may not 
exceed: 
(i) As to property stolen or destroyed, the lesser of 
the fair market value of the property or $5,000; 
(ii) As to property damaged, the lesser of the amount 
of damage not to exceed the fair market value of the property 
damaged or $5,000; and 
(iii) As to personal injuries, inflicted, the lesser 
of the reasonable medical, dental, hospital, funeral, and 
burial expenses incurred by the injured person as a result of 
the injury or $5,000. 
(2) As an absolute limit against any one child or his 
parents, a judgment rendered under this section may not ex-
ceed $5,000 for all acts arising out of a single incident. 
(d) A restitution hearing to determine the liability of a 
parent or a child, or both, shall be held not later than 30 
days after the disposition hearing and may be extended by the 
court for good cause. 
(e) A judgment of restitution against a parent may not be 
entered unless the parent has been afforded a reasonable op-
portunity to be heard and to present appropriate evidence in 
his behalf. A hearing under this section may be held as part 
of an adjudicatory or disposition hearing for the child. 
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(f) The judgment may be enforced in the same manner as en-
forcing monetary judgments. 
(g) The Juvenile Services Administration is responsible for 
the collection of restitution payments when the restitution 
order provides that restitution is to be made in periodic or 
installment payments, as part of probation, or pursuant to a 
work plan. (An. Code 1957, art. 26, § 71A; 1973, 1st Sp. Sess., 
ch. 4, § 1; 1974, ch. 691, § 8; 1975, ch. 554, §§ 1,3; 1976, ch. 
457; 1977, ch. 301; 1978, ch. 814; 1980, ch. 409; 1981, ch. 389; 
1982, chs. 16, 388, 478.) 
Massachusetts 
§ 85G. Civil Liability of Parents for Injuries or Damages 
Resulting from Wilful Acts of Certain Minor Children; 
Exception; Limit of Recovery. 
Parents of an unemancipated child under the age of 
eighteen and over the age of seven years shall be liable in a 
civil action for any willful act committed by said child which 
results in injury or death to another person or damage to the 
property of another, damage to cemetery property, or damage to 
any state, county or municipal property. This section shall 
not apply to a parent who, as a result of a decree of any court 
of competent jurisdiction, does not have custody of such child 
at the time of the commission of the tort. Recovery under this 
section shall not exceed two thousand dollars for any such 
cause of action. (Amended by 1975, 189, approved May 8, 1975, 
effective 90 days thereafter; 1979, 172, approved May 15, 1979, 
effective 90 days thereafter; 1983, 97, approved May 17, 1983, 
effective 90 days thereafter.) 
Michigan 
§ 27A.2913 Actions for malicious destruction of property or 
bodily injury by minors. Sec. 2913. 
A municipal corporation, county, township, village, 
school district, department of the state, person, partnership, 
corporation, association, or an incorporated or unincorpo-
rated religious organization may becover damages in an amount 
not to exceed [$2,500.00] in a civil action in a court of com-
petent jurisdiction against the parents or parent of an 
unemancipated minor, living with his [or her] parents or 
parent, who has maliciously or wilfully destroyed real, per-
sonal, or mixed property which belongs to the municipal 
corporation, county, township, village, school district, 
department of the state, person, partnership, corporation, 
association, or religious organization incorporated or 
unincorporated or who has maliciously or wilfully caused 
bodily harm or injury to a person. 
(MCL § 600.2913.) 
History. 
As amended by Pub Acts 1978, 
No. 577, imd eff January 2, 1979. 
Minnesota 
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540.18. Damage by minor; responsibility of parent, guardian, 
and minor 
Subdivision 1. The parent or guardian of the person of 
a minor who is under the age of 18 and who is living with the 
parent or guardian and who willfully or maliciously causes in-
jury to any person or damage to any property is jointly and 
severally liable with such minor for such injury or damage to 
an amount not exceeding $500, if such minor would have been 
liable for such injury or damage if he had been an adult. No-
thing in this subdivision shall be construed to relieve such 
minor from personal liability for such injury or damage. The 
liability provided in this subdivision is in addition to and 
not in lieu of any other liability which may exist at law. 
Recovery under this section shall be limited to special damages. 
Subdivision 2. This section shall not apply to persons 
having custody or charge of any minor under the authority of 
the welfare or corrections department of the state. 
Laws 1967, Ex.Sess., c. 41, §§ 1 to 3, eff. June 3, 1967. 
Amended by Laws 1969, c. 803, § 1; Laws 1980, c. 580, § 22, 
eff. Aug. 1, 1980. 
Mississippi 
§ 93-13-2. Civil liability of parents for damages resulting 
from malicious and willful acts of certain minor 
children. 
(1) Any property owner shall be entitled to recover damages 
in an amount not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000.00), 
plus necessary court costs, from the parents of any minor under 
the age of eighteen (18) years and over the age of ten (10), 
who maliciously and willfully damages or destroys property 
belonging to such owner. However, this section shall not apply 
to parents whose parental custody and control of such child 
have been removed by court order or decree. 
(2) The action authorized in this section shall be in 
addition to all other actions which the owner is entitled 
to maintain and nothing in this section shall preclude re-
covery in a greater amount from the minor or from any 
person, including the parents, for damages to which such 
minor or other person would otherwise be liable. 
(3) It is the purpose of this section to authorize re-
covery from parents in situations where they are not 
otherwise liable and to limit the amount of recovery. The 
provisions of·this section shall apply only to acts com-
mitted on and after July 1, 1978. 
Sources: Laws, 1978, 1978, ch. 492, § 1; 1931, ch. 370, 
§ 1, eff from and after July 1, 1981. 
Missouri 
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537.045. Parent or guardian liable for damages by minor--
when--limitation--work accepted in lieu of payment. 
1. The parent or guardian, excluding foster parents, of any 
unemancipated minor, under eighteen years of age, in their care 
and custody, against whom judgment has been rendered for pur-
posely marking upon, defacing or in any way damaging any 
property, shall be liable for the payment of that judgment up 
to an amount not to exceed two thousand dollars, provided that 
the parent or guardian has been joined as a party defendant in 
the original action. The judgment provided herein to be paid 
shall be paid to the owner of the property damaged, but such 
payment shall not be a bar to any criminal action or any pro-
ceeding against the unemancipated minor for such damage for the 
balance of the judgment not paid by the parent or guardian. 
2. The parent or guardian, excluding foster parents, of any 
unemancipated minor, under eighteen years of age, in their care 
and custody, against whom judgment has been rendered for pur-
posely causing personal injury to any individual, shall be 
liable for the payment for that judgment up to an amount not to 
exceed two thousand dollars, provided that the parent or guar-
dian has been joined as a party defendant in the original 
action. · The judgment provided herein to be paid shall be paid 
to the person injured, but such payment shall not be a bar to 
any criminal action or any proceeding against the unemanci-
pated minor for such damage for the balance of the judgment 
not paid by the parent or guardian. 
3. Upon rendering a judgment in any proceeding under this 
section, the judge may order the parent or guardian, or the 
minor who damaged the property or caused the personal injury, 
to work for the owner of the property damaged or the person 
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injured in lieu of payment, if the parent, minor and the owner 
of the property damaged or the person injured are agreeable. 
(L. 1965, p. 661, § i. Amended by L. 1979, p. 629, § 1.) 
Montana 
40-6-237. Destruction of property by minor--liability of 
parents. 
Any municipal corporation, county, city, town, school 
district, or department of the state of Montana, any person, 
or any religious organization whether incorporated or unin-
corporated is ·entitled to recover damages in a civil action 
in an amount not to exceed $2,500 in a court of competent juris-
dictio~ from the parents of any person under the age of 18 years, 
living with the parents, who shall maliciously or willfully de-
stroy property, real, personal, or mixed, belonging to such 
municipal corporation, county, city, town, school district, 
department of the state of Montana, person, or religious orga-
nization. 
History: En. Sec. 1, Ch. 195, L. 1957; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 227, 
L. 1977; R.C.M. 1947, 61-112.1; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 560, L. 1981. 
40-6-238. Limitation on amount of recovery. 
The recovery shall be limited to the actual damages in 
an amount not to exceed $2,500 in addition to taxable court 
costs and a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court 
not to exceed $100. The right to recover attorney fees as pro-
vided by this section is limited to a person bringing an action 
under 40-6-237. 
History: En. Sec. 2, Ch. 195, L. 1957; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 178, 
L. 1971; amd. Sec. 2, Ch. 227, L. 1977; R.C.M. 1947, 61-112.2; 
amd. Sec. 2, Ch. 560, L. 1981. 
Nebraska 
43-801. Destruction of property by infants; infliction of 
personal injury; liability of parents; limitation. 
The parents shall be jointly and severally liable for 
the willful and intentional infliction of personal injury to 
any person or destruction of real and personal property 
occasioned by their minor or unemancipated children residing 
with them, or placed by them under the care of other persons; 
Provided, that in the event of personal injuries willfully 
and intentionally inflicted by such child or children, damages 
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shall be recoverable only to the extent of hospital and medical 
expenses incurred but not to exceed the sum of one thousnad 
dollars for each occurrence. 
Source: Laws 1951, c. 126, § 1, p. 545; Laws 1969, c. 347, 
§ 1, p. 1217. 
Nevada 
41.470 Civil liability of parents, guardians for minor's act 
of willful misconduct resulting in injury, death, 
property damage. 
1. Any act of willful misconduct of a minor which results in 
any injury or death to another person or injury to the private 
property of another or to public property is imputed to the 
parents or guardian having custody and control of the minor for 
all purposes of civil damages, and the parents or guardian having 
custody or control are jointly and severally liable with the 
minor for all damages resulting from the willful misconduct. 
2. The joint and several liability of one or both parents or 
guardian having custody or control of a minor under this section 
shall not exceed $10,000 for any such act of willful misconduct 
of the minor. 
3. The liability imposed by this section is in addition to 
any liability now imposed by law. 
(Added to NRS by 1957, 8; A 1967, 419; 1975, 652; 1979, 461) 
New Hampshire 
592-A:16 Judgment Against Parent 
A warrant against a minor may require the parent or guar-
dian of the minor to be summoned to attend the examination or 
trial, by delivering to him an attested copy of the warrant, and 
of the complaint, if annexed thereto, and the parent or guardian, 
being so summoned, may be adjudged to pay the fine imposed, and 
execution may issue against him therefor. 
Source. RS 113:20. 
592:17. 1957, 234:16. 
Sept. 23, 1957. 
cs 119:22. 
GL 252:15. 
GS 362:15. 
PS 248:15. 
RL 421:15. RSA 
PL 244:8, eff. 
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New Jersey 
2A:53A-14. Legislative findings 
The Legislature finds that malicious acts of vandalism 
by youths are increasing at an alarming rate; that such acts 
are frequently attributable to lack of care, custody and con-
trol exercised by the parent; that parents should have some 
responsibility for the conduct of their children; that while 
there is a reluctance to charge a child with juvenile delin-
quency there should be some legal deterrent to juvenile acts 
of vandalism and to parental neglect of child supervision. 
The Legislature therefore finds it desirable to establish a 
civil procedure for the recovery of damages for such acts from 
the neglectful parent, guardian or other person having legal 
custody of the child who caused such damage. 
L. 1965, c. 111, § 1, eff. June 15, 1965. 
2A:53A-15. Liability of parent or guardian for willful de-
struction of property by infant under 18 
A parent, guardian or other person having legal custody 
of an infant ±6 under 18 years of age e~-HRee~ who fails to 
exercise reasonable supervision and control of the conduct of 
such infant, shall be liable in a civil action for any willful, 
malicious or unlawful injury or destruction by such infant of 
the real or personal property of another, ~~evieee-tfiat-Re-~e­
eeve~y-may-ae-fiae-iR-sHefi-aetieR-agaiRst-sHefi-~a~eRt;-gHa~eiaR 
e~-etfieF-~eFseR-iR-exeess-ef-$2§9~99. 
L. 1965, c. 111, § 2. Amended by L. 1979, c. 318, § 2, eff. 
Jan. 18, 1980. 
2A:53A-16. Liability of parent for willful injury to public 
transportation utility by infant 
The parents of any infant who shall maliciously or will-
fully injure any property of a railroad, street railway, 
traction railway or autobus public utility shall be liable for 
damages in the amount of the injury to a limit of $1,000.00, 
to be collected by the public utility in any court of competent 
jurisdiction, together with costs of suit. 
L. 1970, c. 246, § 1, eff. Oct. 28, 1970. 
2A:53A-17. Application to parents without parental custody 
and control 
This act shall not apply to parents whose parental cus-
tody and control of such infant has been removed by court 
order, decree, judgment, military service, or marriage of 
such infant. 
L. 1970, c. 246, § 2, eff. Oct. 28, 1970. 
New Mexico 
32-1-46. Damages for damqge or destruction of property by 
child; parents liable; costs and attorney's fees; 
provisions for damages and restitution. 
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A. Any person may recover damages not to exceed four thousand 
dollars ($4,000) in a civil action in a court or tribunal of 
competent jurisdiction from the parent, guardian or custodian 
having custody and control of a child when the child has mali-
ciously or willfully injured a person or damaged, destroyed or 
deprived use of property, real or personal, belonging to the 
person bringing the action. 
B. Recovery of damages under this section is limited to the 
actual damages proved in the action, not to exceed four thou-
sand dollars ($4,000), taxable court costs and, in the dis-
cretion of the court, reasonable attorney's fees to be fixed 
by the court or tribunal. 
C. Nothing contained in this section limits the discretion 
of the court to issue an order requiring damages or restitution 
to be paid by the child when he has been found to be within the 
provisions of the Children's Code. 
D. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed so 
as to impute liability to any foster parent. 
History: 1953 Comp., § 13-14-44, enacted by Laws 1972, ch. 
97, § 44; 1973, ch. 125, § 1; 1977, ch. 76; § 1, 1981, ch. 36, 
§ 33; 1983, ch. 40, § 1. 
32-1-47. Parental responsibility. 
A. In any complaint alleging delinquency, a parent of the 
alleged delinquent child may be made a party in the petition. 
If a parent is made a party and if a child is adjudicated a 
delinquent, the court may order the parent or parents to sub-
mit to counseling, participate in any probation or other treat-
ment program ordered by the court and, if the child is 
committed for institutionalization, participate in any 
institutional treatment or counseling program including 
attendance at the site of the institution. The court shall 
order the parent to support the child con~itted for institu-
tionalization by paying the reasonable costs of support, 
maintenance and treatment of the child that the parent is 
financially able to pay. 
B. If a fine is imposed against the child by a court of 
this state, the parent of the child is not liable to pay the 
fine. 
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C. The court shall order the parent to pay the reasonable 
costs of support and maintenance of the child that the parent 
is financially able to pay if: 
(1) a child is adjudicated to be neglected or abused; and 
(2) the court orders the child placed with an agency or 
individual other than the parent. 
D. The court may enforce any of its orders issued pursuant 
to this section by use of its contempt power. 
History: 1953 Camp., § 13-14-44.1, enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 
192, § 1; 1981, ch. 36, § 34. 
New York 
§ 3-112. Limited liability of parents or certain legal guar-
dians having custody of an infant for malicious and 
destructive acts of such infant 
Except as otherwise provided for in section seventy-eight-a 
of the general municipal law, section one hundred seventy-one 
of the executive law and sections sixteen hundred four, seven-
teen hundred nine, twenty-five hundred three, twenty-five 
hundred fifty-four and twenty-five hundred ninety-g of the 
education law the parent or legal guardian, other than the 
state or a local social services department or a foster parent, 
having custody of an infant over ten and less than eighteen 
years of age, shall, if such infant willfully, maliciously or 
unlawfully damages or destroys real or personal property or who 
with intent to deprive the owner of property or to appropriate 
the same to himself or to a third person he knowingly enters 
or remains unlawfully in a building and wrongfully takes, 
obtains or withholds personal property from such building which 
perscnal property is owned or maintained by another, be held 
liable for such damage or destruction in a civil action brought 
in a court of competent jurisdiction. For the purposes of t~is 
section the terms "enters or remains unlawfully" and "building" 
shall have the same meaning as ascribed to such terms in section 
140.00 of the penal law. In no event, shall such liability un-
der this section be in excess of the sum of one thousand five 
hundred dollars. It shall be a defense to any action brought 
hereunder that restitution has been made pursuant to section 
seven hundred fifty-eight-a or 353.6 of the family court act or 
paragraph (f) of subdivision two of section 65.10 of the 
penal law. It shall also be a defense to an action brought 
under this section that such child has become emancipated 
from his parent or legal guardian prior to the occurrence 
of such damage. 
As amended L. 1979, c. 138, § 2; L. 1981, c. 896, § 2; 
L. 1881, c. 1045, § 2; as amended L. 1982, c. 920, § 50. 
North Carolina 
§ 1-538.1. Strict liability for damage to person or pro-
perty by minors. 
Any person or other legal entity shall be entitled to 
recover actual damages suffered in an amount not to exceed a 
total of one thousand dollars ($1,000) from the parent or 
parents of any minor who shall maliciously or willfully in-
jure such person or destroy the real or personal property of 
such person. Parents whose custody and control have been 
removed by court order or by contract prior to the act com-
plained of shall not be liable under this act. This act 
shall not preclude or limit recovery of damages from parents 
under common law remedies available in this State. (1961, 
c. 1101; 1981, c: 414, s. 1.) 
North Dakota 
32-03-39. Parental responsibility for minor children--Re-
covery limitations. 
Any municipal corporation, county, township, school 
district, or department of the state of North Dakota, or any 
person, partnership, corporation, association, or religious 
organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated, shall 
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be entitled to recover damages in a civil action in an amount 
not to exceed one thousand dollars in a court of competent 
jurisdiction from the parents of any minor, living with a 
parent, who shall maliciously or willfully destroy property, 
real, personal, or mixed, belonging to such municipal, cor-
poration, county, township, school district, or department of 
the state of North Dakota, or person, partnership, corporation, 
association, or religious organization. 
Recovery shall be limited to actual damages in an amount 
not to exceed one thousand dollars, in addition to taxable 
court costs. 
Source: S. L. 1957, ch. 224, §§ 1,2; R. C. 1943, 1957 Supp., 
§ 32-0339; S. L. 1973, ch. 120, § 34; 1975, ch. 293, § 1. 
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32-03-09.2. Liability for willful damages to property. 
Any person convicted of criminal mischief shall be re-
sponsible for the actual damages to real and personal property 
and such damages may be recovered in a civil action in a court 
of competent jurisdiction. Additionally, any minor against 
-whose parents a judgment may be entered pursuant to section 
32-03-39 for damages resulting from action of the minor, shall 
be jointly and severally liable with his parents for such 
action up to the maximum amount provided in section 32-03-39 
and solely liable for any damages over that amount. Any judg-
ment rendered pursuant to this section shall not be discharged 
in bankruptcy and shall not be subject to the statutes of 
limitations provided in chapter 28-01, nor shall such judgment 
be canceled pursuant to section 28-20-35. 
Source: S. L. 197?, ch. 302, § 1. 
Ohio 
§ 3109.09 [Liability of parents for destructive acts or theft 
by their children.] 
Any owner of property may maintain a civil action in a 
court of competent jurisdiction to recover compensatory damages 
not exceeding three thousand dollars and costs of suit from the 
parents having the custody and control of a minor under the age 
of eighteen years, who willfully damages property belonging to 
such owner or who commits acts cognizable as a "theft offense," 
as defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, involving the 
property of such owner. Such an action may be joined with an 
action under Chapter 1919. or 2737. of the Revised Code against 
the minor, or the minor and his parents, to recover the property 
regardless of value, but any additional damages recovered from 
the parents shall be limited to compensatory damages not ex-
ceeding three thousnad dollars, as authorized by this section. 
A finding of willful destruction of property or of committing 
acts _cognizable as a theft offense is not dependent upon a 
prior finding of delinquency of such minor, or upon his con-
viction of any criminal offense. 
For the purposes of this section, a minor is not within 
the custody and control of his parents, if the minor is marri~d. 
Such actions shall be commenced and heard as other civil 
actions. 
History: 131 v 689 (Eff 10-6-65); 132 v H 257 (Eff 10-24-67); 
133 v S 10 (Eff 9-15-69); 137 v H 456. Eff 5-23-78. 
Oklahoma 
§ 10. Recovery of damages by political subdivisions from 
parents of minors 
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The state or any county, city, town, municipal corporation 
or school district, or any person, corporation or organization, 
shall be entitled to recover damages in a court of competent 
jurisdiction from the parents of any minor under the age of 
eighteen (18) years, living with the parents at the time of the 
act, who shall commit any criminal or delinquent act resulting 
in bodily injury to any person or damage to or larceny or any 
property, real, personal or mixed, belonging to the state or a 
county, city, town, municipal corporation, school district, per-
son, corporation or organization. The amount of damages awarded 
shall not exceed Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00). 
Laws 1957, p. 19, § 1, emerg. eff. June 1, 1957. Amended by 
Laws 1971, c. 62, § 1, emerg. eff. April 7, 1971; Laws 1977, 
c. 212, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1978; Laws 1979, c. 238, § 1; Laws 
1982, c. 19, § 1, operative Oct. 1, 1982. 
Oregon 
30.765 Liability of parents for tort by child; effect on 
foster parents. 
(1) In addition to any other remedy provided by law, the 
parent or parents of an unemancipated minor child shall be 
liable for actual damages to person or property caused by any 
tort intentionally committed by such child. However, a parent 
who is not entitled to legal custody of the minor child at the 
time of the intentional tort shall not be liable for such 
damages. 
(2) The legal obligation of the parent or parents of an un-
emancipated minor child to pay damages under this section 
shall be limited to not more than $5,000, payable to the same 
claimant, for one or more acts. 
(3) When an action is brought under the section on parental 
responsibility for acts of their children, the parents shall be 
named as defendants therein and, in addition, the minor child 
shall be named as a defendant. The filing of an answer by t~e 
parents shall not move any requirement that a guardian ad 
litem be required. 
(4) Nothing in subsections (1) to (3) of this section 
applies to foster parents. 
[1975 c. 712 §§ 1,4; 1977, c. 419 § 1] 
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Pennsylvania 
§ 2001. Definitions 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Person" includes natural persons, partnerships, asso-
ciations, private and public corporations, authorities, fidu-
ciaries, the United States and any governmental agency thereof, 
and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and any agency or political 
subdivision thereof. 
(2) "Parent" includes natural or adoptive parents. 
1967, July 27, P. L. 186, § 1. 
§ 2002. Parents' liability 
Any parent whose child under the age of eighteen years 
is found liable or is adjudged guilty by a court of competent 
jurisdiction of a wilful, tortious act resulting in injury to 
the person, or theft, destruction or loss of property of an-
other, shall be liable to the person who suffers the injury, 
theft, destruction or loss to the extent hereinafter set forth. 
1967, July 27, P. L. 186, § 2. 
§ 2003. Reimbursement in criminal or juvenile court proceeding; 
civil judgment 
(a) In any proceeding of a criminal nature against a child 
under the age of eighteen years and in any proceeding against 
a child in a juvenile court, the court shall ascertain the 
amount sufficient to fully reimburse any person who has suffered 
injury to the person, or theft, destruction or loss of property 
because of the wilful, tortious act of the child, and direct the 
parents to make payment in the amount not to exceed the limi-
tations set forth in section 4 hereof. If the parents fail to 
comply with the direction of the court, the amount may be re-
covered in an action of assumpsit against the parents or either 
of them. 
(b) If a judgment has been rendered against the child for 
injury to the person, or theft, destruction, or loss of prope~ty 
because of the wilful, tortious act of the child in a civil 
proceeding and such judgment has not been satisfied within a 
period of thirty days, the injured person may petition the court 
for a rule to show cause why judgment should not be entered 
against the parent. A parent shall have the right to file an 
answer to said petition and if there is any dispute as to un-
litigated facts, the case shall be set down for trial. If there 
is no dispute as to the unlitigated facts, the court shall 
authorize the entry of a judgment against the parent. In no 
case shall the judgment against the parent exceed the limi-
tations set forth in section 4 hereof. 
1967, July 27, P. L. 186, § 3. 
§ 2004. Limit of liability; distribution; costs; fees; 
joint tort 
(a) Liability of the patents shall be limited to three 
hundred dollars ($300) for injuries to the person, or theft, 
destruction, or loss of property suffered by any one person 
as a result of one wilful, tortious act or continuous series 
of wilful, tortious acts. 
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(b) Liability of the parents shall be limited to one thou-
sand dollars ($1000) regardless of the number of persons who 
suffer injury to the person, or theft, destruction, or loss 
of property as a result of one wilful, tortious act or con-
tinuous series of wilful, tortious acts. In the event that 
actual loss as ascertained by the court or the judgment against 
the child exceeds one thousand dollars ($1000), the parents 
shall be discharged from further liability by the payment of 
one thousand dollars ($1000) into court. The court shall cause 
all aggrieved parties to submit itemized statements of loss in 
writing and shall make distribution proportionately, whether 
the claims be for injuries to the person, or theft, destruction, 
or loss of property. The court shall have the power to take 
testimony to assist it in making proper distribution and may 
appoint a master to accomplish this purpose. All costs and 
fees thus incurred shall be paid from the one thousand dollars 
($1000) paid into court. 
(c) The limitations on liability set forth in subsections (a) 
and (b) of this section shall be applicable when two or more 
children of the same parent engage jointly in the commission of 
one wilful, tortious act or series of wilful, tortious acts. 
1967, July 27, P. L. 186, § 4. 
§ 2005. Common law liability; child's liability; custody; 
emancipation; desertion; indemnity; double recovery 
The liability imposed upon parents by this act shall not 
limit the common law liability of parents for damages caused 
by a child and shall be separate and apart from any liability 
which may be imposed upon the child. No liability shall be 
imposed upon a parent by this act if at the time of commission 
of the wilful, tortious act, such parent has neither custody 
of the child, nor is entitled to custody of the child, or if 
the child is institutionalized or emancipated. No parent 
shall be absolved of liability due to the parents' desertion 
of a child. Any judgment against a child resulting from a 
wilful, tortious act for which a parent makes payment under 
this act shall be reduced by the amount paid by the parent. 
The parent shall have no right of indemnity or contribution 
against the child. In no case shall there be a double re-
covery for one injury. 
1967, July 27, P.L. 186, § 5. 
Rhode Island 
9-1-3. Liability of parents for torts of minors. 
The parent or parents of any unemancipated minor or 
minors, which minor or minors wilfully or maliciously cause 
damage to any property or injury to any person, shall be 
jointly and severally liable with such minor or minors for 
such damage or injury to an amount not exceeding fifteen 
hundred dollars ($1,500) if such minor or minors would have 
been liable for such damage or injury if they had been 
adults; provided nothing herein shall be construed to re-
lieve such minor or minors from personal liability for such 
damage or injury. The liability herein provided for shall 
be in addition to and not in lieu of any other liability 
which may exist at law. 
History of Section. 
P.L. 1956, ch. 3749, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 9-1-3; P.L. 1974, 
ch. 137, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 296, §1. 
South Carolina 
§ 20-7-340. Malicious injury to property by minor. 
When any unmarried minor under the age of seventeen 
years and living with his parent shall maliciously and in-
tentionally destroy, damage or steal property, real, per-
sonal or mixed, the owner of such property shall be entitled 
to recover from such parent of such minor actual damages in 
a civil action court of competent jurisdiction in an amount 
not exceeding one thousand dollars; provided, however, that 
nothing herein contained shall in any way limit the appli-
cation of the family purpose doctrine. 
History: 1981 Act No. 71, § 1, eff May 19, 1981. 
185 
South Dakota 
25-5-15. Parental liability for willful acts of child--
Limitation of recovery--Motor vehicle cases 
excepted. 
Any person, firm, association, private or public cor-
poration, including the state of South Dakota and its 
political subdivisions, suffering damages to real, personal 
or mixed property, or personal injury, through the malicious 
and willful act or acts of a minor child or children under 
the age of eighteen years while residing with their parents, 
shall have therefor a cause of action against and recover of 
the parents of such child or children. In each case the 
amount of recovery against one or both of the parents shall 
be limited to actual damages of seven hundred fifty dollars 
and the taxable court costs, and shall not apply to damages 
proximately caused through the operation of a motor vehicle 
by said minor child or children. 
Source: SL 1957, ch 41; SDC Supp 1960, § 14.0309-1; SL 
1979, ch 166; 1980, ch 188. 
Tennessee 
37-1001. Property damage by juvenile--Recovery against 
parents or guardian. 
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Any municipal corporation, county, township, village, 
school district or department of the state of Tennessee, or 
any person, or any religious organization, whether incor-
porated or unincorporated, shall be entitled to recover 
damages in an action in assumpsit in an amount not to exceed 
ten thousand dollars ($10,000) in a court of competent juris-
diction from the parents or guardian of the person of any 
minor under the age of eighteen (18) years, living with the 
parents or guardian of the person who shall maliciously or 
willfully destroy property, real, personal or mixed, belonging 
to such municipal corporation, county, township, village, 
school district or department of the state of Tennessee or 
persons or religious organizations. [Acts 1957, ch. 76, § 1; 
1969, ch. 170, § 1; 1976 (Adj. S.), ch. 408, § 1; 1981, ch. 
161, § 1] 
37-1002. Limitation on amount of recovery. 
The recovery shall be limited to the actual damages in 
an amount not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000) in 
addition to taxable court costs. [Acts 1957, ch. 76, § 2; 
1969, ch. 170, § 2; 1976 (Adj. S.), ch. 408, § 2; 1981, ch. 
161, § 2. ] 
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37-1003. Circumstances under which parent or guardian liable. 
(a) A parent or guardian shall be liable for the tortious 
activities of a minor child that cause injuries to property 
where the parent or guardian knows, or should know, of the 
child's tendency to commit wrongful acts which can be expected 
. to cause injury to property, and where the parent or guardian 
has an opportunity to control the child but fails to exercise 
reasonable means to restrain the tortious conduct. 
(b) A parent or guardian shall be presumed to know of a 
child's tendency to commit wrongful acts, if the child has 
previously been charged and found responsible for such actions. 
[Acts 1957, ch. 76, § 3; 1981, ch. 161, § 3.] 
Texas 
Section 33.01 Liability 
A parent or other person who has the duty of control and 
reasonable discipline of a child is liable for any property 
damage proximately caused by: 
(1) the negligent conduct of the child if the con-
duct is reasonably attributable to the negligent failure of 
the parent or other person to exercise that duty; or 
(2) the wilful and malicious conduct of a child is 
at least 12 years of age but under 18 years of age. 
Historical Note 
Prior Law: Acts 1957, 55th Leg., p. 783, ch. 320, § 1. Acts 
1965, 59th Leg., p. 430, ch. 217, § 1. Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. 
art. 5923-1, § 1. 
§ 33.02. Limits of Recovery 
Recovery for damage caused by wilful and malicious con-
duct is limited to actual damages, not to exceed $15,000 per 
act, plus court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
Amended by Acts 1981, 67th Leg., p. 915, ch. 331, § 1, eff. 
June 10, 1981. 
§ 33.03. Venue 
A suit under this chapter may be brought in the county 
where the conduct of the child occurred or in the county where 
the defendant resides. 
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Historical Note 
Prior Law: Acts 1957, 55th Leg., p. 783, ch. 320, § 2. Acts 
1965, 59th Leg., p. 430, ch. 217, § 1. Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. 
art. 5923-1, § 2. 
Utah 
78-11-20. Property damage caused by minor--Liability of parent 
or guardian. 
The parents or legal guardian having legal custody of 
such minor, as the case may be, are liable for damages sus-
tained to property not to exceed $1,000 when: 
(1) The minor intentionally damages, defaces, destroys, or 
takes the property of another; or 
(2) The minor recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a 
missile, or other object at or against a motor vehicle, bus, 
airplane, boat, locomotive, train, railway car or caboose, 
whether moving or standing; or 
(3) The minor intentionally and unlawfully tampers with 
the property of another and thereby recklessly endangers human 
life or recklessly causes or threatens a substantial inter-
ruption or impairment of any public utility service. 
History: L. 1977, ch. 181, § 1. 
78-11-21. Property damage caused by minor--When parent or 
guardian not liable. 
No parent or guardian shall be so liable if he or she 
made a reasonable effort to supervise and direct their minor 
child, or in the event the parent knew in advance of the 
possible taking, injury or destruction by their minor child, 
he or she made a reasonable effort to restrain it. 
History: L. 1977, ch. 181, § 2. 
Vermont 
§ 901. Parents' liability for damages 
(a) When an unemancipated minor under the age of seventeen 
years wilfully or maliciously causes damage to any property, 
public or private, or injury to a person, either of his pa-
rents shall be liable to the owner of such property or to the 
person injured, in an action on this statute, for the damage 
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to property, injury to person, or either, in an amount not to 
exceed $250.00 provided such minor would be liable had such 
minor been an adult. If the damage or injury is caused by two 
or more such minors, a parent shall be liable for each of his 
children subject to the provisions of this section in an 
amount not exceeding $250.00. The remedy herein provided 
shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other remedy 
which may exist at law, except, however, that any judgment 
subsequently recovered in any action brought for money damages 
on account of the damage or injury herein contemplated shall 
be reduced by the extent of any previous judgment recovered in 
any other such action. 
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall 
not apply to a parent legally deprived or relieved of the 
custody of said minor prior to the commission of the act com-
plained of. 
1959, No. 124, §§ 1,2. 
Virginia 
§ 8.01-43. Action against parent for damage to public pro-
perty by minor. 
The Commonwealth, acting through the officers having 
charge of the public property involved, or the governing body 
of a county, city, town, or other political subdivision, or 
a school board may institute an action and recover from the 
parents or either of them of any minor living with such pa-
rents or either of them for damages suffered by reason of the 
willful or malicious destruction of, or damage to, public 
property by such minor. No more than $500 may be recovered 
from such parents or either of them as a result of any inci-
dent or occurrence on which such action is based. (Code 
1950, § 8-654.1; 1960, c. 132; 1972, c. 825; 1977, c. 617; 
1983, c. 330.) 
§ 8.01-44. Action against parent for damage to private pro-
perty by minor. 
The owner of any property may institute an action and 
recover from the parents, or either of them, of any minor 
living with such parents, or either of them, for damages 
suffered by reason of the willful or malicious destruction 
of, or damage to, such property by such minor. No more than 
$500 may be recovered from such parents, or either of them, 
as a result of any incident or occurrence on which such 
action is based. Any such recovery from the parent or 
parents of such minor shall not preclude full recovery from 
such minor except to the amount of the recovery from such 
parent or parents. The prov~s~ons of this statute shall be 
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other law imposing 
upon a parent liability for the acts of his minor child. 
(Code 1950, § 8-654.1:1; 1966, c. 532; 1972, c. 825; 1977, 
c. 617; 1984, c. 48.) 
Washington 
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4.24.190. Action against parent for wilful injury to person 
or property by minor--Monetary limitation--
Common law liability preserved. 
The parent or parents of any minor child under the age 
of eighteen years who is living with the parent or parents 
and who shall wilfully or maliciously destroy property, real 
or personal or mixed, or who shall wilfully and maliciously 
inflict personal injury on another person, shall be liable 
to the owner of such property or to the person injured in a 
civil action at law for damages in an amount not to exceed 
three thousand dollars. This section shall in no way limit 
the amount of recovery against the parent or parents for their 
own common negligence. 
Amended by Laws 1967, Ex. Sess., ch. 46, § 1; Laws 1977, 
Ex. Sess., ch. 145, § 1. 
West Virginia 
§ 55-7A-1. Legislative findings; declaration of legislative 
intent. 
The legislature hereby finds and declares that there 
are now and have been repeated and widespread acts of van-
dalism, willful and malicious destruction of property and 
other injury to persons and property occasioned by the will-
ful, malicious and sometimes criminal acts of children under 
the age of eighteen years; that the great majority of such 
children are living with a parent or parents; that there 
arises or should arise out of such relationship, a responsibil-
ity to recompense persons injured by such acts of vandalism 
and willful and malicious injury to persons and property. 
Therefore, it is the intent of the legislature to make parents 
responsible for the torts of their minor children by reason 
of the parent-child relationship, and to impose on said pa-
rent or parents for such acts of their children, who live with 
them and who commit acts of vandalism or willful and malicious 
injury to persons and property, liability in accordance with 
the provisions hereinafter set forth. (1957, c. 1; 1981, c.3.) 
West Virginia 
§ 55-7A-2. Parental liability for willful, malicious or 
criminal acts of children. 
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The custodial parent or parents of any minor shall be 
liable in an amount not to exceed twenty-five hundred dollars 
for damages which are the proximate result of any one or a 
combination of the following acts of such minor: 
(a) The malicious and willful injury to the person of an-
other; or 
(b) The malicious and willful injury or damage to the 
property of another, whether such property be real, personal 
or mixed; or 
(c) The malicious and willful setting fire to a forest or 
wooded area belonging to another; or 
(d) The willful taking, stealing and carrying away of the 
property of another, with the intent to permanently deprive 
the owner of possession. 
For purposes of this section, "custodial parent or pa-
rents" shall mean the parent or parents with whom the minor 
is living, or a divorced or separated parent who does not 
have legal custody but who is exercising supervisory control 
over the minor at the time of the minor's act. 
Persons entitled to recover damages under this article 
shall include, but not be limited to, the State of West Vir-
ginia, any municipal corporation, county commission and board 
of education, or other political subdivision of this State, 
or any person or organization of any kind or character. The 
action may be brought in magistrate or other court of compe-
tent jurisdiction. Recovery hereunder shall be limited to the 
actual damages based upon direct out-of-pocket loss, taxable 
court costs, and interest from date of judgment. The right of 
action and remedy granted herein shall be in addition to and 
not exclusive of any rights of action and remedies therefor 
against a parent or parents for the tortious acts of his or 
their children heretofore existing under the provisions of 
any law, statutory or otherwise, or now so existing indepen-
dently of the provisions of this article. 
The provisions of this article shall be applicable to 
causes of action arising on and aft~~ the effective date of 
this article [June 14, 1981]. Causes of actions arising be-
fore the effective date of this article [June 14, 1981] and 
proceedings thereon shall be governed by the previously 
enacted prov~s~ons of this article in force at the time such 
cause arose. (1957, c. 1; 1959, c. 4; 1981, c. 3). 
Wisconsin 
895.035. Parental liability for acts of minor child 
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(1) The parent or parents having legal custody of an un-
emancipated minor child, in any circumstances where he or 
they may not be otherwise liable under the common law, shall 
be held liable for damages to property or for personal injury 
attributable to a wilful, malicious or wanton act of the 
child not to exceed $1,000, in addition to taxable costs and 
disbursements directly attributable to any wilful, malicious 
or wanton act of the child. 
(2) Maximum recovery from any parent or parents of any 
child may not exceed the limitation provided in sub. (1) for 
any one wilful, malicious or wanton act of such child and if 
2 or more children of the same parent or parents having legal 
custody cornmi t the same act the recovery may twt ·exceed in 
the aggregate $1,000, in addition to taxable costs and dis-
bursements. 
(3) This section shall not limit the amount of damages re-
coverable by an action against the child or children except 
that any amount so recovered shall be reduced and apportioned 
by the amounts received from the parent or parents under this 
section. 
Source: L. 1957, c. 208. L. 1959, c. 562, §2m. St. 1963, 
§ 331.035. L. 1965, c. 66, § 2. L. 1967, c. 245, eff. 
Dec. 23, 1967. L. 1969, c. 328, eff. Jan. 21, 1970. 
Wyoming 
§ 14-2-203. Parental tort liability for property damage of 
certain minors; exception; action cumulative. 
(a) Any property owner is entitled to recover damages from 
the parents of any minor under the age of seventeen (17) years 
and over the age of ten (10) years who maliciously and willfully 
damages or destroys his property. The recovery is limited to 
the actual damages in an amount not to exceed three hundred 
dollars ($300.00) in addition to taxable court costs. This 
section does not apply to parents whose parental custody and 
control of the child has been removed by court order. 
(b) The action authorized in subsection (a) of this section 
is in addition to all other actions which the owner is entitled 
to maintain and nothing in this section precludes recovery in a 
amount from the minor, parents or any person for damages for 
which the minor or other person would otherwise be liable. 
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The purpose of this section is to authorize recovery from 
parents in situations where they would not otherwise be liable. 
(Laws 1965, ch. 73, §§ 1 to 3; 1978, ch. 25, § 1.) 
APPENDIX B 
STATE ACTS PERTAINING TO THE SPECIFIC 
DESTRUCTION OF SCHOOL PROPERTY 
BY PUPILS 
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Arizona 
§ 15-842. Damage to school property; suspension or expulsion 
of pupil; liability of parent 
A. A pupil who cuts, defaces or otherwise injures any school 
property may be suspended or expelled. 
B. Upon complaint of the governing board, the parents or 
guardians of minors who have injured school property shall be 
liable for all damages caused by their children or wards. 
Amended by Laws 1981, Ch. 1, § 2, eff. Jan. 23, 1981. 
Source: 
Laws 1912, Ch. 77, § 88. 
Civ. Code 1913, § 2801. 
Rev. Code 1928, § 1032. 
Arkansas 
Code 1939, § 54-504. 
A.R.S. former § 15-446. 
Laws 1960, Ch. 127, § 33. 
80-1903. Destruction of property--Penalty. 
Any person who shall wilfully destroy, or ~nJure any 
building used as a schoolhouse, or for educational purposes, 
or any furniture, fixtures, or apparatus thereto belonging, 
or who shall deface, mar, or disfigure any such building, 
furniture or fixtures, by writing, cutting, painting, or 
pasting thereon any likeness, figure, words, or devise [device], 
without the consent of the teacher or other person having 
control of such house, furniture, or fixtures, shall be fined 
in a sum double the value of such building, furniture, fix-
tures, or apparatus so destroyed or damaged, and shall be 
fined in a sum not less than ten [$10.00], nor more than 
fifty dollars [$50.00] for each offense, to be recovered by 
civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction; and the 
punishment provided in this section is in addition to and not 
in lieu of the punishment by other statutes for such offenses. 
[Acts 1931, No. 169, § 177, p. 476; Pope's Dig. §§ 3592, 
11619.] 
80-1904. Injury to schoolhouse or fixtures--Penalties. 
To cut, write upon, deface, disfigure, or damage any 
part or appurtenance or enclosure of any schoolhouse, shall 
be a misdemeanor ~unishable by a fine not exceeding one 
hundred dollars [~100]. Any fine collected under this act 
for injury to any schoolhouse or other school property shall 
be paid into the school funds of the district where the 
crime was committed. [Acts 1931, No. 169, § 178, p. 476; 
Pope's Dig., §§ 3593, 11620.] 
California 
§ 48904. Liability of parent for personal ~nJuries of 
property damages; Withholding of grades, diplomas, 
or transcripts 
196 
(a) Notwithstanding Section 1714.1 of the Civil Code, the 
parent or guardian of any minor whose willful misconduct re-
sults in injury or death to any pupil or any person employed 
by or performing volunteer se··rvices for a school district or 
private school or who willfully cuts, defaces, or otherwise 
injures in any way any property, real or personal, belonging 
to a school district or private school, or personal property 
of any school employee shall be liable for all damages so 
caused by the minor. The liability of the parent or guardian 
shall not exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000). The parent 
or guardian shall also be liable for the amount of any re-
ward not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000) paid 
pursuant to Section 53069.5 of the Government Code. The 
parent or guardian of a minor shall be liable to a school 
district or private school for all property belonging to 
the school district or private school loaned to the minor and 
not returned upon demand of an employee of the district or 
private school authorized to make the demand. 
(b) Any school district or private school whose real or 
personal property has been willfully cut, defaced, or other-
wise injured, or whose property is loaned to a pupil and 
willfully not returned upon demand of an employee or the 
district or private school authorized to make the demand may, 
after affording the pupil his or her due process rights, with-
hold the grades, diploma, and transcripts of the pupil re-
sponsible for the damage until the pupil or the pupil's parent 
or guardian has paid for the damages thereto, as provided in 
subdivision (a). 
The school district or private school shall notify the 
parent or guardian of the pupil in writing of the pupil's 
alleged misconduct before withholding the pupil's grades, 
diploma, or transcripts pursuant to this subdivision. When 
the minor and parent are unable to pay for the damages, or 
to return the property, the school district or private school 
shall provide a program of voluntary work for the minor in 
lieu of the payment of monetary damages. Upon completion of 
voluntary work, the grades, diploma, and transcripts of the 
pupil shall be released. 
The governing board of each school district or governing 
body of each private school shall establish rules and regu-
lations governing procedures for the implementation of this 
subdivision. The procedures shall conform to, but are not 
necessarily limited to, those procedures established in this 
code for the expulsion of pupils. 
Added Stats 1983 ch 498 § 91, effective July 28, 1983. 
Prior Law: Former § 48909, as amended by Stats 1979 ch 127 
§ 2, Stats 1982 ch 222 § 1. 
Former Section: Former § 48904, similar to present § 48914, 
was repealed by Stats 1983 ch 498 § 90, effective July 28, 
1983. 
Florida 
235.09. Obscenity on education buildings or vehicles 
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Whoever willfully cuts, paints, pasts, marks, or defaces 
by writing or in any other manner any educational building, 
furniture, apparatus, appliance, outbuilding, ground, fence, 
tree, post, vehicle, or other educational property with an 
obscene word, image, or device is guilty of a misdemeanor of 
the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 
775.084. This section shall not apply to any student in grades 
K-12 subject to the discipline of a district school board. 
Amended by Laws 1977, c. 77-458, § 7, eff. July 1, 1977; Laws 
1981, c. 81-223, § 13, eff. June 30, 1981. 
Hawaii 
§ 298-27 Vandalism damage to public school property. 
(a) Any pupil found to be responsible for an act of van-
dalism against any public school, building, facility, or ground 
shall make restitution in any manner including monetary resti-
tution by the pupil or pupil's parents, or guardians, or both. 
For the purpose of this section, "vandalism" shall in-
clude, but not be limited to, mischievous or malicious de-
struction of property, such as breakage of windows, lockers, 
and doors. The provisions of this section shall be in addition 
to and shall in no way limit the provisions of any other law 
concerning offenses against property rights. 
(b) No pupil, parent, or guardian shall be required to 
make restitution in any manner unless the pupil and the pa-
rents or guardian have been notified and have been given an 
opportunity to be heard, on any report of vandalism involving 
the pupil, and the pupil, parent, or guardian have executed a 
written agreement to make such restitution. 
198 
(c) The principal of the school in which the vandalism 
occurred shall make or order an investigation of the vandalism. 
If after such investigation, the principal has reasonable cause 
to believe that a specific pupil is responsible for the van-
dalism, the principal shall schedule a conference with such 
pupil and his or her parents or guardian. Except for th~ 
principal of the school in which the vandalism occurred, the 
pupil and the parents or guardian, no other person shall be 
permitted to be in the conference for any reason. 
(d) At the conference, the principal of the school in 
which the vanadalism occurred shall present the findings of the 
investigation and the requirements of restitution to the pupil 
and parents or guardian. 
If the pupil and the parents or guardian agree with the 
findings of the principal and the manner in which restitution 
is to be made, the principal and the pupil and parent or guar-
dian shall execute a written agreement which shall specify the 
manner in which restitution is to be made. 
Agreements shall be made only for damages that do not 
exceed $3,500. 
If restitution ,is made in this fashion, then all records 
and documents regarding the investigation and conference shall 
be destroyed. No information about the investigation, con-
ference and the actions taken shall be communicated to any 
person not directly involved in the proceedings. 
If the pupil and parent or guardian do not agree with 
the findings made by the principal, the principal shall pre-
serve all the records and documents regarding the investigation 
and conference and shall report the findings to the district 
superintendent who shall review the findings and may refer the 
matter to the attorney general for any further action pursuant 
to section 577-3. 
(e) If the damages exceed $3,500, the principal shall 
report the matter to the district superintendent who shall re-
fer the matter to the attorney general for any further action 
pursuant to section 577-3. 
(f) Notwithstanding any provisions herein to the con-
trary, the State may elect to bring any appropriate action for 
the recovery of all damages to school properties. Nothing in 
this section shall limit the right of the State to bring an 
action against any person to recover such damages. [L 1978, 
c 216, § 1; am L 1982, c 138, § ]; am L 1983, c 169, § 1] 
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Maine 
§ 6805. Injuries by minor; damages 
If a minor ~nJures or aids in ~nJuring a schoolhouse or 
school outbuildings, utensils or appurtenances; defaces the 
walls,. benches, seats or other parts of school buildings by 
marks, cuts or otherwise; or injures or destroys school pro-
perty belonging to a school administrative unit, the unit may 
recover from the minor's parent, in a civil action, double 
the damage. 
1981, c. 693, § 5, eff. July 1, 1983. 
Laws 1957, c. 364, § 94. 
R.S. 1954, c. 41, § 233. Former§. 3772 of title 20. 
§ 6806. Defacing schoolhouses; outbuildings. 
A person who defaces the walls, benches, seats, black-
boards or other parts of a schoolhouse or school outbuildings, 
by obscene pictures, language, marks or descriptions, commits 
a civil offense and shall pay a fine of not more than $10. 
1981, c. 693, § 5, eff. July 1, 1983. 
R.S. 1954, c. 41, § 234. 
Former § 3773 of title 20. 
§ 6807. Liability for injury to books or appliances 
If a public school student loses, destroys or unneces-
sarily injures a schoolbook or appliance furnished to him at 
the expense of the school administrative unit, his parent shall 
be notified. If the loss or damage is not made good to the 
satisfaction of the school board within a reasonable time, 
they shall report the case to the assessors of the municipality 
in which the student resides. The municipal assessors shall 
include in the next municipal tax of the delinquent parent the 
value of the book or appliance, to be assessed and collected as 
other munic_ipal taxes. 
1981, c. 693, § 5, eff. July 1, 1983. 
Mississippi 
§ 37-11-19. Damaging school property. 
If any pupil shall wilfully destroy, cut, deface, damage, 
or injure any school building, equipment or other school 
property he shall be liable to suspension or expulsion and his 
parents or person or persons in loco parentis shall be liable 
for all damages. 
Source: Codes, 1942 § 6216-04; Laws, 1953, Ex Sess, ch. 26, 
§ 4, eff. from and after July 1, 1954. 
Nevada 
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393.070. Damage to school property; loitering; disturbances; 
penalty. 
1. It is unlawful for any person: 
(a) Willfully and maliciously to injure, mark or de-
face any public schoolhouse, its fixtures, books or appurtenances; 
or 
(b) To commit any nuisance in any public schoolhouse; or 
(c) To loiter on or near the school grounds; or 
(d) Purposely and maliciously to commit any trespass upon 
the grounds attached to a public schoolhouse, or any fixtures 
placed thereon, or any enclosure or sidewalk about the same. 
2. Any person violating any of the provisions of this 
section shall be guilty of a public offense, as prescribed in 
NRS 193.155, proportionate to the value of the property damaged 
or destroyed and in no event less than a misdemeanor. 
[415:32:1956]--(NRS A 1967, 567) 
New Jersey 
18A:37-3. Liability of parents or guardian of minor for 
damage to property 
The parents or guardian of any minor who shall ~nJure 
any public or nonpublic school property shall be liable for 
damages for the amount of injury to be collected by the board 
of education of the district or the owner of the ~remises in 
any court of competent jurisdiction, together wit costs of 
suit. 
Amended by L. 1983, c. 302, § 1, eff. Aug. 11, 1983. 
North Carolina 
§ 115C-398. Damage to school buildings, furnishings, text-
books. 
Students may be liable for damage to school buildings, 
furnishings and textbooks pursuant to the provlslons of G.S. 
115C-523, 115C-100 and 14-132. (1981, c. 423, s. 1.) 
§ 115C-399. Trespass on or damage to school bus. 
Any person who willfully trespasses upon or damages a 
school bus may be liable pursuant to the provisions of G.S. 
14-132.2. (1981, c. 423, s. 1.) 
§ 115C-523. Care of school property. 
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It shall be the duty of every teacher and principal in 
charge of school buildings to instruct the children in the 
proper care of public property, and it is their duty to exer-
cise due care in the protection of school property against 
damage, either by defacement of the walls and doors or any 
breakage on the part of the pubpils, and if they shall fail to 
exercise a reasonable care in the protection of property during 
the day, they may be held financially responsible for all such 
damage, and if the damage is due to carelessness or negligence 
on the part of the teachers or principal, the superintendent may 
hold those in charge of the building responsible for the damage, 
and if it is not repaired before the close of a term, a suffi-
cient amount may be deducted from their final vouchers to repair 
the damage for which they are responsible. 
If any child in school shall carelessly or willfully 
damage school property, the teacher or principal shall report 
the damage to the parent, and if the parent refuses to pay the 
cost of repairing the same, the teacher or principal shall re-
port the offense to the superintendent of schools. 
It shall be the duty of all principals to report immedi-
ately to their respective superintendents any unsanitary 
condition, damage to school property or needed repair. (1955, 
c. 1372, art. 17, s. 7; 1981, c. 423, s. 1.) 
Oregon 
339.260 Injury to school property by pupil. 
(1) No pupil shall wilfully damage or lnJure any school 
property or threaten or wilfully injure any fellow pupil or 
faculty member. 
(2) A pupil who violates subsection (1) of this section 
may be disciplined, suspended or expelled. 
[1965 c. 100 § 290; 1971 c. 561 § 4] 
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339.270 Assessment of costs of school property damage against 
responsible pupil or his parents; action to recover; 
limitation. 
(1) The amount of damage to any school property shall 
be determined by procedures established by the district school 
board and they may be assessed against the pupil wilfully 
causing the injury or damage and against the parent or parents 
having legal custody of the pupil. 
(2) If the assessed damages are not paid as demanded, 
the district school board, in addition to any other remedy pro-
vided by law, may bring an action under this section against 
the pupil and the parent or parents having legal custody of 
the pupil in a court of competent jurisdiction for the amount 
of the assessed damages not to exceed $5,000 plus costs. 
[1971 c. 561 § 5; 1975 c. 712 § 2; 1977 c. 419 § 2] 
South Dakota 
13-32-5. Injury to school property as ground for suspension 
or expulsion. 
Any student, who cuts, defaces, or otherwise injures 
any schoolhouse, equipment, or outbuilding thereof, is liable 
to suspension or expulsion. 
Source: SL 1931, ch 138, § 257; SDC 1939, § 15.3009; SL 1955, 
ch 41, ch 12 § 19; SDC Supp 1960, § 15.3019; SL 1975, ch 128, 
§ 210. 
Vermont 
§ 3744. Liability for damage to textbook or appliance 
A person having the control of a pupil shall be liable 
to the town district for damage occasioned by the loss, de-
struction or unnecessary injury or detention by such pupil 
of a textbook or appliance loaned such pupil, to be recovered 
in an action of tort on this statute, in the name of such 
district. 
Source: V.S. 1947, § 4411. P.L. § 4333. G.L. § 1328. 
1915, No. 64, § 138. P.S. § 1107. R. 1906, § 1019. V.S. 
§ 771. 1894, No. 13, § 3. 
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Virginia 
§ 22.1-276. Liability of pupils for destruction of property. 
Each pupil shall be required to reimburse the school 
board for any actual breakage or destruction of property owned 
by or under the control of the school board done by such 
pupil in pursuit of his studies. (Code 1950, § 22-200; 1980, 
c. 559.) 
Washington 
28A.87.120 Defacing or injuring school property--Liability 
of pupil, parent or guardian--Voluntary work 
program as alternative--Rights protected 
(1) Any pupil who shall deface or otherwise injure any 
school property, shall be liable to suspension and punishment. 
Any school district whose property has been lost or wilfully 
cut, defaced, or injured, may withhold the grades, diploma, 
and transcripts of the pupil responsible for the damage or 
loss until the pupil or the pupil's parent or guardian has 
paid for the damages. When the pupil and parent or guardian 
are unable to pay for the damages, the school district shall 
provide a program of voluntary work for the pupil in lieu of 
the payment of monetary damages. Upon completion of volun-
tary work the grades, diploma, and transcripts of the pupil 
shall be released. The parent or guardian of such pupil shall 
be liable for damages as otherwise provided by law. 
(2) Before any penalties are assessed under this 
section, a school district board of directors shall adopt 
procedures which insure that pupils' rights to due process 
are protected. 
Amended by Laws 1982, ch. 38, § 1. 
APPENDIX C 
State Acts Related to the Grounds for Suspension 
or Expulsion of Pupils, Including Punishment 
for Destruction of School Property 
by Pupils 
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Indiana 
20-8.1-5-4 [28-5390c]. Grounds for expulsion or suspension: 
The following types of student conduct shall constitute 
grounds for expulsion or ~uspension subject to the procedural 
provisions of this chapter. 
(a) Use of violence, force, noise, coercion, threat, 
intimidation, fear, passive resistance or other comparable 
conduct, constituting an interference with school purposes, 
or urging other students to engage in such conduct. The 
following enumeration is illustrative of the type of conduct 
prohibited by this subsection: (1) occupying any school 
building, school grounds, or part thereof with intent to de-
prive others of its use; (2) blocking the entrance or exits 
of any school building or corridor or room therein with intent 
to deprive others of lawful access to or from, or use of the 
building or corridor or room; (3) setting fire to or sub-
stantially damaging any school building or property; (4) firing, 
displaying, or threatening use of firearms, explosives or other 
weapons on the school premises for any unlawful purpose; 
(5) prevention of or attempting to prevent by physical act the 
convening or continued functioning of any school or educational 
function, or of any lawful meeting or assembly on school prop-
erty; and (6) continuously and intentionally making noise or 
acting in any manner so as to interfere seriously with the 
ability of any teacher or any of the other school personnel to 
conduct the educational function under his supervision. This 
subsection shall not, however, be construed to make any par-
ticular student conduct a ground for expulsion where such con-
duct is constitutionally protected as an exercise of free speech 
or assembly or other under the Constitution of Indiana or the 
United States. 
(b) Causing or attempting to cause substantial damage to 
school property, stealing or attempting to steal school prop-
erty of substantial value, or repeated damage or theft involving 
school property of small value.· 
(c) Intentionally causing or attempting to cause sub-
stantial damage to valuable private property or stealing or 
attempting to steal valuable private property, on school 
grounds or during an educational function or event off school 
grounds; or repeatedly damaging or stealing private property on 
school grounds, or during an educational function or event off 
school grounds or when such student is traveling to or from 
school or such educational function or event. 
(d) Intentionally causing or attempting to cause 
physical injury or intentionally behaving in_such a way as 
could reasonably cause physical injury to any person: 
(1) on the school grounds during and immediately before or 
immediately after school hours; (2) on the school grounds 
at any other time when the school is being used by a school 
group; or (3) off the school grounds at an educational fun-
ction or event. Self defense or reasonable action under-
taken on the reasonable belief that it was necessary to 
protect some other person does not, however, constitute a 
violation of this provision. 
(e) [Omitted by 1980 amendment]. 
(f) Threatening or intimidating any student for the 
purpose of, or with the intent of, obtaining money or any-
thing of value from such student. 
(g) Knowingly possessing, handling or transmitting 
any object that can reasonably be considered a weapon: 
(1) on the school grounds during and immediately before or 
immediately after school hours; (2) on the school grounds 
at any other time when the school is being used by a school 
group; or (3) off the school grounds at any educational 
function or event sponsored by the school. 
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(h) Knowingly possessing, using, transmitting or being 
under the influence of any narcotic drug, hallucinogenic drug, 
amphetamine, barbiturate, marijuana, alcoholic beverage, or 
intoxicant of any kind: (1) on the school grounds during 
and immediately before or immediately after school hours; 
(2) on the school grounds at any other time when the school 
is being used by any school group; or (3) off the school 
grounds at a school activity, function or event. 
Use of a drug authorized by a medical prescription from 
a physician is not a violation of this rule. 
(i) Engaging in the unlawful selling of narcotics or 
other violation of criminal law which constitutes a danger to 
other students, or constitutes an interference with school 
purposes or an educational function. 
(j) Failing in a substantial number of instances to 
comply with directions of teachers or other school personnel 
during any period of time when he is properly under their 
supervision, where such failure constitutes an interference 
with school purposes or an educational function. 
(k) Engaging in any activity forbidden by the laws of 
the state of Indiana which constitutes an interference with 
school. pruposes or an educational function. 
(1) A violation, or repeated violation, of any rules 
validly adopted under sections 2 and 3 [20-8.1-5-2, 20-8.1-
5-3] of this chapter. 
[IC 20-8.1-5-4, as added by Acts 1973, P. L. 218, § 1; Acts 
1980, P. L. 146, § 10.] 
Kentucky 
158.150 Suspension or expulsion of pupils. 
(1) All pupils admitted to the common schools shall 
comply with the lawful regulations for the government of the 
schools. Wilful disobedience or defiance of the authority 
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of the teachers or administrators, use of profanity or vul-
garity, assult or battery or abuse of other students or school 
personnel, the threat of force or violence, the use or 
possession of alcohol or drugs, stealing or destruction or 
defacing of school property or personal property, the carrying 
or use of weapons or dangerous instruments, or other incor-
rigible bad conduct on school property as well as off school 
property at school sponsored activities constitutes cause for 
suspension or expulsion from school. 
(2) A pupil shall not be suspended from the common 
schools until after at least the following due process pro-
cedures have been provided: 
(a) The pupil has been given oral or written notice of 
the charge or charges against him which constitute cause for 
suspension; 
(b) The pupil has been given an explanation of the 
evidence of the charge or charges if the pupil denies them; 
and 
(c) The pupil has been given an opportunity to present 
his own version of the facts relating to the charge or 
charges. 
These due process procedures shall precede any suspension from 
the common schools unless immediate suspension is essential 
to protect persons or property or to avoid disruption of the 
ongoing academic process. In such cases, the due process pro-
cedures outlined above shall follow the suspension as soon as 
practicable, but no later than three (3) school days after the 
suspension. 
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(3) The superintendent, principal or head teacher of 
any school may suspend a pupil but shall report such action 
in writing immediately to the superintendent and to the 
parent, guardian or other person having legal custody or 
control of the pupil. The board of education of any school 
district may expel any pupil for misconduct as defined in 
subsection (1), but such action shall not be taken until the 
parent, guardian or other person having legal custody or 
control of the pupil has had an opportunity to have a hearing 
before the board. The decision of the board shall be final. 
(4363-9: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 271, § 1, effective June 17, 
1978.) 
Louis ana 
R. S. 17:416 Discipline of pupils; suspension; expulsion 
A. (1) [a] Every teacher is authorized to hold every 
pupil to a strict accountability for any disorderly conduct 
in school or on the playgrounds of the school, on the street 
or road while going to or returning from school, or during 
intermission or recess. A school principal may suspend from 
school any pupil who: 
(i) Is guilty of willful disobedience; 
(ii) Treats with intentional disrespect a teacher, 
superintendent, member, or employee of the local school 
board; 
(iii) Makes against any one of them an unfounded 
charge; 
(iv) Uses unchaste or profane language; 
(v) Is guilty of immoral or vicious practices, or of 
conduct or habits injurious to his associates; 
(vi) Uses tobacco or who possesses alcoholic beverages 
or any controlled dangerous substance governed by the Uniform 
Controlled Dangerous Substance Law, in any form, in school 
buildings, on school grounds, or on school buses owned by, 
contracted to, or jointly owned by any city or parish school 
board; 
(vii) Disturbs the school and habitually violates any 
rule; 
(viii) Cuts, defaces, or injures any part of public 
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school buildings, any property belonging to the buildings, or 
any school buses owned by, contracted to, or jointly owned by 
any city or parish school board; 
(ix) Writes any profane or obscene language or draws 
obscene pictures in or on any school material or on any 
public school premises, or on any fence, pole, sidewalk, or 
building on the way to or from school; 
(x) Is found carrying firearms, knives, or other imple-
ments which can be used as weapons, the careless use of which 
might inflict harm or injury; 
(xi) Throws missiles on the school grounds liable to 
injure other pupils; 
(xii) Instigates or participates in fights while under 
school supervision; 
(xiii) Violates traffic and safety regulations; 
(xiv) Leaves the school premises without permission; 
(xv) Leaves his classroom during class hours or 
detention without permission; 
(xvi) Is habitually tardy or absent; or 
(xvii) Commits any other serious offense. 
(b) Prior to any suspension, the school principal, or 
his designee, shall advise the pupil in question of the par-
ticular misconduct of which he is accused as well as the 
basis for such accusation, and the pupil shall be given an 
opportunity at that time to explain his version of the facts 
to the school principal or his designee. A student whose 
presence in or about a school poses a continued danger to 
any person or property or an ongoing threat of disruption to 
the academic process may be immediately removed from the 
school premises without the benefit of the procedure described 
hereinabove; however, the necessary procedure shall follow as 
soon as is practicable. 
(c) Notice in writing of the suspension and the reasons 
therfor shall be given to the parent or parents of the pupil 
suspended. Any parent, tutor, or legal guardian of a pupil 
suspended shall have the right to appeal to the city or parish 
superintendent of schools or his designee, who shall conduct 
a hearing on the merits. The decision of the superintendent 
of schools on the merits of the case, as well as the term of 
suspension, shall be final, reserving to the superintendent of 
schools the right to remit any portion of the time of suspension. 
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(d) A pupil suspended for damages to any property be-
longing to the school system or to property contracted to the 
school system shall not be readmitted until payment in full 
has been made for such damage or until directed by the super-
intendent of schools. If the property damaged is a school 
bus owned by, contracted to, or jointly owned by any parish 
or city school board, a pupil suspended for such damage shall 
not be permitted to enter or ride any school bus until payment 
in full has been made for such damage or until directed by the 
superintendent of schools. 
(2) Each city and parish school board shall adopt such 
rules and regulations as it deems necessary to implement the 
provisions of this Subsection, provided that such rules and 
regulations shall include, but not be limited to provisions 
under which: 
(a) Any teacher or other school employee may report any 
violation of the provisions of this Subsection; 
(b) Each principal who receives such report shall be 
required to review and act upon it; and 
(3) Any principal who fails to act upon such report in 
some manner shall explain his reasons for such inaction to the 
local superintendent of the school system by which he is em-
ployed or to such superintendent's designee. 
Amended by Acts 1982, No. 847, § 1; Acts 1983, No. 587, § 1. 
B. (1) Any student after being suspended for committing 
any of the offenses enumerated in this Section may be expelled, 
upon recommendation by the principal of thG public school in 
which said student is enrolled, which recommended expulsion 
shall be subject to the provisions of Subsection C hereof. 
(2) Any student after being suspended on three occasions 
for committing any of the offenses enumerated in this Section, 
during the same school year, shall on committing the fourth 
offense, be expelled from all the public schools of the parish 
or city school system wherein he resided until the beginning 
of the next regular school year, subject to the review and 
approval of the local school board. 
(3) No student who has been expelled pursuant to the 
provisions of this Section shall be admitted to any public 
school in any other parish or city school system in the state 
except upon the review and approval of the school board of the 
school system to which he seeks admittance. 
Amended by Acts 1983, No. 140, § 1. 
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Minnesota 
127.29 Grounds for dismissal 
Subdivision 1. No school shall dismiss any pupil with-
out attempting to provide alternative programs of education 
prior to dismissal proceedings, except where it appears that 
the pupil will create an immediate and substantial danger to 
himself or to persons or property around him. Such programs 
may include special tutoring, modification of the curriculum 
for the pupil, placement in a special class or assistance 
from other agencies. 
Subdivision 2. A pupil may be dismissed on the following 
grounds: 
(a) Willful violation of any reasonable school board 
regulation. Such regulation must be clear and definite to pro-
vide notice to pupils that they must conform their conduct to 
its requirements; 
(b) Willful conduct which materially and substantiall 
disrupts the rights of others to an education; 
(c) Willful conduct which endangers the pupil or other 
pupils, or the property of the school. 
Laws 1974, c. 572, § 4. Amended by Laws 1978, c. 764, § 93, 
eff. April 6, 1978. 
Montana 
20-5-201. Duties and sanctions. 
(1) Any pupil shall: 
(a) comply with the policies of the trustees and the 
rules of the school which he attends; 
(b) pursue the required course of instruction; 
(c) submit to the authority of the teachers, principal, 
and district superintendent of the district; and 
(d) be subje~t to the control and authority of the 
teachers, principal, and district superintendent while he is 
in school or on school premises, on his way to and from 
school, or during his intermission or recess. 
(2) Any pupil who continually and willfully disobeys 
the provisions of this section, shows open defiance of the 
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authority vested in school personnel by this section, defaces· 
or damages any school building, school grounds, furniture, 
equipment, book belonging to the district, or harms.or 
threatens to harm another person or his property shall be 
liable for punishment, suspension, or expulsion under the 
provisions of this title. When a pupil defaces or damages 
school property, as defined above, his parent or guardian 
shall be liable for the cost of repair or replacement upon 
the complaint of the teacher, principal, superintendent, or 
any trustee and the proof of such damage. 
(3) In addition to the sanctions prescribed in this 
section, the trustees of a high school district may deny a 
high school pupil the honor of participating in school activ-
ities. Such action shall not be taken until the incident or 
infraction causing such consideration has been investigated 
and the trustees have determined that the high school pupil 
was involved in such incident or infraction. 
History: En. 75-6310 by Sec. 123, Ch. 5, L. 1971; R.C.M. 
1947, 75-6310. 
Nebraska 
79-4,180. Student conduct constituting grounds for long-term 
suspension, expulsion, or reassignment; enumerated. 
The following student conduct shall constitute grounds 
for long-term suspension, expulsion, or mandatory reassign-
ment, subject to the procedural provisions of sections 79-4, 
170 to 79-4, 205, when such activity occurs on school grounds 
or during an educational function or event off school grounds: 
(1) Use of violence, force, coercion, threat, intimi-
dation, or similar conduct in a manner that constitutes a sub-
stantial interference with school purposes; 
(2) Willfully causing or attempting to cause sub-
stantial damage to private or school property, stealing or 
attempting to steal private or school property of substantial 
value, or repeated damage or theft involving private or 
school property of small value; 
(3) Causing or attempting to cause physical injury to 
a school employee or to any student. Physical injury caused 
by accident, self-defence, or other action undertaken on the 
reasonable belief that it was necessary to protect some other 
person shall not constitute a violation of this subdivision; 
(4) Threatening or intimidating any student for the 
purpose of, or with the intent of, obtaining money or anything 
of value from such student; 
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(5) Knowingly possessing, handling, or transmitting any 
object or material that is ordinarily or generally considered 
a weapon; 
(6) Engaging in the unlawful possession, selling, dis-
pensing, or use of a controlled substance or alcoholic liquor; 
(7) Engaging in any other activity forbidden by the 
laws of the State of Nebraska which activity constitutes a 
danger to other students or interferes with school pruporse; 
or 
(8) A repeated violation of any rules validly established 
pursuant to section 79-4, 176 if such violations constitute a 
substantial interference with school purposes. 
Source: Laws 1976, LB 503, § 11. 
New Jersey 
lBA-37-2. Causes for suspension or expulsion of pupils 
Any pupil who is guilty of continued and willful dis-
obedience, or of open defiance of the authority of any teacher 
or person having authority over him, or of the habitual use of 
profanity or of obscene language, or who shall cut, deface or 
otherwise injure any school property, shall be liable to 
punishment and to suspension or expulsion from school. 
Conduct which shall constitute good cause for suspension 
or expulsion of a pupil guilty of such conduct shall include, 
but not be limited to, any of the following: 
a. Continued and willful disobedience; 
b. Open defiance of the authority of any teacher or 
person, having authority over him; 
c. Conduct of such character as to constitute a con-
tinuing danger to the physical well-being of other pupils; 
d. Physical assault upon another pupil; 
e. Taking, or attempting to take, personal property 
or money from another pupil, or from his presence, by means 
of force or fear; 
f. Willfully causing, or attempting to cause, sub-
stantial damage to school property; 
g. Participation in an unauthorized occupancy by any 
group of pupils or others of any part of any school or other 
building owned by any school district, and failure to leave 
such school or other facility promptly after having been 
directed to do so by the principal or other person then in 
charge of such building or facility; 
h. Incitement which is intended to and does result in 
unauthorized occupation by any group of pupils or others of 
any part of a school or other facility owned by any school 
district; 
i. Incitement which is intended to and does result in 
truancy by other pupils; and 
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j, Knowing possession or knowing consumption without 
legal authority of alcoholic beverages or controlled dangerous 
substances on school premises, or being under the influence of 
intoxicatin li uor or controlled dan erous substances while 
on schoo 
Amended by L. 1969, c. 156, § 1, eff. Sept. 5, 1969; L. 1979, 
c. 189, § 1, eff. Sept. 11, 1979; L. 1981, c. 59, § 1, eff. 
March 3, 1981. 
Tennessee 
49-6-3401. Suspension of students. 
(a) Any principal or principal-teacher of any public 
school in this state is authorized to suspend a pupil from 
attendance at such school, including its sponsored activities, 
or from riding a school bus, for good and sufficient reasons. 
Good and sufficient reasons for such suspension may include, 
but shall not be limited to: 
(1) Willful and persistent violation of the rules of 
the school or truancy; 
(2) Immoral or disreputable conduct or vulgar or pro-
fance language; 
(3) Violence or threatened violence against the person 
of any personnel attending or assigned to any public school; 
(4) Willful or malicious damage to real or personal 
property of the school, or the property of any person attending 
or assigned to the school; 
(5) Inciting, advising, or counseling of others to en-
gage in any of the acts hereinbefore enumerated; 
(6) Marking, defacing or destroying school property; 
(7) Possession of a pistol, gun or firearm on school 
property; 
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(8) Possession of a knife, etc., as defined in § 39-6-1701 
on school property; 
(9) Assaulting a principal or teacher with vulgar, obscene 
or threatening language; 
(10) Unlawful use or possession of barbital or legand 
drugs, as defined in § 53-10-101; 
(11) Any other conduct prejudicial to good order or dis-
cipline in any public school. 
(b) (1) Any principal or principal-teacher may suspend 
any pupil from attendance at a specific class, classes, or 
school-sponsored activity without suspending such pupil from 
attenadance at school pursuant to an in-school suspension 
policy adopted by the local board of education. Good and 
sufficient reasons for such in-school suspension shall include, 
but not be limited to: 
(A) Behavior which adversely affects the safety and 
well-being of other pupils; 
(B) Behavior which disrupts a class or school sponsored 
activity; or 
(C) Behavior prejudicial to good order and discipline 
occurring in class, during school-sponsored activities or on 
the school campus. 
(2) In-school suspension policies shall provide that 
pupils given an in-school suspension in excess of one (1) day 
from classes shall attend either special classes attended 
only by students guilty of misconduct or be placed in an 
isolated area appropriate for study. Students given in-school 
suspension shall be required to complete academic requirements. 
Wyoming 
§ 21-4-306. Same; grounds. 
(a) The following shall be grounds for suspension or 
expulsion of a child from a public school during the school 
year: 
i) Continued willful disobedience or open defiance of 
the authority of school personnel; 
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(ii) Willful destruction or defacing of school property. 
(iii) Any behavior which in the judgment of the local 
board of trustees is clearly detrimental to the education, wel-
fare, safety or morals of other pupils; 
(iv) Torturing, tormenting, or abusing a pupil or in any 
way maltreating a pupil or a teacher with physical violence. 
(Laws 1969, ch. 111, § 62; 1977, ch. 16, § 1.) 
